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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment issued by the Honorable John Paul 
Kennedy, Third District Court, dismissing a legal malpractice action by William 
Borghetti ("Borghetti"), against Appellees Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey and 
Jeffrey S. Williams, Esq. (collectively "Bendinger Crockett"). The Utah Supreme Court 
has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
ISSUE #1: Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on the ground 
that Borghetti incurred no damages as a result of Bendinger Crockett not advising him of 
the deadline for filing a Delaware appraisal action because the "fair value" of Campus 
Pipeline at the time of the Acquisition was less than the preferred shareholders' 
$80,880,000 liquidation preference? 
Standard of Appellate Review: The Utah Supreme Court reviews a trial court's 
decision granting summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to its legal 
conclusions. See Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart 2007 UT 52, %9, 167 P.3d 1011. All 
facts and reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. See id at f2. 
Preservation of Issue: Bendinger Crockett raised and briefed this issue in their 
summary judgment memoranda. (R. 1982-2534; 4777-4882.) 
ISSUE # 2: Can summary judgment be affirmed on the alternative ground that 
Bendinger Crockett and Borghetti had no attorney-client relationship, and therefore 
Bendinger Crockett owed no duty to Borghetti regarding Delaware appraisal actions? 
1 
Standard of Appellate Review: Although the trial court did not reach this issue 
because it granted summary judgment based on Issue # 1, the Utah Supreme Court can 
affirm summary judgment on any basis appearing on the record, regardless of whether the 
trial court relied on it, see Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, Tfl8, 29 P.3d 1225, if the 
record shows that there are no disputed material facts and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. See Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 2001 UT 
App63,f23,21P.3d667. 
Preservation of Issue: Bendinger Crockett raised and briefed this issue in their 
summary judgment memoranda. (R. 1982-2534; 4777-4882.) 
ISSUE # 3: Can summary judgment be affirmed on the alternative ground that it 
is undisputed that Borghetti was advised by separate counsel of the 120-day appraisal 
filing deadline and therefore Bendinger Crockett owed no duty to so advise and caused 
no damage by failing to advise? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Same as issue # 2 above. 
Preservation of Issue: Same as issue # 2 above. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Delaware Code Annotated title 8 section 262 is of central importance to the issues 
presented and is included in the Addendum due to its length. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 
262. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of the issues 
presented and is included in the Addendum due to its length. Rule 56, Utah R. Civ. P. 
2 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence has importance to the issues presented and 
states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise." Rule 702, Utah R. Evid.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a legal malpractice case by Borghetti against Bendinger Crockett. It arises 
out of a business transaction in which System & Computer Technology, Inc. ("SCT") 
acquired Campus Pipeline, Inc. ("CPI"), a Delaware corporation, on October 23, 2002 for 
a purchase price of $42,000,000 (the "Acquisition"). (R. 2131; 2144.) Borghetti was a 
common shareholder in CPI. (R. 2140.) Preferred shareholders in CPI held a liquidation 
preference of $80,800,000 which was required to be satisfied from the proceeds of a sale 
of CPI before CPFs common shareholders would receive anything from a sale. (R. 2132.) 
Because the sale price was $42,000,000, well short of the $80,800,000 liquidation 
preference, the common shareholders' stock, including Borghetti's, was cancelled and 
they received nothing from the sale. (R. 2132.) 
Borghetti opposed the Acquisition. Under Delaware Code Annotated title 8 
section 262 ("Section 262"), any common shareholder who opposed the Acquisition 
could demand an appraisal of the value of their common shares in writing within 20 days 
1
 Bendinger does not cite Rule 702 as amended on November 1, 2007, since the 
trial court entered Summary Judgment at a time when former Rule 702 was still effective. 
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of the effective date of the Acquisition and thereafter file an appraisal action in Delaware 
court ("appraisal action") within 120 days of the same effective date to determine value. 
(R. 2122-2127.) In order for common shareholders to recover damages in such an 
appraisal action in this case, they were required to prove that the fair value of CPI as of 
the date of the Acquisition was more than the $80,800,000 liquidation preference. 
Borghetti submitted the written demand for appraisal within the 20-day deadline, 
but failed to initiate an appraisal action within the 120-day deadline. (R. 1-21; 2129.) 
Borghetti claimed Bendinger Crockett was his counsel and failed to advise him of the 
120-day deadline. (R. 19.) Among other things, Bendinger Crockett denied that it 
represented Borghetti and also claimed that Borghetti was not damaged by not filing the 
appraisal action because the undisputed evidence established that the fair value of CPI at 
the effective date of the Acquisition was far less than the liquidation preference. (R. 
1982-2534; 3221-3224; 4777-4882.) Therefore, Bendinger Crockett's alleged failure to 
advise Borghetti regarding filing an appraisal action did not cause any damages. 
The nature of this case is simple. The question is whether Borghetti was able to 
come forward with evidence showing that the fair value of CPI as of the date of the 
Acquisition was more than the $80,800,000 liquidation preference. He did not. In fact, 
his own expert, Avner Kalay, determined that the value of CPI was far less than the 
liquidation preference. This fact completely resolves this case and this appeal in favor of 
Bendinger Crockett. There is no need to conduct further inquiry into any other issue, or 
to analyze valuation methodologies as urged by Borghetti, because the failure of 
Borghetti to present any evidence of fair value in excess of the liquidation preference 
4 
ends all inquiries and requires that this Court affirm the trial court's summary judgment 
in favor of Bendinger Crockett. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
After discovery was completed, Bendinger Crockett filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Borghetti's legal malpractice claims on several grounds, including: 
(1) Borghetti never had an attorney-client relationship with 
Bendinger Crockett that would give rise to any duty to advise 
Borghetti regarding the appraisal action; 
(2) Bendinger Crockett had no duty to advise Borghetti 
regarding the 120-day deadline because another lawyer had 
already done so; and 
(3) Borghetti could not prove that missing the 120-day 
deadline proximately caused any damage because the "fair 
value" of CPI on the date of Acquisition was less than the 
$80,880,000 liquidation preference. 
(R. 1982-2534; 3221-3224; 4777-4882.) Each argument was asserted as a sufficient and 
independent basis for granting summary judgment. (R. 1982-2534.) 
Borghetti filed an opposition memorandum (R. 4608-4627), supported by an 
affidavit from his damage expert, Avner Kalay (R. 4645-4659). In addition to its reply 
memorandum (R. 4777-4882), Bendinger Crockett filed a Motion to Strike Kalay's 
affidavit because it altered his deposition testimony in an improper attempt to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the fair value of CPI. (R. 4733-4770.) 
C. Disposition in the Court Below. 
The trial court held oral argument on April 23, 2007, granted Bendinger Crockett's 
summary judgment motion (R. 5357), and entered Summary Judgment, dismissing all 
5 
Borghetti's claims against Bendinger Crockett, with prejudice and on the merits, on May 
29, 2007, on the grounds there was no genuine issue of material fact that the fair value of 
CPI as a going concern on the effective date of the Acquisition was less than the 
liquidation preference of $80,880,000. (R. 5368-5375.) Therefore, Borghetti was not 
damaged by the failure to file a Delaware appraisal because he would not have recovered 
anything for his common stock even if a Delaware appraisal action had been filed. 
Borghetti could not prove the "case-within-a-case" as required in a legal malpractice 
claim. (R. 5368-5375.) 
The trial court did not reach the attorney-client relationship argument or the other 
arguments and grounds asserted by Bendinger Crockett in support of summary judgment. 
Also, the trial court did not rule on Bendinger Crockett's Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
AvnerKalay. (R. 5368-5375.) 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts, 
(i) Borghetti's legal malpractice claims. 
Borghetti is the only Appellant who brought a claim against Bendinger Crockett, 
and his only claim is that Bendinger Crockett allegedly failed to keep appraisal rights 
open as an optional remedy for Borghetti. (R. 2107.) 
(ii) Borghetti incorporated Campus Communications, 
which became CPI. 
In June 1998, Borghetti and others incorporated Campus Communications for the 
purpose of acquiring software known as "Campus Pipeline" owned by Digital Scientific. 
(R. 2051 at pp. 112-120.) The software application provided college students, teachers, 
6 
and administrators access to email, grades, transcripts, financial aid, registration, course 
resources, and campus news. (R. 2051 at pp. 122-123.) In 1998 or 1999, after the 
technology had been purchased, Campus Communications changed its name to Campus 
Pipeline, Inc., or CPI. (R. 2051 at pp. 122-123.) 
(iii) When SCT acquired CPI, the common 
shareholders had their stock cancelled and received 
no sale proceeds. 
On September 30, 2002, the Board of Directors of CPI approved a plan for SCT to 
acquire CPI for approximately $42,000,000. (R. 2117; 2119-2120; 2131-2132.) 
Well prior to this time and pursuant to CPFs Restated Certificate of Incorporation 
and terms of issuance, CPI had issued two series of Preferred Stock, Series A and Series 
B, which were sold to preferred stockholders in the total amount of $80,880,000. The 
preferred stock held a "liquidation preference" over the interest of common stockholders, 
meaning that all preferred shares would receive priority to the proceeds of any sale of 
CPI, up to the full $80,880,000. (R. 2131-2132.) 
On October 9, 2002, CPI notified "Common Stockholders" including Borghetti 
indicating that the common shareholders would receive nothing from the Acquisition 
because of the preferred shareholders' $80,880,000 liquidation preference. (R. 2117.) 
Borghetti correctly understood that his remaining common shares would not participate 
in the $42,000,000 proceeds of the Acquisition, and that he would get nothing for his 
stock. (R. 2051 at pp. 155-156; 2117.) 
The Acquisition was approved and became effective on October 23, 2002. 
Common shareholders were so notified by letter dated October 30, 2002. (R. 2144.) 
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(iv) The undisputed evidence, including that from 
Borghetti's expert, established that the fair value of 
CPI on the date of the Acquisition was less than the 
$80,880,000 priority interest held by the preferred 
shareholders. 
On October 23, 2002, SCT purchased CPI for approximately $42,000,000. 
Borghetti held common stock in CPI but received no compensation as a result of the sale. 
(R. 2131-2132; 2140; 2144.) 
A shareholder in a Delaware company, like Borghetti, who does not believe that 
he received adequate compensation in a merger or acquisition can petition the Delaware 
court for an appraisal. (R. 2389-2390.) The Delaware Court must assume the validity of 
the acquisition, determine the "fair value" of the acquired company as a whole as of the 
date of acquisition, and if the fair value is sufficient, then award a pro rata share to the 
petitioning stockholders according to their respective percentage of shares in the 
company. (R. 2389-2390.) 
It is undisputed that at the time of the acquisition of CPI, the preferred 
stockholders held an $80,880,000 "liquidation preference" over the interest of common 
stockholders, meaning that all preferred shares would receive priority to the proceeds of 
any sale of CPI, up to the full $80,880,000. (R. 2131-2132; 2240; 2405 at p. 73.) Thus, 
Borghetti's common stock would have no value in an appraisal action unless the "fair 
value" of CPI on the effective date of the Acquisition exceeded the liquidation preference 
of $80,880,000.00. (R. 2131-2132; 2240; 2398; 2405 at p. 73.) 
The only evidence Borghetti submitted on value was from his damages expert, 
Professor Avner Kalay. Kalay never calculated a value for CPI on the effective date of 
8 
the Acquisition that exceeded the liquidation preference of $80,880,000. Kalay valued 
CPI between $63.6 million at the low end and $72.9 million at the high end at the time of 
the Acquisition. (R. 2435 at pp. 10-12, 107-109, 146.) Kalay admitted that his values are 
less than the liquidation preference and would not be enough to pay the preferred 
shareholders. (R.2435 at pp. 164, 174-176.) 
All other experts agreed that the fair value of CPI at the time of the Acquisition 
was less than the liquidation preference. Roger J. Grabowski, Bendinger Crockett's 
appraisal expert, found that the fair value was $35,000,000. (R. 2267.) Richard S. 
Hoffman, the appraisal expert for the co-defendants, found that the fair value was 
$36,280,000. (R. 2373.) Thomas Weisel Partners, the appraisal company hired by CPI, 
found that the value was between $200,000 and $58,900,000. (R. 2137.) 
Due to the $80,880,000 liquidation amount of the preferred stock, all common 
stock had effectively no value on the date of the Acquisition regardless of which expert 
appraisal is accepted, including Kalay's. (R. 2373.) 
(v) Kalay's valuation methodology. 
Bendinger Crockett does not believe it is necessary for this Court to consider 
whether Kalay's valuation methodology was reliable in order to affirm the summary 
judgment since Kalay did not find a value of CPI in excess of the liquidation preference, 
regardless of his methodology. This fact alone conclusively disposes of this case and this 
appeal in favor of Bendinger Crockett. However, in the event the Court chooses to 
address methodology, the following facts are relevant to show that Kalay's valuation 
methodology was unreliable and would not have been accepted as evidence in a 
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Delaware appraisal action and consequently Borghetti would have no evidence of fair 
value whatsoever. 
Kalay testified that at the time he generated his value calculations he had no 
familiarity or experience with the Delaware appraisal process. (R. 2435 at pp. 159, 165.) 
He acknowledged that he is not aware of the valuation methodologies recognized by the 
Delaware courts for use in a statutory appraisal action. (R. 2435 at p. 184.) 
Consistent with that lack of understanding, Kalay calculated his CPI values by 
assuming that the Acquisition was invalid - calling it a "bad act" and "not in the best 
interest of the common stockholders of Campus Pipeline" - and then calculating the 
resulting economic damages flowing from that bad act. (R. 2239; 2267; 2273; 2277-
2279; 2286; 2322; 2396-2397; 2435 at pp. 29, 164-166.) Damages flowing from a 
wrongful acquisition or bad act are irrelevant in the context of a statutory appraisal, and 
irrelevant to the acquisition date value of the stockholder's shares. (R. 2267; 2273; 2277-
2279; 2286; 2322; 2396-2397.) 
The deposition testimony of Borghetti's corporate law expert, Professor Daniel 
Greenwood, supports the notion that Kalay's damage calculations flow from a bad act. 
Greenwood testified that absent a breach of fiduciary duty, a sale for less than the 
liquidation preference would render the common stock worthless. (R. 2405 at p. 111.) 
By assuming the invalidity of the Acquisition, Kalay's value calculations do not 
yield a fair value for CPI on the date of the Acquisition as is necessary in a Delaware 
appraisal action. (R. 2267; 2273; 2276-2277; 2286; 2322; 2395-2400.) Moreover, Kalay 
stated multiple times in his report and deposition that, rather than making an independent 
10 
determination of the value of CPI as of the date of the Acquisition, he simply assumed 
that the value of CPI at the time of the Acquisition was the price that SCT paid for CPI. 
(R. 2435 at pp. 29, 167-171.) 
Further, Kalay's value calculations are premised on the assumption that the 
Acquisition never occurred (R. 2435 at p. 176; 2405 at pp. 112-113), that CPI continued 
to operate for 9 to 13 years, and that the common shareholders would pay off the 
preferred shareholders' liquidation preference during that time frame. (R. 2242; 2273; 
2435 at pp. 171-172; 2375.) It is impermissible in an appraisal action to use these 
assumptions since they alter the investment position of the shareholders and are not based 
on any actual business reality that CPI planned to implement at the time of the merger. 
Finally, Kalay employed the Black-Scholes formula to reach his CPI value 
opinions. Black-Scholes is a method "used in connection with the determination of 
option pricing or valuing options," (R. 2528 at p. 18), and it is not a business valuation 
method used in a statutory appraisal action in Delaware. (R. 2528 at p. 13.) Kalay could 
not name one instance in his entire career where he had used the Black-Scholes option 
approach to value an entire business as a going concern, as he purports to be doing in the 
instant case, as opposed to using the Black-Scholes approach for simply valuing an 
option. (R. 2435 at pp. 192-195.) 
Bendinger Crockett's appraisal expert Roger Grabowski testified in his deposition 
"that the formulation of the use of the Black-Scholes model by Dr. [Kalay], is . . . the 
wrong formulation of the use of an option pricing model in these circumstances and 
conflicts with the discussions in various texts concerning the appropriate time to use . . . 
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the Black-Scholes option pricing model for what is known as a distressed firm." (R. 2486 
at p. 16.) CPI was not a distressed firm as defined for use of the Black-Scholes 
formulation because CPI "was under operational duress, not under duress because of 
debt. The textbook definition or the textbook use of the word 'financial duress' usually 
means it is too highly levered; that is, too much debt." (R. 2486 at pp. 30-32.) 
Grabowski further testified that it is inappropriate to use the Black-Scholes 
formula to evaluate a company where the stocks and bonds are not publicly traded, as 
was the case with CPI. (R. 2486 at pp. 17, 32.) 
Notwithstanding the obvious problems with Kalay's methodology, even if the 
Court were to accept the methodology, Kalay's opinion as to CPI's value was still far less 
than the liquidation preference, thus precluding any damages. 
(vi) Bendinger Crockett was never Borghetti's lawyer. 
Borghetti first spoke with Jeffery Williams of Bendinger Crockett on or about 
November 4, 2002. (R. 2051 at p. 217.) Thereafter, they exchanged the following 
numerous written statements acknowledging and confirming that Bendinger Crockett was 
not Borghetti's lawyer. 
On November 11, 2002, Borghetti wrote an email to Williams in which he stated: 
"Thank you again for spending time with me last week. I have talked with Jeff Jones and 
we would enjoy meeting you this week." (R. 2155.) 
On November 11, 2002, at 2:21 p.m., Williams wrote an email in response to 
Borghetti expressly stating: "I understand that I have said this before, but I need to 
confirm in writing again that we do not yet represent you and have not accepted 
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representation in this matter. Moreover, from your side, it is my understanding that you 
have not yet retained counsel, and are still considering other firms." (R. 2155.) 
Twenty-six minutes later, at 2:47 p.m., Borghetti responded to Williams' email, 
confirming that Borghetti was still in the process of interviewing other lawyers: "We 
have spent time, as I communicated to you in our meeting together, interviewing 
counselors and various firms. We have narrowed our list down considerably and will be 
prepared to make a decision soon. An in-person meeting would be helpful for me and 
Jeff Jones as part of this process." (R. 2155.) 
On November 19, 2002, Borghetti met with Williams. Williams' notes from this 
meeting include notations that Borghetti still had not hired a lawyer. (R. 2153.) 
On December 4, 2002, Williams wrote an email to Borghetti regarding "Potential 
Contingency Matter" stating that Bendinger Crockett had still not made a decision 
whether to be involved in the case. (Unnumbered page between R. 2158-2159.) 
On December 29, 2002, at 4:46 p.m., Borghetti wrote an email to Williams that 
confirmed that Borghetti did not have an attorney-client relationship with Bendinger 
Crockett, stating: "Just so you know, we have narrowed down our list of potential firms 
considerably." (R.2157.) 
Bendinger Crockett made it clear to Borghetti early on that they were not going to 
represent Borghetti unless there were "big damages" to Borghetti as a result of the 
Acquisition. (R. 2051 at p. 232.) Bendinger Crockett also told Borghetti in November 
2002 that they were not interested in being involved in an appraisal action (R. 2153) and 
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were only interested in investigating the potential of representing Borghetti against CPI, 
SCT, and the officers and directors for potential fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. 
Accordingly, in January, February, and March of 2003, there were various emails 
between Borghetti, Bendinger Crockett, and damages consultant Tucker Alan Inc. as part 
of Bendinger Crockett's investigation into whether there were sufficient damages to 
make it worthwhile to represent Borghetti. (R. 2211 -2226.) 
In an April 4, 2003 telephone conversation, Tucker Alan reported to Bendinger 
Crockett that it could not find a value of CPI above $42,000,000, which was far below 
the liquidation preference. (R. 2228 at pp. 211-212, 219-220.) Consequently, on April 
15, 2003, Williams wrote a letter to Borghetti informing him that Bendinger Crockett 
would not take the case and represent him. (R. 2160.) Borghetti responded on July 1, 
2003, not by claiming that Bendinger Crockett and Williams were or ever had been his 
lawyers, but by stating: "I am still trying to obtain counsel. . . ." (R. 2161.) 
Borghetti admitted there was nothing in writing from Bendinger Crockett which 
expressly or impliedly stated that they were his lawyers: "Q. . . . Did you ever in an e-
mail or a letter, on a napkin, in anyway say, 'Jeff, you're wrong. You are my lawyer'? A. 
I don't believe I put that in writing." (R. 2051 at pp. 235-236.) 
At no time did Bendinger Crockett and Borghetti (a) enter into a written fee 
agreement, (b) enter into a written agreement as to what the scope of representation 
would be, or (c) agree to the terms of representation. (R. 2051 at pp. 174-175.) 
Bendinger Crockett never billed Borghetti for any legal services, and Borghetti never 
paid Bendinger Crockett for any legal services. (R. 2051 at pp. 174, 246-247.) 
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Borghetti never specifically discussed with anyone from Bendinger Crockett a 
contingency fee agreement on an appraisal case (R. 2051 at pp. 195-196), and Borghetti 
regularly told Bendinger Crockett that he was meeting with other law firms. (R. 2051 at 
p. 173.) 
(vii) Even before he met with Bendinger Crockett, 
Borghetti knew that there was a 120-day deadline 
to file an appraisal action. 
On October 9, 2002, CPI sent, and Borghetti received, a second letter to all 
stockholders with an attached Consent Solicitation Statement. (R. 2119-2120; 2131-
2142; 2051 at p. 165.) Borghetti read the Consent Solicitation Statement. (R. 2051 at pp. 
165, 178-179.) Borghetti also received and reviewed a copy of Section 262 which was 
attached to the Consent Solicitation Statement. (R. 2051 at pp. 165, 180-182; 2122-
2127.) Section 262 describes the stockholders' appraisal rights and states that those 
rights must be perfected by filing a petition for appraisal within 120 days of the effective 
date of the Acquisition. (R. 2122-2127.) 
On October 11, 2002, Borghetti conferred with attorney John Parsons to discuss 
the fast-approaching Acquisition. (R. 2177-2178.) As part of their discussion, Borghetti 
retained Parsons as Borghetti's lawyer to review Section 262 regarding appraisal rights, 
and Parsons informed Borghetti of the "critical" deadlines for preserving an appraisal. 
(R. 2181 at pp. 34, 40-41, 46-47.) Parsons and Borghetti specifically discussed strategy 
for preserving Borghetti's appraisal rights. (R. 2181 at p. 40.) 
Parsons' billing records for the October 11, 2002 session confirm that Parsons 
reviewed the "critical deadlines," and that Parsons had two telephone calls with Borghetti 
15 
totaling one hour and 20 minutes regarding appraisal rights. (R. 2177-2178.) On 
October 14, 2002, Borghetti again spoke with Parsons to discuss appraisal rights. The 
billing entry for October 14, 2002 reads: "Final review of Delaware appraisal rights 
statutory procedures; telecom from and to W. Borghetti discuss/analyze/strategize 
appraisal rights procedures and analyze damages issues (39 mins); meeting with D. 
Scofield analyze shareholder rights of recovery in appraisal demand." (R. 2179; 2181 at 
p. 41.) 
Consistent with his billing records, Parsons acknowledged during his deposition 
that he had a duty to inform Borghetti of the 120-day deadline for filing an appraisal 
petition in Delaware and that he therefore would have informed Borghetti of the same. 
(R. 2181 at p. 47.) 
On October 30, 2002, CPI sent correspondence to Borghetti explaining that the 
Acquisition had been approved and that the "effective date of the Merger was 
Wednesday, October 23, 2002." (R. 2144-2145.) Borghetti received and read the 
October 30, 2002 correspondence, including the part that informed Borghetti of his 
appraisal rights under Delaware law, and also read the attached copy of Section 262, 
which again reminded Borghetti to demand appraisal and to file an action "[wjithin 120 
days" to preserve appraisal rights. (R. 2051 at pp. 182-186, 189-190, 193; 2122-2127; 
2144-2145.) 
On November 11, 2002, Borghetti wrote a letter to Williams providing some 
factual background relating to the Acquisition in which Borghetti stated that Borghetti 
was aware of his appraisal rights. (R. 2147-2151.) 
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Borghetti demonstrated his understanding of the appraisal rights procedures and 
Section 262 when he submitted a timely letter to the Executive Vice President and 
Secretary for CPI demanding appraisal on November 18, 2002, stating that: "Consistent 
with Section §262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), I hereby demand 
appraisal for my shares of Campus Pipeline, Inc." (R. 2129.) 
Prior to sending the demand letter, Borghetti asked for and received legal advice 
from attorney John Parsons with regard to the letter, including asking Parsons to advise 
him to whom the letter should be sent. Parson's November 18, 2002 billing entry reads 
as follows: "Receive email from W. Borghetti regarding appraisal rights with respect to 
CPI merger; review Delaware appraisal rights statute and reply email to WB regarding 
assertion of appraisal rights." (R. 2179; 2203-2204.) 
Also, Judge Bruce Lubeck found in his Ruling on motions to dismiss that "[t]he 
Consent Solicitation advised plaintiffs of their appraisal rights under Delaware law." (R. 
2171-2172.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Borghetti's claims of legal malpractice fail as a matter of law for several reasons. 
1. The fundamental, straightforward reason for granting summary judgment 
which the trial court understandably accepted as controlling, is that the undisputed 
material facts established that the fair value of CPI, at the effective date of its Acquisition 
by SCT, was less than the $80,880,000 liquidation preference. (R. 2137; 2267; 2373; 
2435 at pp. 10-12, 107-109, 146, 164, 174-176.) The highest value derived for CPI as of 
the relevant date by Borghetti's own expert, Avner Kalay, was only $72,900,000, far less 
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than $80,880,000. (R. 2435 at pp. 10-12, 107-109, 146, 164, 174-176.) In order to 
recover damages in a Delaware appraisal action, Borghetti had to be able to establish that 
the fair value of CPI was greater than $80,880,000, which he did not. (R. 2131-2132; 
2240; 2398; 2405 at p. 73.) Thus, Bendinger Crockett's alleged failure to advise 
regarding the filing of a Delaware appraisal action did not cause any damage as Borghetti 
would have recovered nothing in such an action, in any event. This is a complete bar to 
all Borghetti's claims against Bendinger Crockett, and this Court should affirm on this 
ground alone. 
The fact that Kalay's own calculations do not exceed the liquidation preference 
resolves this case and this appeal in favor of Bendinger Crockett. There is no need to 
conduct further inquiry into any other issue, or to analyze valuation methodologies as 
urged by Borghetti, because the failure of Borghetti to present any evidence of fair value 
in excess of the liquidation preference ends all inquiries and requires that this Court 
affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Bendinger Crockett. 
Bendinger Crockett does not believe that it is necessary to point out the 
deficiencies in the methodology used by Kalay since Kalay's highest calculations, 
regardless of methodology, do not exceed the liquidation preference. In the event this 
Court nonetheless addresses methodology, Bendinger Crockett also shows below that 
Kalay's valuation methodology is flawed and would not be accepted in an appraisal 
action. Rejection of Kalay's methodology leaves Borghetti with no evidence whatsoever 
of CPI's fair value, thus providing another basis for affirming summary judgment. 
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There are two other alternative grounds which the trial court was not required to 
decide, but upon which this Court may also affirm summary judgment. Bendinger 
Crockett will also explain those as part of its brief. 
2. Borghetti cannot prove the existence of an attorney-client relationship, 
which is a prerequisite to a legal malpractice claim. Bendinger Crockett and Borghetti 
expressly confirmed in writing multiple times that there was no such relationship. (R. 
2153-2159.) Because there was no attorney-client relationship, Bendinger Crockett did 
not have a duty to advise Borghetti of the 120-day appraisal action deadline. 
3. Even assuming that an attorney-client relationship existed, Borghetti's legal 
malpractice claim fails because before he ever met with Bendinger Crockett, Borghetti 
had retained attorney John Parsons to advise him of the critical appraisal deadlines, and 
Borghetti had also been notified multiple times of the deadlines in the documents sent to 
him by CPI. (R. 2051 at pp. 165, 178-193; 2119-2120; 2122-2127; 2129; 2131-2142; 
2144-2145; 2171-2172; 2177-1279; 2181 at pp. 34, 40-41, 46-47; 2203-2204.) 
Bendinger Crockett, therefore, had no duty to advise Borghetti about the 120-day 
deadline of which he was clearly already aware, and a lawyer's failure to advise a party 
about something he already knows cannot be the proximate cause of damage. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE FAIR VALUE OF CPI ON THE DATE OF THE ACQUISITION 
WAS LESS THAN THE $80,880,000 LIQUIDATION PREFERENCE 
AND THEREFORE BORGHETTI WAS NOT DAMAGED BY HIS 
FAILURE TO FILE A DELAWARE APPRAISAL ACTION. 
Borghetti's sole claim for malpractice relates to missing the 120 day deadline for 
filing an appraisal action in Delaware court. But Borghetti cannot prove his "case-
within-the-case" against Bendinger Crockett - i.e., that he would have been successful 
in an appraisal action had one been filed ~ because the value of CPI on the date of the 
Acquisition, even according to his own expert, was less than the $80,880,000 priority 
interest held by preferred shareholders. (R. 2435 at pp. 10-12, 107-109, 146, 164, 174-
176.) Therefore, Borghetti cannot prove that the alleged failure to advise or preserve 
appraisal rights caused him any damage and his legal malpractice claims fail as a matter 
of law. 
A. Borghetti must prove the "case-within-the-case." 
To prevail in a legal malpractice action a plaintiff must plead and prove a causal 
connection between the breach of duty and the resulting injury to the client. See Harline 
v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). To show the necessary causal connection 
element, Borghetti must prove the "case-within-the-case," that is, that he would have 
prevailed in the underlying appraisal action had one been filed. See id. at 439-40. If 
Borghetti would not have recovered damages in an appraisal action, his malpractice claim 
against Bendinger Crockett fails as a matter of law: "Lack of any damages and direct 
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causation is fatal to [any] malpractice claim." Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 28 (internal citation omitted, bracketed insert in original). 
Whether Borghetti can prove the proximate cause element, i.e., the "case-within-
the-case," is an issue that can be decided on summary judgment as a matter of law when 
"the facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about the underlying 
facts or about the application of a legal standard to the facts." Harline, 912 P.2d at 439. 
B. Delaware appraisal actions generally. 
1. Purpose of Section 262. 
Section 262 provides a procedure for obtaining a judicial determination of the fair 
value of shareholdings in an acquired Delaware company. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 
262. The appraisal proceeding is "intended to provide shareholders dissenting from a 
merger on grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial determination of 
the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their shareholdings." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988) (Technicolor "I"). Because CPI was a Delaware 
corporation, any shareholder - including Borghetti - who felt aggrieved by the 
Acquisition had the right to file a petition for appraisal to determine the value of his or 
her shares, and then obtain a judgment for the fair value of the stock. See generally, Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262. 
2. To determine the fair value of shareholdings, the 
entire company must first be valued as a going 
concern. 
The only litigable issue in a Delaware appraisal action is the fair value of the 
dissenting stockholder's shares in the company on the date of the merger. Cede & Co. v. 
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Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 296 (Del. 1996) (Technicolor "IV") (citing Technicolor 
"I", 542 A.2d at 1187). "Fair value is, by now, a jurisprudential concept that draws more 
from judicial writings than from the appraisal statute itself." Del. Open MRI Radiology 
Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 310 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
Delaware law requires that the fair value of an individual's shares is determined 
by first valuing the company as a whole as a going concern as of the date of the merger, 
and then calculating the shareholder's proportionate interest in the total value according 
to their number of shares, rather than attempting to value the individual shareholdings. 
See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) ("the dissenting 
shareholder's proportionate interest is determined only after the company as an entity has 
been valued."); Technicolor "IV", 684 A.2d at 298 ("[T]he Court of Chancery's task in 
an appraisal proceeding is to value what has been taken from the shareholder, i.e., the 
proportionate interest in the going concern.... Thus the company must first be valued as 
an operating entity."); LeBeau v. M.G. Corp., Inc.. 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, 23 ("It is a 
well-established principle of Delaware law that the objective of a section 262 appraisal is 
to value the corporation itself, as distinguished from a fraction of its shares as they may 
exist in the hands of a particular shareholder . . . .") (emphasis in original and internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted); Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 2007 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 126, 19-20 ("In a section 262 appraisal proceeding, the court must 
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determine the fair value of 100% of the corporation [and award] the dissenting 
stockholder his proportionate share of that value") (quotation and citations omitted).2 
3. The merger is assumed to be valid. 
The court conducting the appraisal is required to assume the validity of the merger 
and to simply value the dissenters' equity ownership. Inquiries into corporate 
wrongdoing, such as whether the Acquisition was valid, or whether the sale was in the 
best interests of the shareholders are irrelevant. Economic damages flowing from 
corporate wrongdoing in connection with an Acquisition are irrelevant in the context of a 
statutory appraisal. See Technicolor "I", 542 A.2d at 1189. 
4. The company is valued based on the "operative reality." 
The fair value of the going concern includes future business prospects of the 
company that are subject to proof at the time of the merger. But elements of future value 
2
 The factors to consider to determine the going concern's fair value are 
pronounced in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.. 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983): 
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the 
stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, 
viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern. By value of the 
stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the 
true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In 
determining what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser 
and the courts must take into consideration all factors and elements which 
reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset 
value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any 
other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date 
of merger and which throw any light on future prospects of the merged 
corporation are not only pertinent to an inquiry as to the value of the 
dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered by the agency 
fixing the value. 
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that are speculative and not subject to proof cannot be considered. See Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). In other words, the court must consider the 
"operative reality" of the company when making its fair value determination. See 
Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Inc. v. Doblen 880 A.2d 206, 222 (Del. 2005). 
Similarly, the court must further assume that "the dissenting shareholders would be 
willing to maintain their investment position had the merger not occurred." Technicolor 
"IV", 684 A.2d at 298. 
C. Based on these principles of Delaware law, Borghetti would not 
have prevailed in an appraisal action because he has no evidence 
establishing a value of CPI on the effective date of the Acquisition 
in excess of the liquidation preference. 
Borghetti would be entitled to an appraisal award only if the fair value of the 
company on the effective date of the Acquisition (October 23, 2002) were to exceed 
$80,880,000.00, which is the sum of the liquidation preference held by preferred 
shareholders on that date. Borghetti has the burden of proving this fair value as part of 
his prima facie "case-within-a-case" against Bendinger Crockett. He has failed to meet 
this burden, for at least the following reasons. 
1. BorghettFs own damages expert, Professor Avner 
Kalay, arrives at a value of CPI between $63,600,000 
at the low end and $72,900,000 at the high end, both 
less than the $80,880,00 liquidation preference. 
Borghetti would not have recovered anything had he filed a Delaware appraisal 
action, even using his own expert's calculations. Kalay used the Black-Scholes method 
and calculated a value for CPI of between $63,600,000 and $72,900,000. (R. 2235-2255; 
2435 at pp. 10-12, 107-109, 146.) It is undisputed that the preferred shareholders of CPI 
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held an $80,880,000 liquidation preference on the date of the merger. (R. 2131-2132; 
2240; 2405 at p. 73.) If the company sold for Kalay's highest figure of $72,900,000, only 
the preferred shareholders would realize any value. Because of the $80,880,000 
liquidation preference, there would be nothing left to divide among the common 
stockholders like Borghetti. (R. 2131-2132; 2240; 2398; 2405 at p. 73.) Using Kalay's 
numbers, Borghetti's proportionate interest in CPI on the date of the merger was zero. 
The simple fact that $72,900,000 is less than $80,880,000 means that Borghetti's 
common shares in CPI had no "fair value." Kalay's value opinions are fatal to the claim 
that the loss of appraisal rights was the proximate cause of any damage. 
The record is devoid of any evidence that places the fair value of CPI as a going 
concern on the date of the merger above the liquidation preference. Like Kalay, every 
other expert in this case concludes that the value of CPI was less than the liquidation 
preference. According to the expert report of Roger J. Grabowski, Bendinger Crockett's 
appraisal expert, the fair value of CPI, as of the date of the Acquisition in October 2002, 
was only $35,000,000. (R. 2267.) According to the report of Richard S. Hoffman, the 
expert for the other defendants, the fair value of CPI as of the date of the Acquisition was 
only $36,280,000. (R. 2373.) Finally, according to the report of Thomas Weisel 
Partners, the company hired by CPI to determine its value before the Acquisition, the 
value of CPI was between $200,000 and $58,900,000. (R. 2137.) 
Thus, all experts, including Kalay, share the opinion that the value of CPI was less 
than the liquidation preference. Due to the $80,880,000 liquidation value of the preferred 
stock, all common stock including Borghetti's had effectively no value on the date of 
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Acquisition, regardless of which expert's appraisal is accepted. Therefore, Borghetti 
would not have recovered anything in a Delaware appraisal action and Borghetti can not 
prove the "case-within-the-case" as a matter of law. 
In an attempt to remedy this fatal weakness in his case, Borghetti attempted to 
oppose Bendinger Crockett's summary judgment motion by modifying Kalay's written 
opinions and deposition testimony via a supplemental affidavit, which stated that Kalay's 
calculations generated a "fair value" of Borghetti's shares as of the time of the 
Acquisition of between "$4.2 million and $6,706 million." (R. 4648.) This affidavit does 
not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Borghetti would have prevailed 
in an appraisal action. 
First, the conclusion lacks foundation. As stated above, the Delaware court must 
first value the entity as a whole to determine what a particular shareholder's fractional 
interest may be. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996); LeBeau v. M.G. Corp.. 
Inc., 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, 23; Highfields Capital Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc.. 2007 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 126, 19-20. Given the $80,880,000 liquidation preference, if Borghetti owned 
8.8% of the common stock at the time of the Acquisition (R. 2140), and if the "fair 
value" of Borghetti's shares as of the time of the Acquisition was "$4.2 million and 
$6,706 million" as stated by Kalay in his supplemental affidavit (R. 4648), then the fair 
value of CPI as a whole would need to be between $128,000,000 and $157,000,000. 
However, Kalay did not find these values with respect to CPI on the date of the 
3
 This percentage also includes Borghetti's affiliates. 
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Acquisition. (R. 2435 at pp. 10-12, 107-109, 146.) Therefore, there is no foundation for 
the conclusory assertion in Kalay's supplemental affidavit that the "fair value" of 
Borghetti's shares as of the time of the Acquisition was "$4.2 million and $6,706 
million." 
Next, the affidavit fails to create a genuine issue of material fact because this 
Court has long held that when a party takes a clear position in a deposition, which is not 
modified on cross-examination, "he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own 
affidavit which contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation of the 
discrepancy." Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983); see also Harnicher 
v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998); Hackman v. Valley Fair. 932 F.2d 
239, 241 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Kalay's supplemental affidavit directly contradicts his expert report and 
deposition. Specifically, Paragraph 27 of the Kalay affidavit should not be considered 
because, contrary to his deposition and report, Kalay claims to have offered "fair value" 
calculations under the Delaware statute. (R. 4651.) Kalay testified that he had no 
experience or familiarity with the Delaware appraisal process when he reached his value 
calculations. (R. 2435 at pp. 159, 165, 184.) To the extent that paragraph 27, or in any 
other paragraph in the supplemental affidavit states that Kalay performed a fair value 
calculation of CPI, those paragraphs should not be considered. 
Further, in paragraphs 14 and 28 of the affidavit, Kalay states that the "fair value" 
of Borghetti's shares as of the time of the Acquisition was between "$4.2 million and 
$6,706 million." (R. 4648; 4651-4652.) However, Kalay testified that the highest values 
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that he could find for CPI were $63,600,000 to $72,900,000. (R. 2435 at pp. 10-12, 107-
109, 146). To the extent that the reference to "$4.2 million and $6,706 million" in 
paragraphs 14 and 28 is meant to imply that Kalay reached a corporate value in excess of 
$72,900,000, they should not be considered since they are directly contrary to Kalay's 
deposition testimony. 
Further, Kalay states in paragraph 13 of the affidavit that he once determined that 
the value of CPI was "$73.7 million to $83.2 million." (R. 4648.) He then admits in 
paragraph 14 that he modified his opinions, but neglects to inform the reader that the 
modification was the result of a mathematical error noted by expert Richard Hoffman and 
which resulted in a reduction of Kalay's value range to $63,600,000 at the low end and 
$72,900,000 at the high end, both well below the liquidation preference. (R. 2435 at pp. 
10-12.) Kalay clearly testified in his deposition that "$73.7 million to $83.2 million" is 
no longer his opinion on value, and that $63,600,000 to $72,900,000 is his adjusted 
range. (R. 2435 at pp. 10-12, 107-109, 146.) To the extent that Borghetti intends for the 
Kalay affidavit to imply that the value of CPI was "$73.7 million to $83.2 million," 
paragraph 13 should not be considered because Kalay clearly testified to the contrary. 
In summary, Borghetti cannot prove "the case within the case" because Borghetti 
would not have prevailed in a Delaware appraisal action had one been filed where the fair 
value of CPI on the date of the Acquisition was less than the $80,880,000 liquidation 
preference. Kalay's belated supplemental affidavit does not change this result since it 
lacks foundation and contradicts his deposition testimony. 
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2. In the alternative, Kalay's value calculations should be 
rejected because they are based on improper 
assumptions and methodology. 
Bendinger Crockett does not believe that this Court needs to address whether 
Kalay's reliance on the Black-Scholes method or other valuation assumptions were 
appropriate. The dispositive question is whether Borghetti was able to come forward 
with evidence showing that the fair value of CPI as of the date of the Acquisition was 
more than the $80,800,000 liquidation preference. He did not, and therefore there is no 
need to conduct further inquiry into valuation methodologies because the failure of 
Borghetti to present any evidence of fair value in excess of the liquidation preference, 
regardless of methodology, ends all inquiries and requires that this Court affirm the trial 
court's summary judgment in favor of Bendinger Crockett. 
However, in the alternative, if this Court chooses to address methodology, 
Bendinger Crockett submits that the valuation methodology and assumptions relied on by 
Kalay to reach his opinions are unreliable and invalid, and therefore should be rejected 
entirely by the Court. If this Court does so, then Borghetti has no evidence of fair value 
whatsoever. Although the trial court never reached this issue, the problems with Kalay's 
methodology are a separate and independent basis on which to affirm summary judgment 
in favor of Bendinger Crockett. 
The first problem with Kalay's methodology is that his value calculations 
impermissibly rely on the assumption that the Acquisition was wrongful. Kalay was not 
asked by Borghetti to, nor did Kalay perform or intend to perform, any analysis of the fair 
value of CPI on the date of the Acquisition. (R. 2273.) Kalay was not even familiar with 
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the standards for Delaware appraisal valuations when he reached his value opinions. (R. 
2435 at pp. 159, 165, 184.) Instead, Kalay measured economic damages resulting from 
alleged corporate wrongdoing by individuals who approved the Acquisition. Kalay found 
that the Acquisition transaction was a "bad act" that was not in the "best interests" of the 
shareholders, and he then calculated the damages arising out of that "bad act" and 
equated those damages with the value of CPI.4 (R. 2239; 2267; 2273; 2277-2279; 2286; 
2322; 2396-2397; 2435 at pp. 29, 164-166.) As set forth above, damages arising out of 
the wrongful nature of the Acquisition are irrelevant to the fair value of CPI under 
Delaware law.5 
The second problem with Kalay's methodology is that he employed the Black-
Scholes option pricing method to reach his value for CPI. Black-Scholes is not a valid 
valuation methodology in Delaware appraisal actions. (R. 2528 at p. 13.) There is no 
evidence that the Black-Scholes method has ever been recognized in the financial 
community as a method that yields a fair value of a going concern, which is the issue in a 
Delaware appraisal proceeding. Even Kalay admitted that he cannot name a single 
instance where he has used Black-Scholes to value a company like CPI (R. 2435 at pp. 
4
 Paragraph 27 of Kalay's supplemental affidavit states that the "bad act" of CPI, 
i.e., breaching fiduciary duties by freezing out the minority shareholders, was irrelevant 
to his valuation of CPI. (R. 4651.) This should not be considered by the Court because it 
is directly contrary to his deposition testimony in which he states that his opinions, 
analysis and calculations were all based on the wrongful sale of CPI, which he refers to 
as the "bad act." (R. 2435 at pp. 29, 164-166.) 
5
 Damages flowing from bad acts, if any, could be relevant to the claims against 
the corporate Appellees. They are irrelevant, however, in the context of an appraisal 
action, which is the only damages issue relevant to Bendinger Crockett in this appeal. 
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192-195), and he admitted further that he does not know the proper valuation methods for 
Delaware appraisal actions. (R. 2435 at pp. 159, 165, 184.) Black-Scholes has valid 
uses, but it cannot and does not generate a fair value of CPI, which is the dispositive issue 
in a Delaware appraisal action. Therefore, it would not be accepted under Delaware law, 
nor would it pass the test for novel scientific evidence under Utah law set forth in State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1996).6 
The third problem with Kalay's methodology is that he made assumptions that are 
prohibited by law in Delaware appraisal actions. By assuming that CPI was not sold and 
that it continues to operate for 9 to 13 years during which time the common shareholders 
gradually pay off the liquidation preference, Borghetti improperly ignores the operative 
reality of CPI as of the date of the merger. (R. 2242; 2273; 2375; 2405 at pp. 112-113; 
2435 at pp. 171-172, 176.) There was an $80,880,000 liquidation preference on that date 
and there is no evidence that a pay-off was a business reality at the time of the merger. 
6
 The following three elements must be satisfied under the Rimmasch test: (1) the 
scientific principles and techniques must be shown to be "inherently reliable"; (2) the 
scientific principles and techniques must have been properly applied to the facts by 
qualified experts; and (3) the scientific evidence must be more probative than prejudicial. 
See State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996) (quoting Rule 702, Utah Rules of 
Evidence). 
On November 1, 2007, Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence regarding the 
admissibility of expert opinions was amended, which may affect the application of the 
Rimmasch test. Rule 702, Utah R. Evid. (2007). However, the trial court entered 
Summary Judgment at a time when former Rule 702 was still effective. Since this Court 
reviews the trial court's decision for correctness, it should rely on old Rule 702 and 
Rimmasch on this appeal as that was the rule in effect at the time the trial court reached 
its decision. However, even if new Rule 702 did apply, the result would be the same 
since there continues to be a requirement that the scientific method be both reliable and 
reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
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By assuming a scenario in which the common shareholders eliminate the liquidation 
preference through a pay-off, Borghetti engages in pure speculation and has destroyed the 
operative reality to be appraised. Also, by assuming that the common shareholders 
would pay off the preferred shareholders, Kalay assumes a substantial change in 
Borghetti's investment position contrary to the Delaware case law cited above. 
Point II 
BORGHETTI CANNOT SUE BENDINGER CROCKETT FOR 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE BECAUSE THEY NEVER HAD AN 
ATTORNEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
It is well established that the existence of "an attorney-client relationship is an 
indispensable element of a cause of action for legal malpractice." Bennett v. Jones, 
Waldo. Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, f l3 , 70 P.3d 17. The existence of an 
attorney-client relationship can be either express or implied. As set forth below, there 
was neither an express nor an implied attorney-client relationship between Borghetti and 
Bendinger Crockett, so Borghetti's malpractice claims fail as a matter of law. 
A. Borghetti admits that there was never any express attorney-client 
relationship with Bendinger Crockett. 
It is undisputed that Borghetti and Bendinger Crockett never entered into any 
express attorney-client relationship. Borghetti admitted, and it is otherwise clear from his 
deposition testimony that there was never any written or verbal agreement that Bendinger 
Crockett would represent him in an appraisal action, or in any other matter. 
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B. Borghetti never had an implied attorney-client relationship with 
Bendinger Crockett. 
To the extent Borghetti is asserting an implied attorney-client relationship, that 
claim must fail as a matter of law because Borghetti could not have reasonably believed 
that Bendinger Crockett was his counsel based on the undisputed facts in the record. 
This Court held in Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding. 2001 UT 107, [^40, 37 
P.3d 1130,, that "the proper determination of whether an implied attorney-client 
relationship exists hinges on whether the party had a reasonable belief that it was 
represented." In making that determination, "a court looks at the totality of the 
circumstances." Id. at Tf 49. In order for a person to "reasonably believe" that an attorney 
represents the person, "(1) the person must subjectively believe the attorney represents 
him or her and (2) this subjective belief must be reasonable under the circumstances." 
Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, fK), 54 P.3d 1119. 
Borghetti could not have subjectively believed that Bendinger Crockett was his 
lawyer. He was told in writing that Bendinger Crockett did not represent him, and 
Borghetti confirmed that fact in writing, stating that he had not yet made any hiring 
decisions. (R. 2155-2159.) It is therefore clear that Borghetti subjectively believed that 
Bendinger Crockett and Williams were not his lawyers. Therefore, under Roderick and 
Kilpatrick, there was never any implied attorney-client relationship as there was no true 
subjective belief of representation, and Borghetti's malpractice claims should therefore 
be dismissed as a matter of law on summary judgment. 
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Even assuming that Borghetti subjectively believed that Bendinger Crockett was 
his counsel for advising regarding his appraisal rights, his malpractice claim still fails as a 
matter of law because such belief was not reasonable under the circumstances. He 
claimed during his deposition that he and Williams entered into an attorney-client 
relationship "almost immediately after we met," which meeting he testified occurred 
about November 4, 2002. (R. 2051 at pp. 170, 217.) Yet, the parties exchanged 
numerous written communications subsequent to November 4, 2002 acknowledging and 
confirming that Williams was not Borghetti's lawyer, as follows: 
* On November 11, 2002, Williams wrote Borghetti an email stating: "we 
do not represent you and have not accepted representation in this matter." 
(R.2155.) 
* Also on November 11, 2002, Williams wrote: "moreover, from your side, it 
is my understanding that you have not yet retained counsel, and are still 
considering other firms." (R. 2155.) 
* Borghetti responded 26 minutes later by email, stating: "We have narrowed 
our list down considerably and will be prepared to make a decision soon." 
(R.2155.) 
* On December 4, 2002, Williams wrote Borghetti an email stating that he 
had not yet agreed to be involved in the case: "I believe that I should be in 
a position to discuss this case (including a conclusion regarding whether 
the firm is prepared to go forward on a contingency basis, or be involved 
in the case) by sometime next week." (Unnumbered document between R. 
2158-2159.) 
* On December 29, 2002, Borghetti continued to acknowledge in writing that 
he was still narrowing down the list of potential firms: "Just so you know, 
we have narrowed down our list of potential firms considerably." (R. 
2157.) 
It is unreasonable, as a matter of law, for Borghetti to claim that he subjectively 
believed that Williams was his attorney during this time in light of the several written 
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statements in which the parties confirm that Bendinger Crockett was not Borghetti's 
lawyer. 
All other evidence confirms the written disclaimers and defies any reasonable 
belief of representation. For instance, it is undisputed that: 
* Borghetti never agreed with Bendinger Crockett on the scope and terms of 
representation. (R. 2051 at pp. 174-175.)1 
* Bendinger Crockett never billed Borghetti and was never paid for any 
services. (R. 2051 at pp. 174-175.) 
* Borghetti regularly met with other law firms to decide who he should hire. 
(R.2051 at p. 173; 2155-2159.) 
* Borghetti in fact had an express attorney-client relationship with and 
received advice relating to appraisal rights and deadlines from attorney 
John Parsons. Borghetti was billed for these legal services and paid the 
bills. (R. 2177-2179; 2181 at pp. 34, 40-41, 46-47; 2203-2204.) 
* Bendinger Crockett would not allow Borghetti to see their research. (R. 
2206 at pp. 115-116.) 
* At no time did Borghetti ever dispute in writing the November 11, 2002 
email where Jeff Williams said that Bendinger Crockett did not represent 
Borghetti. (R. 2051 at pp. 235-236.) 
* Borghetti admits that there was never anything in writing from Bendinger 
Crockett to him which either expressly or impliedly stated that they were 
his lawyers. (R. 2051 at pp. 236-236.) 
* Borghetti never specifically discussed with anyone from Bendinger 
Crockett a contingency fee agreement on an appraisal case. (R. 2051 at pp. 
174, 195-196.) 
* Borghetti has no idea how a contingency fee would work on an appraisal. 
(R.2051 at pp. 174, 195-196.) 
"An implied agreement needs to contain all the terms of an express agreement." 
Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice, 2005 Ed, § 8.3, pp. 928-929. 
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* There is a total absence in the record of any verbal or written request or 
agreement that Bendinger would advise Borghetti regarding appraisal rights 
deadlines. 
These undisputed facts, and the numerous express writings confirming no 
attorney-client relationship, show that Borghetti could not have reasonably believed that 
Bendinger Crockett represented him and had a duty to advise him regarding appraisal 
rights. At best, Borghetti had an unreasonable, subjective, and unilateral belief that 
Bendinger Crockett represented him. As the court stated in Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. 
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990), such unilateral belief is insufficient: "[a]n 
attorney-client relationship cannot be created unilaterally in the mind of a would-be 
client; a reasonable belief is required." (Quotations and citations omitted.) 
C. Whether an attorney-client relationship existed is a pure question of 
law under the undisputed facts of the case. 
Where the underlying facts are not subject to dispute, the question of whether an 
attorney-client relationship exists is a question of law: "Whether a given set of facts 
creates an attorney-client relationship typically presents an issue of law for the court. . . 
»7 
7
 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice, 2005 Ed., § 8.3, p. 926; see also Banc One 
Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187 (5th Cir. 1995) (deciding no attorney-
client relationship existed as a matter of law on summary judgment); First Nat' 1 Bank v. 
Lane & Douglass, 961 F. Supp. 153, 155 (D. Tex. 1997); Williams v. Fortson. 441 S.E.2d 
686 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Moore v. Harris, 372 S.E.2d 654, 655 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); 
Carmichael v. Barham, Bennett, Miller & Stone, 370 S.E.2d 639, 640 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1988). 
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The most compelling of the undisputed facts discussed above establishing the lack 
of representation are the express written statements between the parties that Bendinger 
Crockett was not representing Borghetti. It is well established that an attorney-client 
relationship does not exist where express written disclaimers are made and 
acknowledged. Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice, 2005 Ed., § 8.3, pp. 944-945. 
Courts have routinely granted summary judgment to lawyers where express written 
disclaimers of representation were made and received by other persons. 
For instance, in Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187 (5th 
Cir. 1995), the plaintiff investors contributed and later lost significant sums in a company 
called FilmDallas. The investors sued a law firm who prepared and sent an opinion letter 
to FilmDallas stating that "all of FilmDallas' material contracts and agreements had been 
disclosed." The investors claimed that this statement was false and caused them damage, 
and claimed legal malpractice against the firm, arguing that it was rendering professional 
services directly to them as investors of FilmDallas. The court granted summary 
judgment and held that there was insufficient evidence of intent to form an attorney-client 
relationship as a matter of law given an express written disclaimer that stated: 
This opinion is furnished by us, as counsel for the company, to you, solely 
for your benefit, and we are not hereby assuming any professional 
responsibility to any other person whatsoever. 
Id at 1199. 
Similarly, in Williams v. Fortson, 441 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994), the 
plaintiffs were real estate buyers at a residential real estate closing who interacted with a 
lawyer from the bank. During the closing, the buyers signed a disclaimer of legal 
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representation indicating that the lawyer did not represent the plaintiffs, only the bank. 
When the home was later discovered to have termite problems, the plaintiffs sued the 
lawyer for malpractice. The plaintiffs alleged that the lawyer represented that "she was 
their attorney and would take care of them." The court granted summary judgment to the 
lawyer, holding that the written "representation disclaimer, precluded an actionable 
reliance on any promise" by the attorney as a matter of law, and affirmed summary 
judgment. Id. at 688. 
The same result occurred in Moore v. Harris, 372 S.E.2d 654, 655 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1988), where the plaintiffs in a legal malpractice case had signed an agreement that "The 
parties hereto further acknowledge and agree that the law firm of Harris & Lister, P. C. 
was retained by and did in fact represent the seller in this transaction and that Harris & 
Lister, P. C. did not nor does not represent the purchaser in this transaction. . . ." The 
court granted summary judgment for the law firm and held that because "Harris made it 
clear to the appellants that he represented only the sellers . . . . [t]he evidence demanded a 
finding that no attorney-client relationship existed, at least in the classic sense of the 
term." IdL 
The same result was again reached in Carmichael v. Barham, Bennett, Miller & 
Stone, 370 S.E.2d 639, 640 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), where the plaintiffs in a legal 
malpractice case had signed an agreement that "This firm does not represent you as your 
attorney and you are entitled to retain counsel of your choice if you desire to do so." The 
court granted summary judgment for the law firm and held that "we do not find that an 
attorney-client relationship existed. . . . [Tjhere is no issue of fact requiring jury 
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resolution and that the court below properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
law firm." Id. 
As in the Banc One, Williams, Moore, and Carmichael cases, Borghetti both 
received and sent written correspondence confirming that Bendinger Crockett was not his 
lawyer and that Borghetti had not decided who to hire. Borghetti cannot contend that an 
attorney-client relationship existed contrary to these express writings, including his own. 
In an analogous situation, the Utah Supreme Court in Gold Standard v. Getty Oil 
Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1068 (Utah 1996) affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s 
fraud claim on judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that there was no 
reasonable reliance on allegedly fraudulent oral misrepresentations which were contrary 
to written communications. The Supreme Court stated: "Under the law of this state, a 
party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by the opposing party in light of 
contrary written information." Thus, Borghetti cannot establish a reasonable belief of an 
implied attorney-client relationship based on any alleged oral statements where all the 
written information is directly contrary to such a conclusion. 
In addition to the express statements between Borghetti and Bendinger Crockett 
confirming that there was no attorney-client relationship (R. 2155-2159), Borghetti's 
express attorney-client relationship with John Parsons and Mr. Parsons' firm to provide 
legal advice on appraisal rights under Delaware law (R. 2177-2179; 2203-2204), 
including deadlines, shows that he understands how to form an attorney-client 
relationship, which he clearly did not do with Bendinger Crockett, and further precludes 
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any claim that Borghetti reasonably believed Bendinger Crockett was his counsel on that 
subject. 
D. Investigative activities alone do not give rise to an attorney-client 
relationship. 
Attorneys frequently investigate potential litigation matters before that attorney 
can agree to enter into an attorney-client relationship with a client for the purpose of 
pursuing litigation. This insures that attorneys do not bring frivolous lawsuits and that 
would-be clients do not waste their money paying attorneys to pursue frivolous lawsuits. 
To that end, during the time the attorney is investigating a case, that attorney does not 
have an attorney-client relationship with the would-be client. See Mallen and Smith, 
Legal Malpractice, 5th ed, § 8.3, p. 935: 
[I]nvestigative activities by attorneys do not constitute undertaking a 
representation. The courts have recognized that an attorney may need to 
investigate the client's case before agreeing to undertake representation or 
even before proposing a fee agreement. Thus, preliminary interviews, 
without a commitment or follow up activities, do not create an attorney-
client relationship. 
The investigation provides the additional benefit of allowing an attorney to 
evaluate whether a contingency fee arrangement would be prudent. Without the safe 
harbor for investigative activities by the attorney, many plaintiffs' cases would never be 
brought because a prospective plaintiffs attorney could not properly assess the value of 
the contingency fee arrangement. 
In this case, prudence required that Bendinger Crockett conduct a thorough 
investigation before agreeing to represent Borghetti. From the time Bendinger Crockett 
agreed to look into Borghetti's case to determine whether they were interested, to the 
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time that Bendinger Crockett declined the representation of Borghetti, there is nothing in 
the record to suggest that Bendinger Crockett was doing anything other than investigating 
whether to pursue the representation. 
While Bendinger Crockett investigated, they told Borghetti expressly and in 
writing that they did not represent him, such that during the investigative period, 
Borghetti was free to seek other counsel, which he prudently did. As commonly happens, 
Borghetti "shopped" the case to various attorneys. Borghetti also consulted independent 
counsel with whom he had an existing attorney-client relationship, John Parsons, 
concerning his appraisal rights and the applicable limitations period to pursue such rights. 
(R. 2177-2179; 2181 at pp. 34, 40-42, 46-47; 2203-2204.) Borghetti was billed by 
Parsons for this legal advice. (Id.) Borghetti paid these bills. Notwithstanding the 
advice, Borghetti did not timely file an action to enforce his appraisal rights. 
The various investigative activities were necessary and prudent before Bendinger 
Crockett could agree to represent Borghetti. Bendinger Crockett did not, under these 
circumstances, establish any attorney-client relationship with Borghetti. Therefore, 
Bendinger Crockett had no duty to either file an appraisal action in Delaware or to advise 
Borghetti of his rights under Delaware law. 
At best, the communications between Bendinger Crockett and Borghetti were 
preliminary steps toward an agreement for legal services, but not sufficient to establish an 
implied attorney-client relationship. See e.g., Farmer v. Mount Vernon Realty, Inc., 720 
F. Supp. 223, 225 (D.C. 1989) (holding that a preliminary conversation regarding 
potential litigation did not create an attorney-client relationship but was merely a 
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"preliminary step to establishment of an attorney client relationship"); McGlvnn v. 
Gurda, 184 N.Y.S. 2d 608, 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that an attorney-client 
relationship did not exist because, "although defendants were contacted by plaintiff 
regarding the malpractice claim, there was never any agreement to undertake 
representation of plaintiff."). 
Immediately after Williams met with Borghetti, he issued express written 
statements disclaiming any legal representation. (R. 2155-2159.) Because Borghetti's 
case involved complex issues of corporate wrongdoing in a large transaction, it was clear 
that Bendinger Crockett would need to investigate and research the case extensively to 
determine whether prudence and good faith would justify representation. After 
disclaiming representation, Bendinger Crockett needed the freedom to conduct an 
investigation without being subject to the unreasonable belief that those efforts 
constituted legal advice. 
Bendinger Crockett did research various legal, procedural, and damages issues, 
and had some communications with Borghetti regarding the same. But this does not 
evidence that legal advice was sought and received or that an implied attorney-client 
relationship was established. Rather, all of Bendinger Crockett's work and 
communications with Borghetti were subject to the initial and subsequent express written 
disclaimers of representation. Moreover, it was all part of the necessary investigation 
into whether Bendinger Crockett could even consider representing Borghetti. 
Allowing Borghetti's malpractice action to withstand summary judgment in the 
face of express written disclaimers would endorse a policy that leaves no safe harbor for 
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attorneys. If Borghetti's view is accepted, lawyers who prudently disclaim representation 
in writing could still be subject to malpractice claims. This would have a significant 
chilling effect by discouraging lawyers from ever investigating complex contingency 
cases for fear that their preliminary investigative efforts would create an attorney-client 
relationship despite written agreements to the contrary. 
E. Summary: no attorney-client relationship existed and summary 
judgment should be affirmed. 
Based on the foregoing, there was never any express or implied agreement that 
Bendinger Crockett would represent Borghetti with respect to appraisal rights, or for any 
other matter. Absent an attorney-client relationship, no duty existed for Bendinger 
Crockett to advise Borghetti regarding the appraisal action deadline that Borghetti 
missed. Borghetti's malpractice claims against Bendinger Crockett should therefore be 
dismissed. The existence of an attorney-client relationship is a pure question of law 
under the facts of this case and the Court can affirm summary judgment, as many other 
courts have done where the facts are undisputed showing that no attorney-client 
relationship ever existed. 
2
 In addition to the cases already cited, see also Wong v. Aragona, 815 F. Supp. 
889, 896 (D. Md. 1993) (finding that implied attorney-client relationship requires a 
request for legal services and an acceptance by the attorney); Capitol Surgical Supplies, 
Inc. v. Casale, 86 Fed. Appx. 506, 2004 WL 180412, at 2-3 (3rd Cir. 2004) (granting 
summary judgment in favor of attorney who drafted exclusive distribution agreement 
when attorney was not asked for legal advice, did not agree to provide legal assistance, 
and distributor did not pay or agree to pay any legal fees); SMWNPF Holdings, Inc. v. 
Devore, 165 F.3d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 1999) ("In the absence of evidence that the attorney 
knew a party had assumed he or she was representing it in a matter, the attorney has no 
affirmative duty to inform the party that he is not its attorney."); Stratagene v. Parsons 
Behle & Latimer, 315 F. Supp. 2d 765, 773 (D. Md. 2004) (dismissing patent owner's 
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Point HI 
BENDINGER CROCKETT DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO ADVISE 
BORGHETTI OF THE 120-DAY DEADLINE, NOR WAS THE 
FAILURE TO ADVISE A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY DAMAGE 
SINCE BORGHETTI ALREADY KNEW OF THE DEADLINE. 
Borghetti's claim that Bendinger Crockett failed to advise him of the 120-day 
deadline for filing an appraisal action must fail as a matter of law because it is undisputed 
that he was already aware of the deadline. Therefore, even assuming an attorney-client 
relationship existed (which it did not), Bendinger Crockett had no duty to advise him, nor 
was the failure to advise the cause of any damage. 
A. Bendinger Crockett did not have a duty to advise Borghetti 
regarding the 120-day deadline because Borghetti already had 
knowledge of the deadline. 
To prevail in a legal malpractice action a plaintiff must plead and prove: " . . . (ii) 
a duty of the attorney to the client arising from their relationship." See Harline v. Barker, 
912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). Whether a duty exists "is a question of law." AMS Salt 
Indus, v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997). 
Once an attorney-client relationship has been established, the attorney "impliedly 
agrees to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity 
commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake." 
claim against law firm for failure to allege it had consulted, hired or retained the law 
firm); In re Infocure Securities Litigation, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2002) 
(refusing to recognize implied attorney-client relationship when plaintiff paid no legal 
fees, had independent counsel, and never told attorney he was relying on him for legal 
advice); Douglas v. Monroe, 743 N.E.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("[A] 
would-be client's unilateral belief cannot create an attorney-client relationship.") 
(emphasis added.) 
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Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988). The scope of that duty is determined 
by public policy considerations. See Mallen and Smith, Legal Malpractice. 5th ed., § 8.3, 
p. 913. 
Borghetti claims that Bendinger Crockett failed to advise him of the 120-day 
deadline for filing an appraisal action. But there was no duty of Bendinger Crockett to 
advise him of that deadline because Borghetti already knew about it. Borghetti was 
advised on October 30, 2002, that the effective date of the Acquisition was October 23, 
2002. (R. 2144.) He was advised that a 120-day deadline ran from the effective date on 
one or more of the following occasions: 1) the October 9, 2002 letter and Consent 
Solicitation Statement and attachments, including a copy of the Delaware appraisal 
statute, from CPI (R. 2122-2127; 2131-2142); 2) the October 11, 2002 conference with 
Parsons (R. 2177); 3) the October 14, 2002 conference with Parsons (R. 2177); and 4) the 
October 30, 2002 letter from CPI, which included another copy of the Delaware appraisal 
statute. (R. 2122-2127; 2144-2145.) Borghetti in fact filed a written demand for 
appraisal in November 2002 with the advice of Parsons. (R. 2129; 2179; 2203-2204.) 
Also, Judge Lubeck found in his Ruling on the other defendants' early motions to dismiss 
that "[t]he Consent Solicitation advised plaintiffs of their appraisal rights under Delaware 
law." (R. 2171-2172.) 
Bendinger Crockett should not have a duty to advise Borghetti of appraisal 
deadlines when it is undisputed that he already knew about them from other sources. As 
a matter of public policy, a lawyer should not be under a duty to advise clients or 
prospective clients of deadlines of which the client has already been made aware. Such a 
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duty would impose an unreasonable obligation on the lawyer, and it would not be a 
client's expectation to hire and pay for advice that the client does not need. 
This position finds support in the Washington case of State v. O'Connell 523 P.2d 
872, 884 (Wash. 1974) (overruled in part on other grounds), where the court discussed 
with approval an instruction of law stating that a lawyer does not have a fiduciary duty to 
advise a client on matters which the client already knows: 
. . . . It has been stated in other jurisdictions that the lawyer's fiduciary duty 
to his client requires him to advise his client "of any facts or circumstances 
which reasonably appear to be important to the client in connection with the 
matter being handled" but "that this duty does not require a lawyer to 
advise his client of matters which the client already knows or which the 
lawyer reasonably believes the client has already learned or will be advised 
from some other source . . . . " 
Because Borghetti unequivocally knew of the 120-day appraisal action deadline, 
Bendinger Crockett could not have been under a duty to advise him in that regard. 
Therefore, the dismissal of his claim of malpractice on summary judgment should be 
affirmed. 
B. Bendinger Crockett's alleged failure to advise Borghetti regarding 
the 120-day deadline was not the proximate cause of any damage 
since Borghetti already knew the deadline. 
To prevail in a legal malpractice action, Borghetti must also prove "a causal 
connection" between the failure to advise and "the resulting injury to the client . . . ." 
Harlme, 912 P.2d at 439. Assuming that Borghetti suffered an injury when he lost his 
appraisal rights, Borghetti must be able to show that Bendinger Crockett's failure to 
advise him of the 120-day appraisal action deadline was the proximate cause of 
Borghetti's failure to file. 
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Borghetti cannot prevail on this argument. Borghetti did not miss the deadline 
because Bendinger Crockett failed to tell him what it was. Rather, it was Borghetti's 
failure to act on existing knowledge of the deadline. It would not be sound public policy 
if lawyers in Bendinger Crockett's position could be found to have proximately caused 
damage to a party in Borghetti's position for failing to advise him of a deadline of which 
that party (Borghetti) was already aware and with respect to which he had previously 
received express legal advice from separate retained counsel (Parsons). (R. 2122-2127; 
2131-2142; 2144-2145; 2177.) Because Borghetti knew about the deadline, Bendinger 
Crockett owed no duty to advise him, and the failure to advise could not be the proximate 
cause of the failure to file. Borghetti's claims against Bendinger Crockett fail as a matter 
of law and this court should affirm the dismissal with prejudice on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Bendinger Crockett requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's Summary Judgment. 
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STRONG & HANNI 
Philip R. Fishier 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Byron G. Martin 
Attorneys for Appellees Bendinger, Crockett, 
Peterson & Casey and Jeffrey S. Williams 
Al 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J__ day of December, 2007,1 caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES BENDINGER, 
CROCKETT, PETERSON & CASEY, AND JEFFREY S. WILLIAMS to be served via 
U.S. Mail postage prepaid to each the following: 
Martin Stanley 
1541 Ocean Avenue, Suite 200 
Santa Monica, CA 90401 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Curtis L. Wenger 
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
John A. Pearce 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for SunGard Data Systems, Tyler Thatcher, Fred Harman, Oak 
Investment Partners, Chad Muir, Darin Gilson, System & Computer 
Technology, Inc., Thomas Weisel Partners, Michael Chamberlain, David 
Murray, Eric Haskell, Thomas K. Lewis Jr., Andy Cooley, Scott Doughman, 
John Dunn and Dr. David Gardner 
48 
ADDENDUM 
A. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262. 
B. Rule 56, Utah R. Civ. P. 
C. Summary Judgment. 
D. Deposition Excerpts of Professor Avner Kalay. 
E. Deposition Excerpts of John Parsons. 
F. Billing Records of John Parsons. 
G. Correspondence between William Borghetti and John Parsons. 
H. Correspondence between William Borghetti and Jeffrey Williams. 
I. LeBeau v. M.G. Corp., Inc., 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9. 
J. Highfields Capital, Ltd. V. AXA Fin., Inc.. 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 126. 
49 
Tab A 
Page 1 
LEXSTAT DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8 SEC. 262 
DELAWARE CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2007 by The State of Delaware 
All rights reserved. 
*** THIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH 76 DEL. LAWS, CH 181 *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH SEPTEMBER 7, 2007 *** 
TITLE 8. CORPORATIONS 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 
SUBCHAPTER IX. MERGER, CONSOLIDATION OR CONVERSION 
GO TO DELAWARE STATUTES ARCHIVE DIRECTORY 
8 Dei C. § 262 (2007) 
§ 262. Appraisal rights 
(a) Any stockholder of a corporation of this State who holds shares of stock on the date of the making of a demand 
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section with respect to such shares, who continuously holds such shares through the 
effective date of the merger or consolidation, who has otherwise complied with subsection (d) of this section and who 
has neither voted in favor of the merger or consolidation nor consented thereto in writing pursuant to § 228 of this title 
shall be entitled to an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of the stockholder's shares of stock under the 
circumstances described in subsections (b) and (c) of this section. As used in this section, the word "stockholder" 
means a holder of record of stock in a stock corporation and also a member of record of a nonstock corporation; the 
words "stock" and "share" mean and include what is ordinarily meant by those words and also membership or member-
ship interest of a member of a nonstock corporation; and the words "depository receipt" mean a receipt or other instru-
ment issued by a depository representing an interest in one or more shares, or fractions thereof, solely of stock of a cor-
poration, which stock is deposited with the depository. 
(b) Appraisal rights shall be available for the shares of any class or series of stock of a constituent corporation in a 
merger or consolidation to be effected pursuant to § 251 (other than a merger effected pursuant to § 251(g) of this title), 
§ 252, § 254, § 257, § 258, § 263 or § 264 of this title: 
(1) Provided, however, that no appraisal rights under this section shall be available for the shares of any class or 
series of stock, which stock, or depository receipts in respect thereof, at the record date fixed to determine the stock-
holders entitled to receive notice of and to vote at the meeting of stockholders to act upon the agreement of merger or 
consolidation, were either (i) listed on a national securities exchange or (ii) held of record by more than 2,000 holders; 
and further provided that no appraisal rights shall be available for any shares of stock of the constituent corporation sur-
viving a merger if the merger did not require for its approval the vote of the stockholders of the surviving corporation as 
provided in subsection (f) of § 251 of this title. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, appraisal rights under this section shall be available for the 
shares of any class or series of stock of a constituent corporation if the holders thereof are required by the terms of an 
agreement of merger or consolidation pursuant to §§251, 252,254, 257,258,263 and 264 of this title to accept for such 
stock anything except: 
a. Shares of stock of the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation, or depository re-
ceipts in respect thereof; 
b. Shares of stock of any other corporation, or depository receipts in respect thereof, which shares of stock (or 
depository receipts in respect thereof) or depository receipts at the effective date of the merger or consolidation will be 
either listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by more than 2,000 holders; 
8 Del. C. § 262 
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c. Cash in lieu of fractional shares or fractional depository receipts described in the foregoing subparagraphs a. 
and b. of this paragraph; or 
d. Any combination of the shares of stock, depository receipts and cash in lieu of fractional shares or fractional 
depository receipts described in the foregoing subparagraphs a., b. and c. of this paragraph. 
(3) In the event all of the stock of a subsidiary Delaware corporation party to a merger effected under § 253 of 
this title is not owned by the parent corporation immediately prior to the merger, appraisal rights shall be available for 
the shares of the subsidiary Delaware corporation. 
(c) Any corporation may provide in its certificate of incorporation that appraisal rights under this section shall be 
available for the shares of any class or series of its stock as a result of an amendment to its certificate of incorporation, 
any merger or consolidation in which the corporation is a constituent corporation or the sale of all or substantially all of 
the assets of the corporation. If the certificate of incorporation contains such a provision, the procedures of this section, 
including those set forth in subsections (d) and (e) of mis section, shall apply as nearly as is practicable. 
(d) Appraisal rights shall be perfected as follows: 
(1) If a proposed merger or consolidation for which appraisal rights are provided under this section is to be sub-
mitted for approval at a meeting of stockholders, the corporation, not less than 20 days prior to the meeting, shall notify 
each of its stockholders who was such on the record date for such meeting with respect to shares for which appraisal 
rights are available pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) hereof that appraisal rights are available for any or all of the shares 
of the constituent corporations, and shall include in such notice a copy of this section. Each stockholder electing to de-
mand the appraisal of such stockholder's shares shall deliver to the corporation, before the taking of the vote on the 
merger or consolidation, a written demand for appraisal of such stockholder's shares. Such demand will be sufficient if 
it reasonably informs the corporation of the identity of the stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to de-
mand the appraisal of such stockholder's shares. A proxy or vote against the merger or consolidation shall not constitute 
such a demand. A stockholder electing to take such action must do so by a separate written demand as herein provided. 
Within 10 days after the effective date of such merger or consolidation, the surviving or resulting corporation shall no-
tify each stockholder of each constituent corporation who has complied with this subsection and has not voted in favor 
of or consented to the merger or consolidation of the date that the merger or consolidation has become effective; or 
(2) If the merger or consolidation was approved pursuant to § 228 or § 253 of this title, then either a constituent 
corporation before the effective date of the merger or consolidation or the surviving or resulting corporation within 10 
days thereafter shall notify each of the holders of any class or series of stock of such constituent corporation who are 
entitled to appraisal rights of the approval of the merger or consolidation and that appraisal rights are available for any 
or all shares of such class or series of stock of such constituent corporation, and shall include in such notice a copy of 
this section. Such notice may, and, if given on or after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, shall, also no-
tify such stockholders of the effective date of the merger or consolidation. Any stockholder entitled to appraisal rights 
may, within 20 days after the date of mailing of such notice, demand in writing from the surviving or resulting corpora-
tion the appraisal of such holder's shares. Such demand will be sufficient if it reasonably informs the corporation of the 
identity of the stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the appraisal of such holder's shares. If 
such notice did not notify stockholders of the effective date of the merger or consolidation, either (i) each such constitu-
ent corporation shall send a second notice before the effective date of the merger or consolidation notifying each of the 
holders of any class or series of stock of such constituent corporation that are entitled to appraisal rights of the effective 
date of the merger or consolidation or (ii) the surviving or resulting corporation shall send such a second notice to all 
such holders on or within 10 days after such effective date; provided, however, that if such second notice is sent more 
than 20 days following the sending of the first notice, such second notice need only be sent to each stockholder who is 
entitled to appraisal rights and who has demanded appraisal of such holder's shares in accordance with this subsection. 
An affidavit of the secretary or assistant secretary or of the transfer agent of the corporation that is required to give ei-
ther notice that such notice has been given shall, in the absence of fraud, be prima facie evidence of the facts stated 
therein. For purposes of determining the stockholders entitled to receive either notice, each constituent corporation may 
fix, in advance, a record date that shall be not more than 10 days prior to the date the notice is given, provided, that if 
the notice is given on or after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, the record date shall be such effective 
date. If no record date is fixed and the notice is given prior to the effective date, the record date shall be the close of 
business on the day next preceding the day on which the notice is given. 
(e) Within 120 days after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, the surviving or resulting corporation or 
any stockholder who has complied with subsections (a) and (d) of this section hereof and who is otherwise entitled to 
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appraisal rights, may commence an appraisal proceeding by filing a petition in the Court of Chancery demanding a de-
termination of the value of the stock of all such stockholders. Notwithstanding the foregoing, at any time within 60 days 
after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, any stockholder who has not commenced an appraisal proceeding 
or joined that proceeding as a named party shall have the right to withdraw such stockholder's demand for appraisal and 
to accept the terms offered upon the merger or consolidation. Within 120 days after the effective date of the merger or 
consolidation, any stockholder who has complied with the requirements of subsections (a) and (d) of this section hereof, 
upon written request, shall be entitled to receive from the corporation surviving the merger or resulting from the con-
solidation a statement setting forth the aggregate number of shares not voted in favor of the merger or consolidation and 
with respect to which demands for appraisal have been received and the aggregate number of holders of such shares. 
Such written statement shall be mailed to the stockholder within 10 days after such stockholder's written request for 
such a statement is received by the surviving or resulting corporation or within 10 days after expiration of the period for 
delivery of demands for appraisal under subsection (d) of this section hereof, whichever is later. Notwithstanding sub-
section (a) of this section, a person who is the beneficial owner of shares of such stock held either in a voting trust or by 
a nominee on behalf of such person may, in such person's own name, file a petition or request from the corporation the 
statement described in this subsection. 
(f) Upon the filing of any such petition by a stockholder, service of a copy thereof shall be made upon the surviving 
or resulting corporation, which shall within 20 days after such service file in the office of the Register in Chancery in 
which the petition was filed a duly verified list containing the names and addresses of all stockholders who have de-
manded payment for their shares and with whom agreements as to the value of their shares have not been reached by the 
surviving or resulting corporation. If the petition shall be filed by the surviving or resulting corporation, the petition 
shall be accompanied by such a duly verified list. The Register in Chancery, if so ordered by the Court, shall give notice 
of the time and place fixed for the hearing of such petition by registered or certified mail to the surviving or resulting 
corporation and to the stockholders shown on the list at the addresses therein stated. Such notice shall also be given by 1 
or more publications at least 1 week before the day of the hearing, in a newspaper of general circulation published in the 
City of Wilmington, Delaware or such publication as the Court deems advisable. The forms of the notices by mail and 
by publication shall be approved by the Court, and the costs thereof shall be borne by the surviving or resulting corpora-
tion. 
(g) At the hearing on such petition, the Court shall determine the stockholders who have complied with this section 
and who have become entitled to appraisal rights. The Court may require the stockholders who have demanded an ap-
praisal for their shares and who hold stock represented by certificates to submit their certificates of stock to the Register 
in Chancery for notation thereon of the pendency of the appraisal proceedings; and if any stockholder fails to comply 
with such direction, the Court may dismiss the proceedings as to such stockholder. 
(h) After the Court determines the stockholders entitled to an appraisal, the appraisal proceeding shall be conducted 
in accordance with the rules of the Court of Chancery, including any rules specifically governing appraisal proceedings. 
Through such proceeding the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising 
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon 
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant 
factors. Unless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise for good cause shown, interest from the effective date of 
the merger through the date of payment of the judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall accrue at 5% over the 
Federal Reserve discount rate (including any surcharge) as established from time to time during the period between the 
effective date of the merger and the date of payment of the judgment. Upon application by the surviving or resulting 
corporation or by any stockholder entitled to participate in the appraisal proceeding, the Court may, in its discretion, 
proceed to trial upon the appraisal prior to the final determination of the stockholders entitled to an appraisal. Any 
stockholder whose name appears on the list filed by the surviving or resulting corporation pursuant to subsection (f) of 
this section and who has submitted such stockholder's certificates of stock to the Register in Chancery, if such is re-
quired, may participate fully in all proceedings until it is finally determined that such stockholder is not entitled to ap-
praisal rights under this section. 
(i) The Court shall direct the payment of the fair value of the shares, together with interest, if any, by the surviving 
or resulting corporation to the stockholders entitled thereto. Payment shall be so made to each such stockholder, in the 
case of holders of uncertificated stock forthwith, and the case of holders of shares represented by certificates upon the 
surrender to the corporation of the certificates representing such stock. The Court's decree may be enforced as other 
decrees in the Court of Chancery may be enforced, whether such surviving or resulting corporation be a corporation of 
this State or of any state. 
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(j) The costs of the proceeding may be determined by the Court and taxed upon the parties as the Court deems equi-
table in the circumstances. Upon application of a stockholder, the Court may order all or a portion of the expenses in-
curred by any stockholder in connection with the appraisal proceeding, including, without limitation, reasonable attor-
ney's fees and the fees and expenses of experts, to be charged pro rata against the value of all the shares entitled to an 
appraisal. 
(k) From and after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, no stockholder who has demanded appraisal 
rights as provided in subsection (d) of this section shall be entitled to vote such stock for any purpose or to receive pay-
ment of dividends or other distributions on the stock (except dividends or other distributions payable to stockholders of 
record at a date which is prior to the effective date of the merger or consolidation); provided, however, that if no petition 
for an appraisal shall be filed within the time provided in subsection (e) of this section, or if such stockholder shall de-
liver to the surviving or resulting corporation a written withdrawal of such stockholder's demand for an appraisal and an 
acceptance of the merger or consolidation, either within 60 days after the effective date of the merger or consolidation 
as provided in subsection (e) of this section or thereafter with the written approval of the corporation, then the right of 
such stockholder to an appraisal shall cease. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no appraisal proceeding in the Court of 
Chancery shall be dismissed as to any stockholder without the approval of the Court, and such approval may be condi-
tioned upon such terms as the Court deems just; provided, however that this provision shall not affect the right of any 
stockholder who has not commenced an appraisal proceeding or joined that proceeding as a named party to withdraw 
such stockholder's demand for appraisal and to accept the terms offered upon the merger or consolidation within 60 
days after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, as set forth in subsection (e) of this section. 
(1) The shares of the surviving or resulting corporation to which the shares of such objecting stockholders would 
have been converted had they assented to the merger or consolidation shall have the status of authorized and unissued 
shares of the surviving or resulting corporation. 
HISTORY: 8 Del. C. 1953, § 262; 56 Del. Laws, c. 50; 56 Del. Laws, c. 186, § 24; 57 Del. Laws, c. 148, §§ 27-29; 59 
Del. Laws, c. 106, § 12; 60 Del. Laws, c. 371, §§ 3-12; 63 Del. Laws, c. 25, § 14; 63 Del. Laws, c. 152, §§ 1, 2; 64 Del. 
Laws, c. 112, §§ 46-54; 66 Del. Laws, c. 136, §§ 30-32; 66 Del. Laws, c. 352, § 9; 67 Del. Laws, c. 376, §§ 19,20; 68 
Del. Laws, c. 337, §§ 3, 4; 69 Del. Laws, c. 61, § 10; 69 Del. Laws, c. 262, §§ 1-9; 70 Del. Laws, c. 79, § 16; 70 Del. 
Laws, c. 186, § 1; 70 Del. Laws, c. 299, §§ 2, 3; 70 Del Laws, c. 349, § 22; 71 Del. Laws, c. 120, § 15; 71 Del. Laws, c. 
339, §§ 49-52; 73 Del. Laws, c. 82, § 21; 76 Del. Laws, c. 145, §§ 11-16. 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
URCP Rule 56 (2007) 
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without sub-
stantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof re-
ferred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judg-
ment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts show-
ing that there is a genuine issue for trial Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to 
file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the 
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004 
TabC 
Philip R. Fishier, #1083 
Stuart H. Schultz, #2886 
Byron G. Martin, #8824 
STRONG &HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants Bendinger, Crockett, 
Peterson & Casey and Jeffery S. Williams 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
Tele: (801) 532-7080 
Fax: (801)596-1508
 D A T E 
f f tRi l , , T I I C T g^BT 
»niref Judicial District 
MAY 2 8 2007 
Deputy Cferk 
OF JUDGMENTS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM BORGHETTI, et al., 
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SYSTEM & COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, 
INC., et al., 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040921012 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey 
and Jeffrey S. Williams (hereinafter "Bendinger Crockett") was heard, pursuant to notice, on April 
23,2007, before the Honorable John Paul Kennedy, District Judge. Philip R. Fishier and Stuart H. 
Schultz of the law firm of Strong & Hanni appeared on behalf of Bendinger Crockett. Martin L. 
Stanley and Curtis L. Wenger appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. John A. Pearce, Andrew H. Stone 
and Mark D. Tolman of Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough appeared on behalf of all other 
Summary Judgment @J 
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defendants of record and argued their separate motions for summary judgment. 
The Court, having received and reviewed extensive briefing from the parties, including 
numerous exhibits, both in favor of, and in opposition to, Bendinger Crockett's Motion, having 
considered oral argument from the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, grants Bendinger 
Crockett's Motion for Summary Judgment. In so doing, the Court finds and concludes as follows: 
1. William Borghetti (hereinafter "Borghetti") is the only Plaintiff who asserts any claim 
against Bendinger Crockett. 
2. This case arises out of a business transaction in which System & Computer 
Technology, Inc. (hereinafter "SCT") acquired Campus Pipeline, Inc., a Delaware corporation 
(hereinafter "CPI"), on October 23, 2002 for a purchase price of $42,000,000 (hereinafter the 
"Acquisition"). 
3. Borghetti owned common stock in CPI. 
4. The effective date of the Acquisition was October 23,2002. Borghetti was so notified 
by correspondence dated October 30, 2002, from CPI. 
5. Borghetti's common stock, which was subject to an $80,800,000 liquidation 
preference held by preferred shareholders, was canceled and he received nothing for it as a result 
of the Acquisition. 
6. Borghetti claims that CPI should not have approved the Acquisition because it was 
unfair to the common shareholders. He claims that the directors of CPI committed fraud, 
misrepresentation, breached their fiduciary duties, and were unjustly enriched by agreeing to a 
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purchase price with SCT that was so low that it extinguished all common shares in CPI. 
7. Because Borghetti opposed the Acquisition, he was entitled under Delaware law to 
sue SCT, CPI, and its officers and directors for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and other related 
claims based on his claim that the Acquisition was improper. He was also entitled under Section 262 
of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) to file an appraisal action in Delaware to seek 
a determination of the fair value of CPI as of the effective date of the Acquisition. 
8. In an appraisal action under Section 262 of the DGCL, the Acquisition is presumed 
to be fair and proper, and the exclusive purpose of the appraisal action is to determine the fair value 
of the acquired entity, in this case CPI, as a going concern as of October 23,2002, the effective date 
of the Acquisition. 
9. Section 262 of the DGCL requires that an appraisal action be filed within 120 days 
after the effective date of the Acquisition. 
10. Prior to the time of the Acquisition of CPI by SCT, CPI had issued two series of 
preferred stock referred to as Series A and Series B Preferred Stock. 
11. Pursuant to CPFs Restated Certificate of Incorporation and the terms of issuance of 
the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock, preferred shareholders held an $80,880,000 liquidation 
preference over the interest of common shareholders, meaning that all preferred shareholders would 
receive priority and have first right to the proceeds of the Acquisition of CPI, up to the full amount 
of $80,880,000. 
12. In order for Borghetti or any other common shareholder to receive any payment for 
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their common stock from the Acquisition, the consideration received as a result of the Acquisition 
had to exceed the liquidation preference of $80,880,000. 
13. The fair value of CPI as a going concern on the October 23,2002, effective date of 
the Acquisition did not exceed the preferred shareholders' liquidation preference of $80,880,000, 
and therefore Borghetti and all other common shareholders were not entitled to any consideration 
from the $42,000,000 that SCT paid for the Acquisition of CPI. 
14. Borghetti alleges that Bendinger Crockett had an attorney-client relationship with 
Borghetti and that Bendinger Crockett committed legal malpractice because Bendinger Crockett did 
not advise Borghetti of the 120-day statute of limitations for filing a Delaware appraisal action and 
did not file such an appraisal action within the 120-day deadline. 
15. Bendinger Crockett claims that no attorney-client relationship existed, either express 
or implied, between Borghetti and Bendinger Crockett, that no duty was owed to Borghetti by 
Bendinger Crockett, and that any alleged failure of Bendinger Crockett to advise Borghetti of the 
120-day deadline was not a breach of duty or the proximate cause of any damage to Borghetti 
because Borghetti was advised of the 120-day deadline by his own separate and independent legal 
counsel, John Parsons, before the deadline expired. 
16. In order to establish a legal malpractice claim, Borghetti must prove (1) an attorney-
client relationship; (2) a duty owed by the attorney; (3) a breach of the duty; (4) a causal connection 
between the breach of duty and the alleged damages; and (5) actual damages. See Harline v. Barker, 
912 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1998). The causal connection element requires that Borghetti prove a 
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"case-within-a-case," which means that Borghetti must establish that but for Bendinger Crockett's 
alleged malpractice, Borghetti would have prevailed in a Delaware appraisal action. 
17. Specifically, the case-within-a-case causal connection requirement in Borghetti*s 
action against Bendinger Crockett requires that Borghetti prove that if an appraisal action had been 
timely filed in the Delaware court, Borghetti could have proven that the fair value of CPI as a going 
concern as of the effective date of the acquisition, October 23, 2002, exceeded the liquidation 
preference of $80,880,000, thereby allowing Borghetti to receive consideration equal to his 
percentage ownership (approximately 8%) of the fair value in excess of $80,880,000. 
18. Borghetti failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact on the question of whether the fair value of CPI exceeded the liquidation preference of the 
Campus Pipeline preferred shareholders as of the effective date of the Acquisition. 
19. Specifically, Borghetti's expert, Avner Kalay, assigned a value to CPI of between 
$63.6 million and $72.9 million which fell well short of the liquidation preferences held by the CPI 
preferred shareholders. 
20. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the fair value of CPI as a going 
concern as of the effective date of the Acquisition was less than $80,880,000, and therefore did not 
exceed the liquidation preference of the preferred shareholders, Borghetti was precluded from 
receiving any consideration from the Acquisition, and even if a Delaware appraisal action had been 
timely filed, the fair value of CPI would not have been sufficient to provide for any recovery by 
Borghetti. 
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21. Absent a finding that the fair value of CPI as of the effective date of the Acquisition 
exceeded the $80,880,000 liquidation preference of the preferred shareholders, Borghetti could not 
establish a fair value in a Delaware appraisal action which would result in him receiving any 
damages. Therefore, the allegation that Bendinger Crockett was negligent in failing to advise of the 
120-day deadline and in failing to file the Delaware appraisal action within that time frame did not 
proximately cause any damage to Borghetti, as a matter of law, because even if the Delaware 
appraisal action had been timely filed, it would not have resulted in a judgment of any damage award 
for common shareholders because the value of CPI did not exceed the liquidation preference. 
Based on the foregoing findings, undisputed material facts, and conclusions, and good cause 
appearing, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Summary Judgment is granted in favor of Bendinger Crockett and against Borghetti, 
and Borghetti's complaint against Bendinger Crockett and all causes of action and claims against 
Bendinger Crockett contained therein or arising therefrom, alleged or which could have been alleged, 
are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, and on the merits, no cause of action; and 
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2. Judgment is entered in favor of Bendinger Crockett and against Borghetti for 
Bendinger Crockett's costs of court incurred in the amount of $ 0.(0 . 
DATED this " ^ 7 day of }fyl<v~s/^,mn. 
BY THE COURT 
£i~2r\) 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the L] day oHMM-, 2007,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER to be served on the following in 
the method shown: 
By hand-delivery to: 
Curtis L. Wenger 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
John A. Pearce 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
By mail, postage pre-paid, to: 
Martin L. Stanley 
LAW OFFICES OF MARTIN STANLEY 
9701 Wilshire Blvd., 10th Floor 
Beverly Hills, CA 90212 
^yMU^U^CtA^ 
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Judge John Paul Kennedy 
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INC, a corporation, et a l , 
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1 Vidoetape Deposition of Avner Kalay 
2 August 7, 2006 
3 PROCEEDINGS 
4 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: All right Today is 
5 August 7, 2006. The approximate local time is 
6 a m . Location is Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
7 McDonough, PC, 170 South Mam Street, Suite 1500, 
8 Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101. My name is Brad 
9 Fischer, video specialist from I-Dep, LLC, located 
10 at 1 South 443 Summit Avenue, Oakbrook Terrace, 
11 Illinois. This is Case No. 040921012, entitled 
12 Borghetfr, et aL, vs System & Computer 
13 Technology, Incorporated, et al. The name of the 
14 deponent is Avner Kalay. The video deposition is 
15 requested by the defense. Will the counsel for 
16 all-all present please identify themselves for 
17 the record. 
18 MR. STANLEY: Martin Stanley and Curt 
19 Wenger for the plaintiff. 
20 MR. STONE: Andrew Stone for certain of 
21 defendants, excluding the Bendinger, Crockert firm 
22 and Jeffrey Williams. 
23 MR. SCHULTZ: Stuart Schultz for 
24 Bendinger, Crockett and Jeff Williams. 
25 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The deponent may now 
I 
»x*- it " JM**, *.*..fit._i 
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1 be sworn in by Scott Knight of Thacker + Company. 
1 2 AVNER KALAY, called as a witness for 
; 3 and on behalf of the Defendants SunGard Data 
4 Systems, Tyler Thatcher, Fred Harman, Oak 
; 5 Investment Partners, Chad Muir, Darin Gilson, 
6 System & Computer Technology, Inc., Thomas Weisel 
1 7 Partners, Michael Chamberlain, David Murray, Eric 
8 Haskell, Thomas K. Lewis Jr., Andy Cooley, Scott 
; 9 Doughman, John Dunn, and Dr. David Gardner, being 
10 first duly sworn, was deposed and testified as 
11 follows: 
12 EXAMINATION 
13 BY-MR.STONE: 
14 Q. Good morning, Professor. 
15 A. Good morning. 
• 16 Q. Why don't we go ahead and get this 
17 marked as Exhibit 1. 
18 ExhibiM marked 
19 MR. STANLEY: Do you have a copy for 
20 us? 
21 MR. STONE: Oh, I'm sorry. 
i 22 BY-MR.STONE: 
23 Q. Professor, you've had your deposition 
' 24 taken before, haven't you? 
i 25 A. Yes. 
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j 1 Q. About how many occasions? 
2 A. Quite a few. I don't remember exactly. 
3 Q. So you know the drill. 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. I'm going to ask you a series of 
6 questions, most of them focused on Exhibit 1, your 
7 report that I've just placed in front of you. If 
8 you don't understand one of my questions, please 
9 feel free to ask me to rephrase it. If you need 
! 10 to take a break, let me know that too. 
\ 11 A. Okay. 
1 12 Q. And I'll try to make this as quick and 
| 13 as painless as possible. 
14 Turn to page .2 of your report, which is 
15 probably about page .4 of this Exhibit. 
16 A. Yes. 
I 17 Q. First sentence there, it says, " I was 
1 18 asked to determine the economic damages to the 
19 holders of common stock of Campus Pipeline, Inc." 
20 Was that your assignment here? 
21 A. My assignment was to determine the 
22 damage to the common stock or in particular I was 
i 23 asked to assess economic damage to Mr. William 
24 Borghetti. That was my assignment. 
25 Q. Was that-has that always been your 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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assignment since being engaged in this case? 1 
A. Yes. 1 
Q. And approximately when were you first 1 
engaged in this case? 1 
A. A long time ago. I t could be two, | 
three years ago. I don't exactly remember the 1 
date. 1 
Q. Ckay. Had you - 1 
A. Maybe 2003, summer of 2003. That could § 
be . . . 1 
Q. Had you known Mr. Borghetti before | 
then? | 
A. No. I 
Q. Ever met him prior to that? 1 
A. No. 1 
Q. Okay. And was that how you were | 
approached was to do an analysis of his economic | 
damages? 1 
A. Yes. 1 
Q. In the course of analyzing' Mr. If 
Borghetti's economic damages, did you do what you 1 
would consider a valuation of Campus Pipeline? | 
A. I have evaluated the damages to Mr. 1 
Borghetti under the assumption that the total p 
compensation paid by SCT to pure hase Campus 1 
h 
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Pipeline is valid. My own opinion is that | 
probably the true value's higher than that, but I I 
have-to minimize conflict, I have assumed that | 
what they paid is the total things that they have | 
paid, the total economic value they gave up is 1 
the value of the firm, and from that, I derive 6 
Mr. Borghetti's damages. | 
Q. Okay. And we're maybe getting ahead of | 
our ourselves a bit, but when you talk about 1 
total economic value, you are talking about the | 
approximately 42 million dollars paid, as well as 1 
the value of SCTs common stock; is that correct? | 
A. What I'm saying is it is the sum of the | 
cash payment and the forgone value of the equity | 
they gave u p - | 
(Reporter/witness discussion to clarify record.) 1 
THE WITNESS: - the forgone value of | 
the equity they gave up. f 
BY-MR.STONE: | 
Q. Is that the same as the fair market i 
value of Campus Pipeline at the time of the 1 
transaction? | 
MR. STANLEY: I'm going to object. 1 
Vague. Go ahead. I 
THE WITNESS: Are you asking me from a | 
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1 legal point of view or as an- economist? 
2 BY-MR.STONE: ' 
3 Q. As an economist. 
4 A. As an economist, this is a lower bound 
5 on what the fair market value is. The fair 
6 market value is probably, in ail likelihood, 
7 higher than that, but that is the value that was 
8 actually paid. 
9 Q. So this would be the lower bounds of 
10 fair market value? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. In other words what-if the firm were 
13 sold to any willing buyer and a willing seller; 
14 is that right? 
15 A. Basically, I have~I have adopted the 
16 valuation of SCT, the amount that they were 
17 willing to pay as the value, to estimate damages. 
18 I don't assume anything above it. 
19 Q. Okay. So did you perform a traditional 
I 20 business valuation in this case? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. And that is by adopting the 
23 price actually paid by SCT and adding to the 
24 amount of their equity that they gave up? 
I 25 A. The economic value of the equity that 
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1 so essentially, the fraction, as argued by Mr. 
2 Hoffman in his report of SCT on a fully diluted 
3 basis is--is lower and I have computed--I 
4 recomputed the damage using exactly the same 
5 methodology that I have used before, only 
6 correcting for this lower fraction. Resulting 
7 from that is a conservative estimate to the 
8 damages to Mr. Borghetfj that are from a low of 
9 $4.2 million to a high of $6.7 or $6 million. I 
10 want to give you a copy of this computation. I t 
11 is in Table 1, panels A, B, C, and D. 
12 BY-MR.STONE: 
13 Q. I think at the next break, what we'll 
14 do is make some copies of this and have it marked 
15 as-
16 A. Oh, sure. I will give you some more 
17 things. 
18 Q. Based on that correction, then, did 
19 that change your estimate of the value of Campus 
20 Pipeline at the time of'the transaction? 
21 A. Yes. If you would look on the range of 
22 possible values in this table, you will see that 
23 Table-in Table 1, the value is from a low of 
24 $63.6 million to a high of $72.9 million. You 
25 can see in the value in Panel A on the bottom 
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1 they gave up. 
2 Q. So what was the value of Campus 
3 Pipeline on September 30, 2002? 
4 A. In order to answer this question-
5 MR. STANLEY: I'm sorry. I have to 
6 object. Vague as to value, but go ahead. 
7 MR. SCHULTZ: Object to foundation 
8 also. 
9 THE WITNESS: I have here for you a 
10 modification to my report~I have here for you a 
11 very slight modification to my report. 
12 Conceptually, my report is totally accurate and I 
13 have used in my report an incorrect table as a 
14 data point in order to estimate the fraction of 
15 ownership of SCT in the common equity of Campus 
16 Pipeline. 
17 In Mr. Hoffman's report, Mr. Hoffman 
18 pointed out~and I myself have checked it-he 
19 points out that the fraction that I've used is 
| 20 too high. As a matter of fact, I have checked it 
21 and I have adopted and revised my report to 
I 22 correct for this use of the incorrect data-data 
[ 23 point. So I thank Mr. Hoffman for pointing it 
24 out to me. He is correct in this point. 
I 25 And I have further assumed that- that-
Page 12 I 
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1 left side of the table, you could see $63.6. And 
2 on the right, you can see $72.9. 
3 Let me just add for clarification, so 
4 that everybody will be on board. I have also 
5 done another modification to the report. In my 
6 original report, I have used the time it would 
7 take to pay the liquidation value to the preferred 
8 stockholders. I have used 10.78 as my estimate. 
9 " I still think that this is the best guess of what 
10 would happen. But in order to be more 
11 conservative, I have allowed for a range of 
12 possible time period and you can see in the 
13 computation that I have nine years, which are 
14 panels A and B. You can see the second column, 
15 time, it says nine. And in Panel C and D, it is 
16 13 years, so I have kind of a breakout of time 
17 around and, in fact, the range of values for the 
18 ftrm-the range of values for the damages are 
19 around the value that would come out with 10.78. 
20 Q. Very good. 
21 A. These are the modification. And I 
22 really thank Mr. Hoffman for pointing that out to 
23 me and to help me correct it. 
24 Q. And these-this range of payouts-this 
25 modification to your report that you've handed 
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1 have to get help. 
2 So we have all kind of method. We have 
3 the market method and the income method and the 
4 cost method and the prior transaction and equity-
5 (Reporter/witness discussion to clarify record.) 
6 THE WITNESS: And typically, when we 
7 don't know and only when we don't know, we are 
8 developing all kinds of models looking at firms 
9 that we know are not the same and trying to infer 
10 from them value. Looking at transactions that we 
11 know are historical and try to learn from them. 
12 But if we know there is a transaction 
13 at the time of-in absence of other words, I call 
14 it a bad act, if you don't mind. At the time of 
15 the event, we know what the value is. All we 
16 have he to do is look on SO* how much they paid, 
17 and from that, we can learn what the value was. 
18 And that's what I have done. 
19 BY-MR.STONE: 
20 Q. There are pretty generally accepted 
21 methods of business valuations; is that correct? 
22 A. The--as I said before, there is one-as 
[ 23 a finance professor, I can tell you that in the 
24 finance profession, we develop valuation. 
I 25 Valuation is developed in academic research and 
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1 are derived from transaction of significant 
2 interest in companies in similar lines of 
3 business. And Mr. Hoffman has used the same 
4 definition and I'm trying to use even the same 
5 words so that we will-so anything that is not a 
6 dispute will be off the table. 
7 And then there is Mr. Garbowski-am I 
8 pronouncing it right7 Mr. Garbowski, the other 
9 expert, has mentioned market approach 
10 consideration of prior sales of company stock. 
11 Tnat is, you can look at what happened to your 
12 own company in order to value it. So that is one 
13 approach. 
14 And then there's the income approach, 
15 which-which essentially is the discount cash flow 
16 method, essentially. You're looking at a 
17 projected cash flows. You are finding the right 
18 discount rate and you bring it to the future. 
19 And then there's a cost approach that is based on 
20 the theory that the prudent investor would pay no 
21 more than the cost of constructing a similar asset 
22 of~ 
23 (Reporter/witness discussion to clarify record.) 
24 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Let me 
25 repeat, yeah. So the cost approach is based on 
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1 then applied later on in the world. And-and we 
2 know what we need for a valuation. What we need 
3 for a valuation is the projection of the cash 
4 flow or the benefit that the holders will receive 
5 and the right discount rate to bring it in. 
6 And as I said before, the world is not 
7 as perfect and we don't always know what is 
8 exactly the discount rate and we don't always know 
9 what exactly are the expected cash flows. So we 
10 use any help that we can get. 
11 And in this process, let me just 
12 mention--and-to you-and here I am looking at my 
13 notes just to be precise—there are-there are 
14 different ways to evaluate companies. There is 
15 something that is called the market approach. And 
16 the market approach has some subcategories to it. 
17 There's the market approach guideline, public 
18 companies, which-which is stated also by Mr. 
19 Hoffman-is a method using the market approach 
i 20 whereby market multiples are derived from market 
I 21 prices of traded stocks of companies in similar 
! 22 lines of business. 
i 23 And then there's a market approach, 
24 mergers and acquisition basis, which is-this is a 
25 method within the market method whereby multiples 
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1 the theory that the prudent investor would pay no 
2 more than the cost of constructing a similar asset 
3 of like utility at prices applicable at the time 
4 of the appraisal. I'm using the language used by 
5 Mr. Hoffman, again, to make sure that things that 
6 are not in dispute are off the table. 
7 So these are method by which we can get 
8 help to get into the valuation. And they are 
9 accepted method I used-there are some practical 
10 books helping the appraiser to use them, the 
11 association-the different association of 
12 appraisers are recommending to use them, and I am 
13 using them, too. 
14 BY-MR.STONE: 
15 Q. Okay. Looking at the cases listed on 
16 pages .36 through 37 of your report— 
17 A. Of my report? 
18 MR. STANLEY: Give us I'd second here 
19 so we can turn to that. 
20 THE WITNESS: Which page? 
21 BY-MR.STONE: 
22 Q. Yeah, 36 through 37. You listed, 
23 "Selected Activities as an Expert Witness." 
24 A. Oh, on my resume. I have different 
25 page numbers, so I apologize. Mine is . . . 
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1 Q. -cost approach? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Now, in that statement, you appear to 
4 be drawing a distinction between option 
5 methodology and income approach? 
6 A. I don't. 
7 Q. Okay. There is no distinction? 
8 A. There is no distinction. It's 
9 consistent completely. 
10 Q. Now, what I am suggesting is using 
11 income approach-using a risk-adjusted discount 
12 rate to work up to see if we can get to the same 
13 valuation you did using the Black-Scholes method. 
14 A. I'm sorry? 
15 Q. What I am suggesting is what-it'll 
16 come as no surprise, I'm sure-ts we intend to 
17 use the discounted cash flow method using a risk-
18 adjusted discount rate to see if we can work 
:
 19 towards the results you obtained using the Black-
20 Scholes formulation. 
! 21 A. You can do some other valuation. I 
' 22 mean, obviously, people have different opinion. 
; 23 Q. How would you go about establishing a 
j 24 risk-adjusted discount rate to do so? 
! 25 A. Okay. As I said, the advantage of 
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1 rate might be below that rate. 
2 A. It could. 
3 Q. Do you think it is reasonable to assume 
4 in this case that the risk-adjusted rate in this 
5 industry, for this company, should be below the 
6 risk-free rate? 
7 A. I think that most likely it is above 
8 the risk-free rate. It's the most likely range 
9 of risk-adjusted discount rate. 
10 Q. Can you give any more precise range 
11 than that, something above the risk-free rate? 
12 A. As I say, I really don't want to sit 
13 here and speculate. It would be really misleading 
14 to the jury. 
15 Q. What would you then do~you looked at 
16 the-you look at cash flows, projected cash flows. 
17 Would you study the industry? 
18 A. We would. 
19 Q. You didn't study the industry in this 
20 case? 
21 A. I didn't have to. 
22 Q. Your opinion is that this company, as I 
23 understand it, at the time of the sale, would 
24 have been worth between $63.6 million and $72.9 
25 million? 
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1 using the option methodology is that when use the 
2 certainty equivalent approach and one gets 
3 valuation that is consistent with infinitely many 
4 different discount rates. Thus, one shy away from 
5 the tremendously difficult problem of determining 
6 what's the risk-adjusted discount rate. I didnt 
7 have to do it in my evaluation and~and in order 
8 to come up with any number, I'd have to really 
9 seriously work on that. It's not something that 
10 I can just sit here and tell you: I think the 
11 number is X, Y, or Z. 
12 Q. I understand. 
13 A It could be a number. It could be many 
14 numbers. You could choose X. Somebody else 
15 could choose Y. 
16 Q. What would be the process you would 
17 follow in order to come up with that number? 
18 A. Well, it's a very lengthy process. 
19 First of all, I have to study the projected cash 
I 20 flows of the firm. I have to follow, basically, 
21 the guidelines that we develop in financial 
22 economics, and as I've stated before, just go out 
23 and do i t 
24 Q. Okay. We talked about the risk-free 
25 rate and the possibility that the risk-adjusted 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
toD? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
You're referring to Tables 1, Panel A 
Yes. 
$63.6 to $72.9-
Okay. 
-yeah. 
In your opinion, does that mean that 
the preferred shareholders did a lousy job of 
negotiating? 
A. The preferred shareholders? 
Q. Yeah. 
MR. STANLEY: Well, I'm going to-I 'm 
going to object that it calls for a legal 
opinion. From an economic standpoint, I guess he 
can give an opinion, if he has an opinion. 
BY-MR.STONE: 
Q. Let me ask it another way. Did they 
leave money on the table? 
A. Who? 
Q. The preferreds. 
A. The preferred shareholders? 
Q. Yeah. 
MR. STANLEY: I have to object. I'm 
going to object. It's an incomplete hypothetical. 
It's vague, but go ahead. 
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1 THEWTTNESS: I don't understand what 
2 you mean by leave money on the table. 
3 BY-MR.STONE: 
4 Q. Well, they had a right to-at this 
5 point, to the first 82 and change in proceeds 
6 from the sale of the company, right? 
7 A. If there was a sale. 
8 Q. Okay. And your opinion is the company 
9 was worth as much as $72.9 million? 
10 A. Uh-huh (Affirmative). 
11 Q. And they yielded 42 million. So does 
12 that mean that the preferreds left $31 million on 
13 the table? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Why is that? 
16 A. The preferred shareholders don't own 
17 the company. There is also common equity. They 
18 don't have a right necessarily to receive $82.9 
19 million. They only receive it if there is a 
I 20 liquidation. And the decision on liquidation is a 
21 decision that the common stockholders decide on 
22 and the majority--the vote is decided by majority. 
I 23 So the value of the preferred is not equal to the 
24 value of the firm. It's lower. 
I 25 Q. There are two scenarios, the one that 
109 Page 111 
1 what happened to the value of Campus Pipeline 
2 within SCT, what is generated there, what 
3 potential synergy there is there, what's the value 
4 of the tax shields to SCT. So there are so many 
5 unknowns, it would be irresponsible for me to 
6 answer this. 
7 BY-MR.STONE: 
8 Q. Ckay. Just holding everything 
9 constant-you can't tell me whether SCT is better 
10 owning the company 100 percent now, paying off the 
11 preferreds at $42 million, and paying, under your 
12 assumptions, the $83 million to itself, owning 100 
13 percent of the company in 13 years, or whether it 
14 would be better off operating the company, paying 
15 out the $83 million to-to the preferreds and 
16 owning 78 percent of the company in 13 years? 
17 A. You can't say that because-
18 MR. STANLEY: I have to, again, object 
19 that it's an incomplete hypothetical, but go 
20 ahead. 
21 THEWTTNESS: You can't really compare 
22 it. You're comparing apples and oranges, and you 
23 have here your ex-post knowledge of what happened 
24 13 years later compared to a decision that had to 
25 be taken at the time that it was taken. And 
I 
I 
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1 played out and the one that you project in your 
2 opinion. Under the first scenario, we all know 
3 what happened. SCT ends up owning the coming, 
4 paying off the preferreds at $42 million, and 
5 owning the company outright. 
6 I'm going to state what I believe is 
7 your scenario, and then when I finish, if you'd 
8 let me know if I got it right. But under your 
9 scenario, we'll take the scenario where you 
10 maximize the value, where SCT does not sell the 
11 company, or the commons don't give up their 
12 interest. They operate the company for 13 years, 
13 they pay the preferred shareholders the full 
14 amount of the preference over that time, and at 
15 the end of it all, SCT owns 78 percent of the 
16 company 13 years from now. Under which of those 
17 two scenarios does SCTs financial interest-under 
18 which of those scenarios is SCT better off? 
19 MR. STANLEY: I'll have to object. 
j 20 Vague, but go ahead. Incomplete hypothetical, but 
I 21 go ahead. 
; 22 THE WITNESS: You are-yeah, I have to 
| 23 disagree. I mean, it's~you cannot determine 
24 which is a better scenario when you're looking 13 
25 years into the future. You have to think about 
Page 112 
there are so many unknowns, it's really difficult 
to say. 
BY-MR.STONE: 
Q. It really depends on the assumptions 
you use as to what's going to happen in the next 
13 years, doesn't it? 
A. It depends also on the assumption as 
what would have happened to Campus Pipeline in the 
end of SCT, within SCT in the nexl 13 years, 
which is something we don't have data on and we 
didn't really look at. 
Q. Okay. And you didn't have data for the 
13 year projection you make herer do you7 
A. No, I base my projection on the Tom 
Weisel estimates to avoid conflict and to be as 
close as possible to the other side. 
Q. I'm saying, using that data-
A. Yeah. 
Q. -can't you make an assumption about 
how SCT would be better off? 
MR. STANLEY: Well, I have to again 
object that it's an incomplete hypothetical 
because of the amount of variables that are 
involved, at least some of which he's talked 
about, but go ahead. 
I 
^*^*S^^^SriS3wTt^Ti 
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valuation, employing Black-Scholes. 
Q. Is it part of the paper, the 
Btack-SchGles paper? Did they go through an 
iteration process? 
A. That's what Black-Scholes would have 
done in this case. If they would have applied 
the methodology, that's what they would do. 
Q. Just my question is, would the paper 
where the methodology is established, does it go 
through an iteration approach? 
A. The paper doesn't have to go through an 
iteration approach because it's a different 
application. But whenever an application like 
this is done, you have to go through iterational 
approach, as I explained in this example that I 
would-I would love to share with you. 
Q. It's well stated here, and this is an 
exhibit to your deposition. 
A. If you don't have to~ 
Q. I'd let you go through it, but-
A. No, if it's stated, that's fine. 
That's fine, then. 
MR. STONE: How we doing? 
MR. STANLEY: Take a break. 
MR. STONE: Change the tape. Take a 
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1 BY-MRSTONE: 
2 Q. The company is sold for fair market 
3 value? 
4 A. The company sold for this much-for 
5 this value. 
6 Q. And Mr. Borghetti is nevertheless 
7 damaged? 
8 A. Mr. Borghetti's damage-
9 (Reporter/witness discussion to clarify record.) 
10 THE WITNESS: Mr. Borghetti is damaged 
11 in the sale through liquidation, because he gets 
12 zero. 
13 BY-MR.STONE: 
14 Q. Turn to page .11 of your report. 
15 MR. STANLEY: Page .11 of his report? 
16 MR. STONE: Yes. 
17 MR. STANLEY: Sometimes I can't hear 
18 you that well over here, Andy. I apologize. 
19 It's okay. I can hear you pretty well, but 
20 sometimes if I start chatting with Curt for a 
21 minute or so, then I'm not a good listener. 
22 BY-MR.STONE: 
23 Q. Last paragraph, third sentence, it 
24 says, "I assume that between the years 2004 and 
25 2005, revenues and cost of goods sold are growing 
1 
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1 break. 
2 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Time's approximately 
3 3:08 p.m. We are now off the record. 
4 (Recess taken, 3:08-3:26 p.m.) 
5 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Time is 
6 approximately 3:26 p.m. We're now back on the 
7 record. 
8 BY-MR.STONE: 
9 Q. Professor, the high end of your 
10 estimate of value of this company is 72.9 million, 
11 as I read Table 1, Panel D. 
12 A. Table 1, Panel D. Just to make sure. 
13 It's 72-yeah, 72.9. 
14 Q. If the company sells for the value of 
15 $72.9 million, is anyone damaged? 
16 A. When you say sell, you mean a sale that 
17 include liquidation? 
18 Q. Assume that the company is sold in 2002 
19 for $72.9 million. Is anyone damaged? 
I 20 A. General liquidation-generally in 
I 21 liquidation? 
[22 MR. STANLEY: I have to object. It's 
i 23 an incomplete hypothetical, but go ahead. 
j 24 THE WITNESS: In this case, the common 
| 25 stockholders are losing their claim. 
Page 148 
1 at a rate of 20 percent per year." Do you see 
2 where that is? 
3 A. Yeah, I see that. 
4 Q. What's the basis for that assumption? 
5 A. Kind of projected forward from the~ 
6 from the Weisei report. 
7 Q. Did you do any research on this 
8 industry to see if those are reasonable numbers7 
9 A. No, no, I just projected based on the 
10 research that they have done. 
11 Q. Okay. They did-they projected that 
12 for two years, correct? 
13 A. That's true. The rest, I extended it. 
14 Q. But you didn't do any independent 
15 research on the reasonableness of that assumption? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Next paragraph: " I assume that 
18 research and development, as well as selling 
19 general and administrative, are growing at a rate 
20 of 15 percent per year." 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. What's the basis for that assumption? 
23 A. Seems reasonable that it would continue 
24 to grow at this rate. And I-as I say, I only 
25 did it for getting as to the expected time to 
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1 technology that Campus Pipeline had in terms of 
2 access to the Web to one point-
3 (Reporter/witness discussion to clarify record.) 
4 THEWrTNESS: They can-they can use 
5 Campus Pipeline access to the Web to hook into 
6 their own software and have some benefit from 
7 that. That's what I understand it, the synergy 
8 to be. 
9 BY-MR.STONE: 
10 Q. How would a failure of Campus Pipeline 
11 have affected SCTs ability to market its own 
12 products? 
13 A. You mean sitting on the board, if—just 
14 in terms of their investment? Well, nobody likes 
15 to lose, so I assume they don't like to lose. 
16 Q. I'm thinking more in terms of SCTs 
17 customers. Are SCTs customers more likely to buy 
18 SCTs service and products if they perceive that 
19 Campus Pipeline is likely to be liquidated? 
20 (Reporter/attorney discussion to clarify record.) 
121 MR. STONE: Likely. 
22 THE WITNESS: I'd have to study this 
| 23 issue more. 
| 24 BY-MR.STONE: 
! 25 Q. Could it be a concern like that that 
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1 Jeffrey Williams. Have you-have you ever given 
2 testimony as an expert witness in a Section 262 
3 Delaware appraisal action? 
4 A. No, not that I know. 
5 Q. I think you'd probably know if you did, 
6 wouldn't you? Have you ever testified--
7 A. I'm not a legal expert, so maybe of 
8 what I did implies it so . . . 
9 Q. No, listen to my question. 
10 A. Okay. 
11 Q. Have you ever testified as an expert 
12 witness in a Delaware appraisal action? 
13 A. Not that I know-I think I did not, * 
14 because I would know. 
15 Q. Have you ever prepared an expert report 
16 that purported to provide an evaluation of the 
17 appraisal value of a business for a Delaware 
18 appraisal lawsuit? 
19 A. Now that would mean any-valuating any 
20 company that is incorporated in Delaware or a 
21 particular process that I'm not familiar with? 
22 Q. It's a particular process-
23 A. Oh, no. So the answer is no. 
24 Q. In your opinion, as of September-
25 October of 2002, was Campus Pipeline a company 
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1 might cause SCT to pay more than a third party 
2 might pay for Campus Pipeline? 
3 A. It's-would be speculation. I mean, I 
4 didn't see the auction, didn't see the 
5 participation of others, and . . . 
6 MR. STONE: Let me take a quick break. 
7 THEWrTNESS: Okay. Sure. 
8 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Time is 
9 approximately 3:40 p.m. We are now off the 
10 record. 
11 (Recess taken, 3:40-3:45 p.m.) 
12 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Ail right. Time is 
13 approximately 3:45 p.m. We're now back on the 
14 record. 
15 MR. STANLEY: And-so by the way, he's 
16 going to read and sign, just so we have an 
17 understand on this deposition transcript. Okay, 
18 gentlemen? 
19 MR. SCHULTZ: Sounds good. 
20 MR. STANLEY: Thank you. 
21 EXAMINATION 
22 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
23 Q. Professor Kalay, my name is Stuart 
24 Schultz. I introduced myself earlier today. I 
25 represent Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson, Casey and 
Page 160 
1 that was in financial distress? 
2 A. Because a company not doing well in the 
3 sense that it has historical losses has very 
4 significant historical losses. If you mean-if 
5 you imply financial distress as being close to 
6 bankruptcy, my answer is no. 
7 Q. Okay. Well, how do you define 
8 financial distress? 
9 A. It's not an easy thing to--to define. 
10 I mean, if we're thinking about not being able to 
11 meet its short-term obligation is financial 
12 distress, that was not the case here. 
13 Q. So in your opinion, Campus Pipeline was 
14 not a company in financial distress the way you 
15 define it as of September-October 2002? 
16 A. It was not a company ckse to 
17 bankruptcy in that sense. It was a company not 
18 doing well given the historical losses. 
19 Q. Okay. Was it a company in financial 
20 distress the way you define financial distress as 
21 of September-October 2002? 
22 A. Given my definition, the answer is no. 
23 Q. I just want to-you mentioned a few 
24 times today that you tried to table anything that 
25 wasn't-
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1 A. In dispute. 
2 Q. - i n dispute. So I want to see if we 
3 can agree on a few things that are not in dispute 
4 in this case, okay? Do you agree that the 
5 effective date of the acquisition merger of Campus 
6 Pipeline by SCT was October 23, 2002? 
7 MR. STANLEY: I'd have to object. 
8 Calls for a legal conclusion. But as best as you 
9 know, if you have an opinion on that. 
10 THE WITNESS: As far as I could see, 
11 based on the documents, the-the acquisition was 
12 in October of 2002, as far as I can-
13 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
14 Q. It's not supposed to be a trick 
15 question. 
16 A. No, I just don't know, I mean, like 
17 because legally, perhaps, it's not the date that 
18 maybe you should . . . 
19 Q. Well, did you read the notices that 
20 were--
21 A. Yeah yeah. 
[ 22 Q. -sent out? 
23 A. Yeah. 
; 24 Q. Will you take my word for it that there 
! 25 was a notice that said that the effective date of 
Page 163 
1 claim holders. 
2 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
3 Q. Okay. I'm not-my question is not 
4 asking you whether or not the sale should have 
5 taken place, okay? The sale did take place, 
6 didn't it? 
7 A. That is true. 
8 Q. All I'm asking you to-to agree with me 
9 on is that as of the date of the sale in this 
10 case, under the terms of the certificate of 
11 incorporation, which I'm sure you've been given to 
12 look at, the proceeds-the first $82.9 million of 
13 the proceeds of the sale on that date went to the 
14 preferred shareholders, correct? 
15 MR. STANLEY: I have to object. Calls 
16 for a legal conclusion as to the validity of that 
17 particular document and its terms. 
18 MR. SCHULTZ: I'm not asking him for a 
19 legal opinion. 
20 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: ' 
21 Q. I'm just asking you, is that what the 
22 documentation says? 
23 MR. STANLEY: Weli-
24 THE WITNESS: That's what I -
25 MR. STANLEY: Go ahead. 
I 
I 
i 
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1 the acquisition was October 23, 2002? 
2 A. No problem. 
3 Q. Okay. That's not something w e -
4 A. No. 
5 Q. -dispute here? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. I'm just using that date as a reference 
8 point now, okay? Do you agree that as of October 
9 23, 2002, the preferred shareholders owned stock 
10 that had a preference amount of $82.9 million? 
11 A. Both Series A and B~together, yes. 
12 Q. Yes, uh-huh (Affirmative). And do you 
13 also agree that it is not disputed that a sale or 
14 an acquisition that was completed as of that date, 
15 October 23, 2002, that the first $82.9 million of 
16 proceeds of a sale on that date had to be paid to 
17 the preferred shareholders? 
18 MR. STANLEY: I have to object-That 
19 calls for a legal opinion, so that would be 
j 20 speculation on his part, I think. 
| 21 THE WITNESS: That's a legal-it is a 
j 22 legal issue. I mean, as an economist, I've said 
I 23 before that this sale would not have happened if 
i 24 it was-if the company was run according to 
25 economic theory to maximize the benefit of the 
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1 THE WETNESS: That's what I read in the 
2 documents. The documents said if something like 
3 this happened, then the first 82 point whatever 
4 goes to the preferred. 
5 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
6 Q. Okay. And so is it undisputed also 
7 that any sale that takes place or that took place 
8 as of that date, October 23, 2002, for less than 
9 the $82.9 million would result in the common 
10 shareholders getting nothing? Is that correct"? 
11 A. That is-that is correct, but that is 
12 precisely why the common stockholders would not 
13 agree to do something like that. 
14 Q. But as a matter of fact, that is true? 
15 A. As a legal-
16 Q. I fs what happened? 
17 A. -as a legal effect, as I read it in 
18 the documents. And what the documents say is 
19 consistent with what you described to me. 
20 Q. Okay. Now, do you agree~or correct me 
21 if I'm wrong, but I understand your opinion~or 
22 your analysis and your calculation that there were 
23 damages in this case is based on your opinion 
24 that there should not have been a sale as of 
25 October 23, 2002, correct? 
I 
Sfc^c3i^fcxJ*^^U»i8J»U^:i\<is^^ 4? 
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1 A. Yeah, there should not have fcfeen a 
2 sale. 
3 Q. Okay. Are you familiar at all, 
4 Professor Kalay, with the provisions of the 
5 appraisal statute under Delaware law? 
6 A. Provision of the-
7 Q. Appraisal statute under Delaware law. 
8 Are you familiar with that at all? 
I 9 A. I'm not sure that I am. I mean . . . 
10 Q. Okay. You haven't-
11 A. I haven't looked particularly on that. 
12 0. In this case, you have not been asked 
13 to, nor have you taken it upon yourself to 
14 perform an appraisal under Delaware statute? 
15 A. Yeah. 
I 16 Q. You have not, have you? 
; 17 A. Yeah. 
18 MR. STANLEY: Well-I have to object 
j 19 that that's vague, but it's irrelevant. He's 
20 answered the question. 
21 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
22 Q. Okay. And just to-your opinion-your 
| 23 opinion is that this sale shouldn't have taken 
24 place, right? 
j 25 A. Yes. 
Page 166 
1 Q. Okay. And in your report, you refer 
2 sometimes to what you referred to as a bad act? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Is that right? What is the bad act 
5 that-
! 6 A. It's just-
1 7 Q. The sale? 
8 A. - i t 's just a term, that the sale was 
9 done to harm the—and harmed the common equity 
10 owner. 
i 11 Q. So is your opinion premised on the 
12 assumption that the sale of Campus Pipeline to SCT 
1 13 somehow involved a breach of a fiduciary dub/ or 
14 fraud or some kind of breach? 
15 MR. STANLEY: I have to object that it 
16 calls for a legal opinion. 
17 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I am- I just don't 
j 18 know. It's not my expertise. I'm not going to 
19 comment on that. 
20 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
i 21 Q. But you just think it was a bad act? 
22 A. From an economic point of view. 
i 23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. And I've-I just use it for lack of 
1 25 other words, just as a reference point to 
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something. | 
Q. Am I correct-based on your testimony V 
and based on your report, am I correct that you h 
did not see the need to perform /our own 1 
independent calculation of the fair market value | 
of Campus Pipeline as of the date of the merger? P 
MR. STANLEY: I have to object. Vague 1 
as to quote fair market value, unquote. Go I 
ahead. 1 
THE WITNESS: This is not accurate. 1 
The—the-I have based my analysis, the- I needed 1 
to do an analysis as the document-as my report 1 
shows. But I based the analysis on what SCT | 
actually paid. So my estimate was what SCT § 
actually paid rather than just going and doing an | 
analysis independent of~that is correct. 1 
BY-MR.SCHULTZ: | 
Q. Okay. Fair enough. In fact, you said J 
that several times in your report, didn't you? 1 
A. I did. ' 1 
Q. Let me just make sure I've got those fi 
spots here. If I have understood that correctly. 1 
Look at page .6 of your report, would you. 1 
A. Yeah. 1 
MR. STANLEY: Are we talking about § 1 1 Page 168 fa 
Exhibit—what is this, one? His report, right? 1 
THE WITNESS: My report, the | 
liquidation of Campus Pipeline, yeah. 1 
BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 1 
Q. Was that Exhibit 1? 1 
A. That's-I don't know. It's not 1 
numbered from here. But you're talking about my | 
report, right? I 
Q. Yeah, your report. I think- 1 
A. I think we're on the same page. f 
Liquidation of Campus Pipeline. 1 
Q. Yeah. Yeah. Just up at the top of the 1 
page, first line, you say, "This estimate of 1 
damages is conservative in several respects. 1 
First, it is based on the assumption that the | 
price (cash plus forgone common stocks) SCT paid | 
for Campus Pipeline, is the market value." Is § 
that one place where you said that that was your | 
assumption of market value? | 
A. That's-that's where I said that-that 1 
I am basing my damages on the price that SCT I 
actually paid-actually paid. 1 
Q. Yeah, 1 
A. Yeah. I 
Q. And you said that that was- f 
: p 
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1 A. I assumed. 
2 Q. You caiied-you said you assumed that-
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. - is the market value-
5 A. Assumed. 
6 Q. -correct? 
7 A. Yeah. Yeah. In order to do an 
8 analysis, yes. Do I do . . . 
9 Q. And then look over on page .8, if you 
10 would, please, near the bottom of the page-
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. -you say-this is the third line from 
13 the bottom, you say, "One thing to stress is - I 
14 am using the actual price paid by SCT as the base 
15 for the estimation of damages." 
16 A. That is correct. 
17 Q. In other words, I obtained a 
18 conservative estimate of damages by adopting the 
19 valuation of the defendants-
20 A. Yeah. 
| 21 Q. -correct? Now, is that again-you're 
22 referring to the purchase price at-as of October 
23 2002, correct? 
| 24 A. The cash plus the forgone equity, yes. 
25 Q. So you just accepted that as the value 
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1 on my conservative estimate of damages, yes. 
2 Q. Right. Now, you-do you have Exhibit 2 
3 there in front of you? 
4 A. Yeah. 
5 Q. There's your panel. Table 1, panels-
6 A. A toD. 
7 Q. -A, B, C, and D? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And I believe you testified earlier 
10 that this two-page document takes the place of 
11 Tables 7 and 8 in your original report-
12 A. I did. 
13 Q. - is that correct? 
14 A. That's correct. 
15 Q. Okay. I just want to ask you a 
16 couple-three questions about the factual 
17 assumptions that underpin this table, okay? 
18 A. (Witness moves head up and down.) 
19 Q. Do these numbers in this table assume 
20 the preferred shares will, in fact, be convert~or 
21 purchased over either a 9-year or a 13-year 
22 period? 
23 MR. STANLEY: I have to object. Vague 
24 as to, quote, purchase, unquote, but go ahead. 
25 THEWrTNESS: The-the analysis is done 
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1 as of that date for purposes of your calculation 
2 of damages? 
3 A. That is correct. 
4 Q. Okay. You didn't go out and do a whole 
5 separate independent valuation? 
6 A. I did valuation as you can see in the 
7 report, but it is based the starting point, yes. 
8 Q. Right, that's what I meant. You didn't 
9 do a separate base point evaluation? 
10 A. That's true. 
11 Q. Look over on page .15, if you would. 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. The second-to-the-last paragraph, about 
14 three lines up from the bottom of that paragraph. 
15 See where it says, "Nevertheless"? 
16 A. Yeah. 
17 Q. "Nevertheless, to minimize conflicts 
18 and arguments with the defendants, my estimate of 
19 damages uses the amount paid by SCT as the market 
i 20 value of Campus Pipeline at the time of the 'bad 
I 21 act.'" So there again, you've again stated that 
! 22 you've accepted as the market value of Campus 
I 23 Pipeline as of the date of sale as the amount of 
| 24 the sale, right? 
[ 25 A. As-as my conservative estimate-based 
H 
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1 under the assumption that the preferred-
2 liquidation value of the preferred would be paid 
3 at the time that is mentioned, yes. 
4 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
5 Q. Okay. So when you say, for example, in 
6 Table 1, Panel A, when your value in the first 
7 column there at the end of nine years, the amount 
8 is $63.6. Do you see that? 
9 A. Yes, I see. 
10 Q. Okay. That's-that calculation 
11 presumes that the preferred stocks, Series A and 
12 B, have all been paid for, correct? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. During-over a nine-year period? 
15 A. They're not paid yet. 
16 Q. No, over a nine-year period, you're 
17 assuming-
18 A. They will be paid using the current 
19 value under the assumption that in nine years they 
20 will be paid. 
21 Q. Right. Yes. And under that 
22 assumption, then you are able to follow your-
23 A. Yeah. 
24 Q. -table through and find some amount of 
25 damage for Mr. Borghetti, correct? 
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1 A. Correct. 
2 Q. Okay. But if you assumed that the 
3 preferred shareholders were not paid off, okay? 
4 A. Were not paid off? 
5 Q. Yeah, just-just for sake of-
6 A. Okay. 
7 Q. -argument assume that the preferred 
8 shareholders were not paid off, okay? 
9 A. Uh-huh (Affirmative). 
10 Q. $63.6 million in value, standing alone, 
11 would not be sufficient to have paid the preferred 
12 shareholders their ownership value as of October 
13 23, 2002, would it? 
14 A. Let me clarify. The answer is no, but 
15 let me clarify to you. The-
16 Q. Let me make sure I got my question 
17 answered before you clarify. 
18 A. No, you-you didiVt get it yet, because 
19 I'm answering it now. 
I 20 Q. Let me ask it again. Would you just 
| 21 agree with this-with this—I'll simplify it: As 
I 22 of October 23, 2002, $63.6 million would not have 
23 been enough to pay the preferred shareholders off, 
24 correct? 
25 A. Nine years later? 
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1 THE WITNESS: I answered. 
2 MR. STANLEY: And if you want, he's 
3 going to explain. 
4 THE WITNESS: I disagree with you. 
5 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
6 Q. You disagree that as of October 23, 
7 2002, $63.6 million was insufficient to pay the 
8 preferred shareholders? 
9 MR. STANLEY: No-he already-no, he 
10 agreed with that, but he disagreed with your 
11 further analysis. 
12 THE WITNESS: Your interpretation. I 
13 disagree with-T agree with your $63.6. 
14 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
15 Q. I'm asking a different question. 
16 A. Okay. I agree that $63.6 is a smaller 
17 number than $82.93. 
18 Q. And therefore, as of October 23, 2002, 
19 it would not have been enough to pay the 
20 preferred shareholders in full, correct? 
21 A. It was not enough and it was not 
22 needed. 
23 Q. Okay. It was not~if it was? 
24 A. It was not needed. 
25 Q. Okay. If the company was sold for 
Page 174 
1 Q. No, as of October 23, 2002, would $63.6 
2 million have been enough to pay the preferred 
3 shareholders in fulP 
4 A. The $63.6 is not cash in the bank. The 
5 $63.6 is the value-some of the value of all the 
6 claims on the firm. 
7 Q. Okay. I'm-my question is very simple. 
8 A. No, no, I'm-but I'm answering it. You 
9 have to give me~ 
10 Q. Listen to my question. 
11 A. I have listened. 
12 Q. As of October 23, 2002-
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q, --you agree, don't you, that $63.6 
15 million would not have been enough to pay off the 
16 preferred shareholders? 
17 A. If you're asking whether or not $63.6 
18 is a smaller number than $82.93, it is a smaller 
19 number. 
20 Q. So it's not enough to pay them off? 
21 A. Now here is where we disagree. And if 
22 you want, I'll explain. 
23 Q. Well, just answer my question first. 
:24 MR. STANLEY: He just said he 
I 25 disagrees. 
Page 176 
$63.6 million, it would not have been enough to 
pay the preferred shareholders? 
A. If the company was sold in a way 
through liquidation, then $63.6 would be-since 
it's a smaller number, there wouldn't be enough to 
pay. 
Q. And the same would apply to $72.9 
million under Table 1, Panel D? 
A. Yeah, I agree that $72.9 is still lower 
than $82.93. 
Q. Okay. And-you-you refer in your 
report in a few places, Professor, to the-what 
you call the "but for" world. Is the "but for" 
world a world without a sale on October 23, 2002? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Look at Exhibit 4 just for a second. 
MR. STANLEY; What page are we on here? 
I'm sorry. 
MR. 
MR. 
apologize. 
MR. 
number. 
MR. 
SCHULTZ: 
STANLEY: 
What? 
What page are we on? I 
SCHULTZ: I didn't give you a page 
STANLEY: Oh. 
BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
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1 A. And that's what I meant by that. 
2 Q. So would you-would it be correct to 
3 say that the income approach, market approach, and 
4 cost approach are generally accepted methodologies 
5 in the economic profession for valuing a business? 
6 A. Yeah. Yes. 
7 Q. Are you familiar with any Hterature-
8 and I'm going to try to be as specific as I can 
9 with this-
10 A. Okay. 
11 Q. —question. 
12 A. Okay. 
13 Q. Are you familiar with any literature 
14 that specifically addresses the point that you 
15 make in this paragraph 7, and that is, consistency 
16 of your option methodology with the accepted 
17 method of valuation, 
18 income approach, market approach, and cost 
19 approach? 
20 A. Okay. The~you have a lot of citations 
[ 21 here that are consistent wi th-
! 22 Q. I know, but-
| 23 A. The point i s -
j 24 Q. Do you understand how specific I'm 
! 25 trying to be with my question, though? 
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methodology is consistent with the income 
approach? 
A. No. 
Q. None? 
A. No. 
Q. At all? 
A. Not that I know, no. 
Q. Do you yourself-do you still believe 
that the-what's referred to as the accepted 
method of valuation, income approach, market 
approach, and cost approach-do you agree that 
those are still generally accepted methodologies 
for valuing business? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And when I say that, I mean 
not-I'm excluding from that your option 
methodology. 
A. Yeah, there are still other ways to do 
things. 
Q. And do you still use them'yourself? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. You wouldn't have a problem with 
somebody using those methodologies, then, as a~as 
an accepted method? 
MR. STANLEY: I'll have to object that 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
122 
23 
24 
25 
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A. I understand how specific, and I'll be 
specific with my answer. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. 
A. As I said before, the option valuation 
is discounted cash flows, valuation. Discounted 
cash flow valuation is similar, or significant 
part of the income approach. When you talk about 
the income approach, you're talking about 
discounted cash flow valuation. 
Q. Can I stop you? 
A. As mentioned-as mentioned by Mr. 
Garbowski-
Q. Can I stop you just for a sec on that? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Is that where you believe the 
consistency— 
A. 
Q 
and-
A. 
Q 
A. 
Q 
Yes. 
-lies between the option methodology 
And this. 
—the accepted method? 
Yes. 
Okay. Thank you. Are you familiar 
with any literature, Professor, that has taken 
issue or disagrees with the view that the option 
Page 184 
1 it's an incomplete hypothetical and it would 
2 depend on the circumstances, but it's your opinion 
3 that he's asking for. 
4 THE WITNESS: These are generally 
5 accepted and it doesn't mean that anybody who's 
6 using these is doing the right things. Of 
7 course, these are just names. One has to 
8 evaluate the valuation. 
9 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
10 Q. Well, you have to use the method 
11 properly, correct? 
12 A. Exactly. If it's done properly, I have 
13 no problem. 
14 Q. You may have already covered this, but 
15 I apologize if you haven't, but just-can you tell 
16 me whether you are aware of the valuation 
17 methodologies recognized by the Delaware courts in 
18 an appraisal proceeding? 
19 MR. STANLEY: I object. Calls for a 
20 legal opinion, but if you know, go ahead. 
21 MR. SCHULTZ: I'm just asking him if 
22 he's aware of it. 
23 THEWrTNESS: I-I 'm not aware. I 
24 assume it's no different than others. 
25 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
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1 you will see that I have finance books with 
2 chapters on real options. 
3 Q. Correct. 
4 A. And I actually detail here where 
5 exactly they talk about this use of the option 
6 methodology to value other assets. The term often 
7 used for it is real options. 
8 Q. Other-
9 A. Then on page .8, you can see that I have 
10 a lot of Web sites that shows the use of real 
11 options and I describe what is in there in this 
12 Web site. 
13 Q. And are any of those-Tm assuming you 
14 haven't read every one of these articles? 
15 A. Of course not. 
16 Q. Yeah. Okay. 
17 MR. STANLEY: We'll leave it to you to 
18 do that. 
19 BY-MR.SCHUL7Z: 
20 Q. And obviously, notwithstanding Mr. 
21 Stanley's delight and his statement-
22 MR. STANLEY: Just teasing you, and you 
23 laughed, too, Stuart. 
24 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
> 25 Q. --you don't know for a fact how many of 
Page 191 
1 Q. Yeah. 
2 A. When you say employee, what—I mean, 
3 I'm a professor, so~ 
4 Q. I guess what I'm asking you is 
5 sometimes a university~I heard when I was in law 
6 school, a university was described as 90 acres 
7 surrounded by reality. 
8 A. That's funny. 
9 Q. Have you ever worked out for a company 
10 in the real world, like Thomas Weisel, doing the 
11 kind of evaluations that— 
12 A. Yeah. 
13 Q. -they did in this case? 
14 A. Okay. Let me- I guess the best way of 
15 answering this question is just to go through-
16 Q. Is it in your CV? 
17 A. Go through my CV. Not all of it is 
18 there, but I can tell you, I served on six 
19 different board of directors. I served as the 
20 chairman of the investment committee of a group of 
21 mutual funds. I served as the chairman of the 
22 investment committee for a large portfolio 
23 manager. I'm currently on the board of directors 
24 of a large portfolio manager. I am on the board 
25 of directors right now of a mineral company-
I 
i 
Page 190 
1 these articles applied directly to the issue in 
2 this case, do you? 
3 A. Well, meaning-I don't know what you 
4 mean by apply directly. A lot of them and most 
5 of the textbook-and I've read quite a few and 
6 I've brought you citation of quite a few-the most 
7 important one is the citation to Black-Scholes, 
8 the paper itself, and then textbook and so on. 
9 So you have to-you have to understand that I am 
10 dealing with this topic for 25 years. And I'm 
11 writing on this topic. I'm teaching it. I am 
12 lecturing it to executives. And so it's not 
13 something that I have collected-it mention in 
14 many, many places. 
15 And obviously, out of this 5,000 
16 articles, you find some that just make a very 
17 small use of it, but they just mention it. 
18 Perhaps some would just have it on the reference 
19 list and I wouldn't know. That is definitely 
20 possible. And you could find papers there that 
21 they disagree with a lot of their content. 
I 22 Q. Sure. Have you ever worked as an 
23 employee and-for a company that did the type of 
24 work that Thomas Weisel Partners did? 
25 A. Valuation? 
Page 192 l> 
1 mineral water company that there-obviously, I'm 
2 not an expert in water, so—but I am—I have 
3 performed valuations of companies. I was 
4 consultant to the Security and Exchange 
5 Commission. 
6 Q. How many times or how many different 
7 issues or problems or cases have you consulted on 
8 with the SEC? 
9 A. Oh, with the SEC? 
10 Q. Was it more than once? 
11 A. I was in Washington in 2004. I had an 
12 office at the headquarters in D.C., but I was an 
13 independent consultant. I have worked with the 
14 head of their investments branch. We still work 
15 together-that came out from my association with 
16 them in the four months that I was there. And I 
17 still work on this particular issue and we still 
18 work together-of course, less intensely. 
19 Q. I just wondered if there was more than 
20 one issue— 
21 A. That I did? 
22 Q. -one problem. 
23 A. There was more than one. There were 
24 two problems that I worked on. 
25 Q. Have you ever-you, youiself, ever 
. „ . , _ w „ - - : ^Jj 
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1 prepared a fairness opinion tike the Thomas Weisel 
2 one in this case? 
3 A. Well, the- I have done, for example, 
4 the valuation of the Israeli telephone company 
5 before the IPO and-before their IPO. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. And my opinion was the base for the 
8 negotiation with the underwriter. And I helped 
9 them out through the process. 
10 I have done evaluations of ftrms. I 
11 have done evaluation of firms prior to an IPO. I 
12 have done restructuring, that is firm in financial 
13 distress and dealing with banks to restructure 
14 their debt. 
15 Q. In any of those evaluations that youVe 
16 just made reference to, have you~have you used a 
17 methodology other than the Black-Scholes option 
18 methodology that you used on this case? 
19 A. I've used others as well, obviously. 
; 20 Q. Okay. Have you ever used the Black-
21 Scholes option methodology in the-any of these 
22 other evaluations that you've done? 
| 23 A. Often IVe-IVe used the option 
I 24 approach to valuation projects. 
I 25 Q. Have you ever used it to value the 
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1 where you've used this? 
2 A. For a valuation of-
3 Q. Right. 
4 A. That's correct. 
5 0. Okay. Give me about two minutes, okay? 
6 A. No problem. 
7 THEVIDEOGRAPHER: Time is 
8 approximately 4:30 p.m. We're now off the record. 
9 (Recess taken, 4:30-4:40 p.m.) 
10 THEVIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 
11 approximately 4:38 p.m. We are now back on the 
12 record. 
13 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
14 Q. Just as a general concept, when the 
15 preferred shareholders' interest is paid, do they 
16 then become common shareholders? Or can they 
17 become common shareholders? 
18 A. If they pay the~ 
19 MR. STANLEY: I'm going to object. 
20 Calls for a legal opinion, but if you know. 
21 BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
22 Q. Well, you've talked about this. 
23 A. What you're saying is if they get the 
24 liquidation value? 
25 Q. Right, yeah. Is their—is their stock 
i 
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1 entire-the value of an entire going concern as 
2 opposed to just the option? 
3 A. In the context of teaching and cases 
4 and so on, I have done that. 
5 Q. Not-
6 A. In the context of evaluating a firm, 
7 the case-this is kind of a natural case for it. 
8 Others are-the data was different, calling for a 
9 different type of evaluation, so-
10 Q. Is this the case the only one where 
11 you've done it outside of the university academic 
12 scene? 
13 A. I'm not sure. I mean-I mean . . . 
j 14 Q. Can you think of one other one where 
15 you've done it the way you did here, where you 
16 were actually doing it for a business, for the 
17 entire corporation valuation? 
18 A. I'm thinking as-as you are talking-
19 typically, the data was better for the market 
j 20 approach and the other types of income approach, 
21 sometime cost approach. And I've always went-you 
I 22 know, used whatever data-this is an excellent 
| 23 case for the application of this particular 
I 24 method. 
25 Q. So you can't give me one other case 
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converted or are they just out of the picture 
completely, they're no longer owners? 
MR. STANLEY: Object again. Calls for 
legal opinion. Depends on legal documentation, 
but if you know. 
BY-MR.SCHULTZ: 
Q. If you don't know, just~thatfs a good 
answer, too. 
A. Yeah, I probably should read and make 
sure before I answer. 
MR. SCHUL7Z: Okay. That's all I have. 
MR. STANLEY: So he's going to read and 
sign. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Sounds good. 
MR. STANLEY: All right 
THE REPORTER: And did you want a copy 
of this, Mr. Schuitz? 
MR. SCHULTZ: Yeah. 
(A discussion was held off the record.) 
MR. STANLEY: Get it on the disk, and 
blah, blah, blah. 
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This concludes the 
videotape deposition of Avner Kalay in the case of 
Borghetti, et al., vs. System & Computer 
Technology, Incorporated, et al., consisting of 
: iiit„:»*«i>afei»v's.-. s ; ?3S*fli ia3ST!>r^r7" 
49 (Pages 193 to 196) 
Thacker + Co LLC 
Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
S01-98S-21SO Toll Free: 877-441-2180 Fax-801-983-3181 
TabE 
CONDENSED 
TRANSCRIPT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM BORGHETTI, MICHELLE ] 
BORGHETTI, LA DOZZINA ; 
SPORCA, LLC, LA FAMIGLIA ; 
BORGHETTI, LLC, CAMPUS ; 
PIPELINE, INC, ] 
(DERIVATIVELY) ] 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ] 
SYSTEM & COMPUTER ; 
TECHNOLOGY, INC, a ; 
corporation, et al., ] 
Defendants. ] 
) Deposition of: 
> JOHN PARSONS 
i Civil No. 040921012 
May 19, 2006 
9:47 a.m. to 11:42 a.m. 
Location: Law Offices of Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Reporter: Judy A. Holdeman, RPR 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah 
CD ENCLOSED 
1872 South Main Street a Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
T?\ 801 484.2929 E-rrail reporting@QAreport,com 
21190971-4f17-46fd-ae5a-0ffcfab4c83cd 
# 0 1<5^\ 
Q6:A REPORTING, INC. 
1 MR. FISHLER: I am talking ^ u t 10/10/02. I 
2 donft know, do you want the hour? 
3 Q. (BY MR, FISHLER) When he came to you or you! 
4 got these documents on 10/10/02, did you speak with him 
5 at or about that time? 
6 A. I think I spoke to Michelle. 
7 Q. Okay. And tell me what she said to you and 
8 what you said to her. 
9 A. 'Tve got some documents I want to send you. 
10 And William would like you," me, "to look at them." 
11 Q. And from -- did it appear to you that he sent 
12 to you all of the documents relating to this acquisition 
13 and merger? 
14 A. I don't know. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. I know what he sent me is in Exhibit 1. I 
17 Q. And in your billings ~ and everybody does this I 
18 differently, but on 10/10/02, there is no indication how j 
19 much time you spent on the matter that I can see. 
20 A. That's correct. 
21 Q. Do you have a recollection as to how much time 
2 2 you spent on them? 
23 A. I don ' t 
24 Q. Okay. The next entry is 10/11/02. On j 
25 10/11/02, do you recall how much time you spent on that 
Page. 32 
1 A. OnlO/ i l . 
2 Q. On 10/11, you complete review of select 
3 provisions of Campus Pipeline merger and related 
4 documents. 
5 Did those related documents contain portions of 
6 the Delaware corporate code? 
7 A. It would have been what is in Exhibit 1. 
8 Q. Okay. Can you tell me if Exhibit 1 contains 
9 Delaware corporate code? I think it's under Tab E. 
10 A. Tab E has Section 262 of the Delaware general 
11 corporate law, which is the section pertaining to 
12 appraisal rights. 
13 Q. All right And you reviewed those documents? 
14 A. I would have reviewed them, yes. 
15 Q. All right In your entry to 10/11, it said 
16 that you reviewed documents for critical deadlines. Do 
17 you see that? 
18 A. Yes, I do. 
19 Q. One of those critical deadlines for — giving 
2 0 notice of a demand for appraisal? 
|21 A. That would have been a critical deadline. 
2 2 Q. And would another critical deadline have — let 
[2 3 me just ask you this: What were those deadlines? 
[2 4 So you understand, at all times in this 
2 5 deposition, this is an open-book test. 
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1 date reviewing select provisions of the Campus Pipeline 
2 merger and related documents? 
3 A. I would have to rely on what it says there, an 
4 hour and 20 minutes. 
5 Q. Okay. 
6 A. Oh, I'm sorry, the hour and 20 minutes was the 
7 telephone call. So I don't know. 
8 Q. The next entry, and this may be nothing more 
9 than my professional curiosity, I see on 10/14 there was 
10 an entry for 39 minutes. 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Do you have some type of a device on your phone 
13 that actually times your calls? 
14 A. Yeah, I use a clock on my phone. 
15 Q. Not so much a clock, but it just tells you how 
16 much time elapsed from the time the call starts until it 
17 ends? 
18 A. That's correct 
19 Q. So you - on 10/11, you spoke to him for 
20 1 hour, 20 minutes? 
21 A. Him? 
22 Q. Or her? 
23 A. Well, I would have spoken to William and 
2 4 Jeffrey Jones. 
^5 Q. Okay. 
Page 331 
1 So what were the critical deadlines? If you 
2 want to look back through the documents, tell me. What 
3 were the critical deadlines to you? 
4 A. Would have been the time in which a shareholder 
5 would have had to file a notice of taking appraisal 
6 rights. 
7 Q. All right. Would there be another deadline for 
8 filing a lawsuit? 
9 A. I don't recall that I would have been involved 
10 with that. 
11 Q. No, but was that a deadline set forth in the 
12 code? 
13 A. I don't recall. 
14 Q. Look at the code, if would you, and see if you 
15 can find that. 
16 MR. FISHLER: Let's take a short break while we 
17 give John a chance to look at that. 
18 (Recess from 10:37 a.m. to 10:43 a.m.) 
19 Q. (BY MR. FISHLER) Mr. Parsons, you have had a 
2 0 chance to review a portion of the Delaware corporate 
|21 code; correct? 
22 A. I have. 
|2 3 Q. And you would have reviewed that on or about 
;2 4 10/11/02? 
25 A. I believe I would have. 
Page 35 
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1 Q. Does it contain a deadline ior filing an action 
2 in a Court of Chancery? 
3 A. It does. 
4 Q. Let's go over your entry for 10/11. The total 
5 entry would be for how many hours and minutes? 
6 A. I don ' t know. 
7 Q. What would be your hourly rate? 
8 A. I don*t know at tha t time. 
9 Q. We could find out what your hourly rate is and 
10 then we would divide that into 1114. Arid then that could 
11 tell us the total number of hours that you spent for 
12 these four entries, would that be a fair methodology? 
1 3 A. That would be. 
14 Q. Give me an estimate as to your hourly rate. 
15 A. Estimated between 200 and $220 an hour at tha t 
16 time. 
17 Q. Okay. And so using - if that is the number 
18 and we spent an hour and 20 minutes for that entry in 
19 talking on the telephone with CPI officers and directors, 
2 0 how much do you estimate you spent on the phone with 
2 1 Mr. Borghetti? 
22 A. I don't know that I was talking to officers of 
2 3 CP on the phone. I was talking to William and JefT. I 
2 4 don't know if they were officers of Campus Pipeline at 
25 that time. 
Page 3fi 
1 Q. I may have misunderstood what that entry says. 
2 That 1 hour, 20 minutes, is that telephone time? 
3 A That's telephone time, yes. 
4 Q. So does that include — I presume what you are 
5 saying here in this entry is that you talked to 
6 Mr. Borghetti twice? 
7 A. Yes. And Mr. Jones. 
8 Q. And so the 1 hour and 20 minutes, would that be 
9 for the two calls to Mr. Borghetti and Mr. Jones and also 
10 calls to the officers and directors of CPI? 
11 A. I didn't talk to any officers or directors of 
12 CPI. 
13 Q. So the 1 hour and 20 minutes would be a total 
14 telephone time with Mr. Borghetti and Mr. Jones? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Okay. And can you tell me what you said to 
17 them and what they said to you? 
18 A I really do not recall. The gist of it would 
19 have been - I don't recall specifics, but the gist of it 
2 0 would have been my focus on the appraisal rights and what I 
21 these people had to do to preserve their appraisal I 
2 2 rights, the first step they had to do, not the filing in 
2 3 court because that wasn't my focus. I am not the 
2 4 litigation person, as I said earlier. j 
25 So I would have focused on what they had to do I 
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1 timely to preserve their appraisal rights. 
2 Q. Okay. And to preserve appraisal rights, it's a 
3 two-step process? 
4 A. Whatever the statute says. 
5 Q. The first would be to give notice. The second 
6 would be to file your action? 
7 A. If that 's what the statute says, I would agree. 
8 Q. Would you have told him that? 
9 A. I don't know. I don't know whether I focused 
10 at all on the filing of litigation. Again, that is not 
11 sort of my mentality. I was more concerned about them 
12 doing what they needed to do to get down the road. 
13 Q. All right. 
14 A. I mean, get down the road beyond the initial 
15 preservation of rights. 
16 Q. This hour and 20 minutes, these two phone 
17 calls, what else did you discuss besides the deadlines? 
18 A. We would have discussed any potential claims 
19 that they may have against the officers and directors of 
2 0 Campus Pipeline. 
21 Q. Did you discuss the fact that they needed an 
2 2 evaluation of their interest? 
2 3 A. Who needed an evaluation? 
2 4 Q. Jones and Borghetti. 
2 5 A. I don't recall. 
Page, 3B 
1 Q. Did you follow up with a letter? 
2 A I don't think I would have followed this 
3 conversation with a letter. 
4 Q. So you didn't send any confirmation to tell 
5 them what you — or to confirm what you had told them in 
6 these two calls? 
7 A. Not that I recall. 
8 Q. Let's just talk about what your role was. Is 
9 there any question in your mind that you were 
10 representing Mr. Borghetti and Mr. Jones? 
11 A. There was a question in my mind in terms of the 
12 extent of my representation. 
13 Q. And this bill that you sent him, you sent that 
14 on what date, October 31, '02? 
15 A. No, it wouldn't have been sent on October 31. 
16 It would have been sent sometime between the 5th and 15th 
17 of November. 
18 Q. Do you say that just because that is your 
Jl 9 standard practice? 
20 A. Yeah. It's the practice of getting bills— 
21 prebiils out for counsel review. And counsel then 
122 reviews, makes corrections. They go back to the officer 
2 3 manager for finals. And counsel looks at the finals. 
2 4 And depending on schedules, it can be anywhere from a 
2 5 week to ten days to get through that process. 
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Q. The fact — was this bill paid 
A. I don't know. I would have to assume it was. 
Q. All right. So in other words, he called you 
for advice. You gave advice, submitted a bill, and 
presumably he paid it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says here on 10/10/02, the runner service. 
It says runner service to William Borghetti and return. 
Looking at that in context with the first entry, would 
that be an indication how you received the documents is 
that you sent someone out to get them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that your recollection? 
A. It's not my recollection, but I think that 
speaks for itself. That is probably how they got to us 
Q. And presumably there was a phone call or some 
type of communication on or — before you sent the runner] 
out or the runner wouldn't know to go out; right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You say here that you discussed facts, issues, 
theorys, and strategies. 
Do you recall what those were, the strategies 
were? 
A. The strategies would have been to, of course, 
preserve the appraisal rights. And then William and 
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Q. 
A. 
Q-
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
They would not have been present. 
And D. Scofield, that is David Scofield? 
Yes. 
And forgive me, was he a lawyer in your office? 
Yes, he was a partner of mine at the time. 
Okay. So, again, you look at appraisal rights, 
statutory procedures, and you called Mr. Borghetti. 
A. Right. 
Q. And apparently that call lasted 39 minutes? 
A. That's correct 
Q. And this meeting with Mr. Scofield, was that 
before or after the phone call? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. At this time, I have noticed in some of your 
documents that you have letters concerning your 
representation of clients wherein you set forth what you 
will do. And you set forth what your billing process is. 
Do you do that customarily with clients? 
A. When the ethical standards require. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever send the letter to 
Mr. Borghetti and/or Mr. Jones or Mrs. Borghetti 
concerning that -- giving them your billing rates and 
what you planned to do? 
A. Planned to do with respect to this matter? 
Page. 42. 
1 Jeffrey would have had to make a decision if there was no 
2 negotiation process instigated as to whether they were 
3 going to litigate at tha t po in t 
4 Q. All r ight You presumably saw in those 
5 documents that there was a 120-day deadline for filing a 
6 lawsuit in a Chancery Court in Delaware — you saw that 
7 most likely? 
8 A. I saw that I just read that, yes. 
Q. And did you read the statute if they don't do 
that, they would lose their appraisal rights; correct? 
A Well, I didn't pay attention to the statutes, 
but I assume that's what the statute says. 
Q. And did you feel that you had any duty to 
advise them of that deadline? 
A. Well, I am sure I would have discussed with 
16 them if they intended to litigate they had to get 
17 litigation counsel. 
Q. And they had to do that within a certain period 
of time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, on 10/14,1 do not understand that entry. 
22 Is that — was Mr. Borghetti and/or Mr. Jones — were 
2 3 they present or — 
24 A With — present with the meeting with 
25 D. Scofield? 
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1 Q. Yes. 
2 A. W e were p lanning n o t to do any th ing for them. 
3 Q. Pardon? 
4 A. O u r firm was not going to represent them 
5 regarding the appraisal rights in the litigation. 
6 Q. How did you advise them of that, the client? 
7 A. I advised them tha t w e d o n ' t d o contingency fee 
8 work and that they should seek counsel with other firms. 
9 Q. All right When you talked on the 14th, was it 
1 0 just with Mr. Borghetti? 
1 1 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And you advised him on 10/11 or 10/14 that you 
;13 would not do a contingency fee work? 
14 A. T h e best of my recollection, it would have been 
1 5 on one of those dates. 
1 6 Q. But could an appraisal rights case be taken on 
17 an hourly rate? 
18 A. I am sure it could be . 
1 9 Q. Okay. Were you interested in that? 
20 A. I don't recall 
J21 Q. What is Mr. Scofield's specialty? 
2 2 A. He is a litigator. 
12 3 Q. If he was a litigator, is there any specific 
2 4 reason that you were talking to him on October 14? 
[2 5 A. It had something to do with shareholder rights, 
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1 appraisal demand, but I don't know the specifics. 
2 Q. Okay. Do you know if Mr. Scofield made any 
3 time entries on this matter? 
4 A. They would have been on this statement had he. 
5 Q. Okay. What type of litigation does 
6 Mr. Scofield do? 
7 A. General litigator. 
8 Q. In your view, would he be competent to handle 
9 an appraisal rights litigation? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Why do you say that? 
12 A. Because I don't think he ever handled one. 
13 Q. Has he ever done a derivative shareholders 
14 action, plaintiffs counsel? 
15 A. I don' t know. 
16 Q. Did Mr. Borghetti ever tell you that he was 
17 talking to other lawyers? 
18 A. Somewhat, sometime. After I referred him, in 
19 those October dates, to some counsel, somewhere after 
2 0 that, long after that, I am sure that he told me that he 
21 had engaged counsel. 
22 Q. Did you refer him to anyone? I 
23 A. Well, I remember referring him over to 
2 4 Steve Crockett 's firm only because I have referred work 
25 to Steve Crockett in past years. And I thought that that 
P a g e 44 
1 Q. Even though his name is not in the title of the 
2 firm? 
3 A. Right 
4 Q. When you talked about analyzing damage issues, 
5 can you recall what you said about that? 
6 A. I don't recall. 
7 Q. Okay. Did you discuss whether or not you could 
8 simultaneously have — proceed with an appraisal action 
9 and fraud action against directors? 
10 A. That would have been beyond my capability. 
11 Q. Where were you meeting with Mr. Scofield if you 
12 didn't think he was capable of handling it? 
13 A. I can only speculate if you want me to 
14 speculate. And that would be that there was something in 
15 the statute that I wanted to check on. Some question 
16 must have come in my mind. 
17 Q. And because you were talking with Mr. Scofield, 
18 would it be a question that would involve litigation? 
19 A. Not necessarily. 
[2 0 Q. Do you believe you advised Mr. Borghetti and 
2 1 Mr. Jones of all the deadlines that were pertinent? 
|2 2 A. Certainly the ones that they wanted me to look 
23 a t 
|24 Q. You say you analyzed damages. In what context, 
25 do you recall? 
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1 firm would be very good for William in terms of handling 
2 the appraisal rights. 
3 Q. And what part of the appraisal rights? Are you 
4 talking about the notice or the filing of the lawsuit? 
5 A. I don't - at this point, I don't remember 
6 being involved in filing any notice for them. So it 
7 probably was the whole thing. 
8 Q. All right. And so when you said this firm does 
9 not do this type of thing, you need someone who can get 
10 involved in litigation because the appraisal process may 
11 include litigation; correct? 
12 A. I would only add to that that — the 
13 contingency fee piece of it also. 
14 Q. Okay. But if — even if he would be willing to 
15 pay your firm on an hourly basis, you did not want to get 
16 involved in that litigation? 
17 A. Well, I really donft recall. We had other 
18 litigators in the office. I never went further than 
19 David Scofield. 
20 Q. Who were the other people that do litigation? 
21 A. Well, at that time, Glen Davies probably would 
2 2 have been the one that I would have gone to if we handled 
2 3 the case. 
24 Q. And Glen Davies, was he with your firm then? 
25 A. Yes. 
P a g e 45! 
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1 A. It would have been general discussion of wha t 
2 may be involved in terms of recovery, 
3 Q. Okay. Did you talk about the fact that there 
4 were these preferred shareholders that would get the 
5 first moneys that were paid? 
6 A, I don't recall 
7 Q. Did you keep any notes of these conversations? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Did you advise them that there was a 120-day 
10 deadline? 
1 1 A. I don ft recall. 
12 Q. Do you believe that you had an obligation to 
1 3 advise them? 
14, A. I believe I had an obligation to advise them. 
1 5 Q. And if you had an obligation, you would have 
1 6 done that, wouldn't you? 
17 A. Uh-huh, yes. 
18 Q. Yes? 
19 A. Yes. 
2 0 Q. Do you recall whether or not William mentioned 
21 to you that he had any other attorneys working for him or 
2 2 Dirty Dozen at the same time you were working on his 
2 3 problem? 
2 4 A. I donft recall that. 
|2 5 Q. Did he mention to you that he was interviewing 
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General 
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October 31, 2002 
Client No: 25027-01M 
Statement No: 131557 
10/10/2002 
JP 
10/11/2002 
JP 
10/14/2002 
JP 
10/29/2002 
JP 
Receive and commence review/analysis of CPI/SCT 
merger documents and fairness opinion. 
Complete review of select provisions of Campus 
Pipeline merger and related documents; telecom 
to (2x) W. Borghetti and J. Jones discuss 
facts, issues, theories and strategies 
regarding shareholder appraisal rights and 
claims of action against SCT, CPI, officers and 
directors(1hr 20mins); review documents for 
critical deadlines. 
Final review of Delaware appraisal rights 
statutory procedures; telecom from and to W, 
Borghetti discuss/analyze/strategize appraisal 
rights procedures and analyze damages 
issues{39mins); meeting with D. Scofield 
analyze shareholder rights of recovery in 
appraisal demand, 
Receive, review and analyze email from W. 
Borghetti regarding strategies for CPI sale to 
SCT; telecom(vm) to WB regarding status and 
strategies in moving SCT/CPI issues forward. 
For Current Services Rendered 1,114.00 
10/10/2002 Runner Service - Runner service to William 
Borghetti and return. 28,50 
am 
Wil l iam Borghett i 
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11/02/2002 
JP 
11/04/2002 
JP 
11/18/2002 
JP 
Draf t ing non-disclosure/use agreement regarding 
c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f in format ion i n connection to 
SCT/CPI va luat ion claims and review Rule of 
Procedure 504 regarding j o i n t defense issues. 
Telecom from W. Borghet t i discuss fac ts / issues 
regarding CPI claims(16mins); review, rev ise , 
augment and . f i na l i ze NDA and t ransmi t t o 
c l i ent. 
Receive email from W.Borghetti regarding 
appraisal r i gh ts w i t h respect t o CPI merger; 
review Delaware appraisal r i gh t s s ta tu te and 
reply email to WB regarding assert ion of 
appraisal r i g h t s . 
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TabG 
Subject; Quick Question. 
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 08:45:57-0700 
From: WilEamBorghetti <williain@borgh.ettixom> 
To: John Parsons <jp@pdkpIaw.com> 
Hi CTohn, 
Hope you had a great weekend and are doing well. 
Quick question for you. To what address should we send our demand for 
appraisal consistent with Section 262 of the DGCL? To SCT? TO CP? I 
have the letter written and ready to go. 
Thanks. -w-
I of] 
5/15/2006 11:17 AM 
Subject: Re: Qnick Question. 
Bate: Mon, 18 Nov 2002 12:30:03 -0700 
From: John Parsons <jp@pdkplaw.oom> 
Organization: Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn & Peters 
To: William Borghetti <william@borghetti.com> 
Dear William: 
The Delaware appraisal rights statute states that the a constituted 
corporation before the effective date of the merger, or the resulting 
corporation within 10 days after the effective date of the merger, shall 
notify each shareholder entitled to appraisal rights that the merger was 
approved and *that their appraisal rights may be exercised. Each such 
shareholder entitled to appraisal rights within 20 days after the date of 
mailing such notice shall demand in writing from the resulting corporation 
the appraisal of the shareholder's stock. This procedure is applicable only 
if, among other things, the merger was approved by shareholders1 consent 
rather than at a shareholders1 meeting. It is my understand (I have not 
verified this fact) that, if the merger was approved, such approval .was via 
a shareholders' consent without a shareholders1 meeting. The above 
statements are taken from Tab E, page 3, of the materials sent to you by 
CPI. I suggest you determine whether the merger was approved and if so 
when did it become effective. Darin or some other insided would have this 
information. Also, you could call corporate counsel who could provide this 
information regarding which, as a shareholder, you are entitled. Please 
let me know if I can be of further assistance. 
Best regards, 
John 
William Borghetti wrote: 
> Hi John, 
:> 
> Hope you had a g r e a t weekend and are doing- well. 
> 
> Quick question for you. To what address should we send our demand for 
> appraisal consistent with Section 2S2 of the DGCL? To SCT? TO CP? J 
> have the l e t t e r written and ready to go. 
> 
> Thanks. -IV-
TabH 
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From: Jeff Williams 
To: William Borghetti 
Date: 11/11/02 5:03PM 
Subject: RE: Campus Pipeline 
Tuesday works best for me. What time? My schedule is flexible all day. Jeff. 
> » "Willram Borghetti" <william@borghetti.com> 11/11/02 02:47PM > » 
Got your note. Next week is fine. \ would suggest Monday or Tuesday 
for getting together as I might be out of town for the Thanksgiving 
break. 
We have spent time, as I communicated to you in our meeting together, 
interviewing counselors and various firms. We have narrowed our list 
down considerably and will be prepared to make a decision soon. An in 
person meeting would be helpful for me and Jeff Jones as part of this 
process. 
Thanks for your time and feel free to contact me should you have any 
questions. 
Best regards, William 
—Original Message— 
From: Jeff WiHiams rmailto Jsw©bcoclaw com] 
Sent Monday, November 11, 2002 2:21 PM 
To- wiHiam^borohetti com 
Subject Campus Pipeline 
William, Thanks for the information. I will run a conflict checkf and 
circulate the attachment to my partners for consideration. This week 
will be hard for me in terms of a meeting. How does next week look for 
Jeff and you? Let me know what you think. I understand that I have 
said this beforef but I need to confirm in writing again that we do not 
yet represent you and have not accepted representation in this matter. 
Moreover, from your side, it is my understanding that you have not yet 
retained counsel, and are still considering other firms. 
Sincerely, Jeff. 
> » "William Borghetti" <william@borqhetti com> 11/11/02 01*1BPM > » 
Hi Jeff, 
Hope you had a great weekend. Thank you again for spending time with 
me 
last week. I have talked with Jeff Jones and we would enjoy meeting 
you 
this week. Please let me know what time is convenient for you. 
Best regards, 
Kb:.He: potential Gonr -y Matter 
From: Jeff Williams 
To: William Borghetti 
Date: 12/4/02 9:23AM 
Subject: RE: Re: Potential Contingency Matter 
Hello William, 
Has anything changed since we last met? I have received research results on one of the critical issues. 
It appears that if fraud exists, shareholders may not be limited to the appraisal remedy. This, however, 
forces the need to resolve the contours of a potential fraud claim against the protection provided by the 
business judgment rule. This research is not yet complete. I believe that! should be in a position to 
discuss this case again (including a conclusion regarding whether the firm is prepared to go forward on a 
contingency basis, or be involved in the case) by sometime next week. How is your schedule? 
Jeff. 
> » "William Borghetti" <william@gardnertech.com> 11/12/02 Q2:54PM > » 
Hi Jeff, 
We'll spend some time on our side thinking through this, but the 
valuation that Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs came up with (who were 
selected as co-lead underwriters for our IPO was equal to our greater 
than $500M. With my stake and Jeffs (on an as-converted basis) 
representing -14%, that equated to roughly in $70M in shareholder value 
for the two of us. 
You can understand the heartburn we have with recent events. The 
valuation has only gone down since then for a variety of reasons. 
Corporate mismanagement being the most significant. 
I look forward to discussing this further when we meet 
Best, -W-
—Original Message— 
From: Jeff Williams fmailto:Jsw® bcpclaw.cornl 
Sent Tuesday, November 12, 2002 11:34 AM 
To: wilftarn@Qardnertech.com 
Subject Fwd: Re: Potential Contingency Matter 
HBTO are some thoughts from Gary. Maybe we could discuss these on 
Tuesday. Jeff. 
> » Gary Bendinger 11/12/02 11:16AM > » 
couple of other thoughts, there must have been valuations done in 
connection with going public, what did those reflect and what happened 
to value of company between then and transaction that closed? could 
also insist that valuation be done as of transaction date by consultant 
now to give us ballpark of what independent analyst would value it at. 
also interested in knowing more about other damage methodologies that 
are more lucrative. 
Gary F. Bendinger 
Attorney at Law 
Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson & Casey, PC 
qf b @ bcpclaw,corn 
(801)533-8383 
BCPC 0138 
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From: Jeff Williams 
To: chb 
Date: 12/30/02 8:57AM 
Subject Fwd: Re: Potential Contingency Matter 
File Campus Pipeline. 
> » William Borghetti <william@borghetti.com> 12/29/02 04:46PM > » 
Hi Jeff, 
Thanks for your call on Friday. I did speak with Jeff and we're excited 
to learn more from your preliminary research on Delaware case law that 
might be relevant to our case. 
Just so you know, we have narrowed down our list of potential firms 
considerably. I believe that we need a smart aggressive and 
established SLC-based firm to lead us through this process. Although we 
haven't had a chance to see you in action yet, I am under the impression 
that you fit the above criteria well. 
As I mentioned to you, we are eager to move forward. Let's try to chat 
sometime next week-
Best wishes this New Year! 
William 
Jeff Williams wrote: 
>Call me when you have time. My cell number by the way is 801-243-9102. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
»»Wil l iarn Borghetti <williamfS)borqhetti.com> 12/21/02 08:35AM » > 
> > » 
» » 
>HI Jeff, 
> 
>Sorry J missed you yesterday. With the holidays approaching I have 
>been 
>crushed. I have you on my calendar for first thing Monday AM. I'll 
Houch base with you then. 
> 
>Hope you have a great weekend. 
> 
>Bestf -W-
> 
>Jeff Williams wrote: 
> 
> 
> 
>>l should be around. J. 
» 
BCPC 0088 
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TAYLOR, Wilmington, Delaware; and Thomas E. 
Chomicz of WILSON & McILVANE, Chicago, Illinois; 
Attorneys for Petitioners. 
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JUDGES: JACOBS, VICE CHANCELLOR. 
OPINION BY: JACOBS 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
JACOBS, VICE CHANCELLOR 
This appraisal action, brought under 8 Del C. § 262, 
arises out of a "cash-out" merger (the "Merge") of M.G. 
Bancorporation, Inc. ("MGB") into its corporate parent, 
Southwest Bancorp, Inc. ("Southwest") on November 17, 
1993. The Merger consideration was $ 41 per share, 
which the Petitioners claim was inadequate because 
MGB's fair value as of the Merger date was at least $ 85 
per share. The Petitioners also seek 10% compound in-
terest on their appraisal [*2] award, plus their costs and 
expenses including reasonable expert witness and attor-
ney's fees. 
The Respondents contend that the fair value as of 
the Merger date was $ 41.90 per share and that 8% sim-
ple interest is appropriate. 
For the reasons discussed below, the Court con-
cludes that (i) the fair value of MGB's shares at the time 
of the Merger was $ 58,514,000, or $ 85 per share, (ii) 
the Petitioners are entitled to 8% interest compounded 
monthly, and (iii) the Petitioners are not entitled to an 
award of legal fees or expenses. 
I. FACTS 
A. The Parties and the Merger 
The Petitioners are shareholders who owned 18,151 
shares of common stock of MGB before the Merger. The 
Respondents are Southwest Bancorp, Inc. ("Southwest") 
and its subsidiary, MGB. Before the Merger, MGB was a 
Delaware-chartered bank holding company headquar-
tered in Worth, Illinois. MGB had two operating Illinois-
chartered bank subsidiaries, Mount Greenwood Bank 
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("Greenwood") and Worth Bancorp, Inc ("WBC") Both 
banks served customers in the southwestern Chicago 
metropolitan area MGB owned 100% of Mount Green-
wood and 75 5% of WBC 
Before the Merger, Southwestern owned 91 68% of 
MGB's common shares On [*3] November 17, 1993, 
MGB was merged into Southwest in a "short form 
merger" under 8 Del C § 253 Because the Merger was 
accomplished unilaterally, neither MGB's board of direc-
tors nor its minority shareholders were legally required 
to, or did, vote on the transaction MGB's minority 
shareholders were offered $ 41 in cash per share in the 
Merger The Petitioners rejected that offer, electing in-
stead to pursue their statutory appraisal rights 
To assist it in setting the Merger price, Southwest 
engaged Alex Sheshunoff & Co Investment Bankers 
("Sheshunoff) to determine the "fan* market value" of 
MGB's minority shares In a report submitted to South-
west on or about October 28, 1993, Sheshunoff deter-
mined that the fair market value of MGB's minority 
shares was $ 41 per share as of June 30, 1993 ' Thereaf-
ter, a stockholders breach of fiduciary duty damage ac-
tion was filed attacking the Merger, and this appraisal 
proceedmg was also commenced On July 5, 1995, this 
Court issued an Opmion m the companion class action, 
holdmg that Sheshunoff had performed its appraisal m a 
legally improper manner The basis for the Court's con-
clusion was that Sheshunoff had determined only [*4] 
the "fair market value" of MGB's minority shares, as 
opposed to valuing MGB in its entirety as a going con-
cern and determining the fair value of the minority shares 
as a pro-rata percentage of that value 2 
1 Pet'rs Exhibit Number 5 
2 Neb el v Southwest Bancorp, Inc, 1995 Del 
Ch LEXIS80, *ll ,Del C h , C A No 13618, Ja-
cobs, V C (July 5, 1995) 
B The Petitioners' Valuation 
The Petitioners commenced this appraisal proceed-
mg on March 15, 1994 The case was tried on December 
2-5, 1996 At trial the Petitioners' expert witness, David 
Clarke ("Clarke"), testified that as of the Merger date the 
fair value of MGB common stock was at least $ 85 per 
share In arriving at that conclusion, Clarke used three 
distmct methodologies to value MGB's two operatmg 
bank subsidiaries (l) the comparative publicly-traded 
company approach, (n) the discounted cash flow 
("DCF") method, and (in) the comparative acquisition 
technique Clarke then added a control premium to the 
values of the two subsidiaries to [*5] reflect the value of 
the holdmg company's (MGB's) controlling mterest in 
those subsidiaries 3 Lastly, Clarke then added the value 
of MGB's remammg assets to the sum of his valuations 
of the two subsidiaries, to arrive at an overall fair value 
of$ 85 per share for MGB 
3 The Petitioners had instructed Clarke that 
Delaware law mandated such a premium at the 
subsidiary level, relymg on Rapid American v 
Harris 603 A 2d 796, 804-05 (1992) In Rapid-
American the Supreme Court of Delaware held 
that the trial court had erred by failing to include 
a 'control premium' m valuing the subsidiaries of 
a holdmg company that was the subject of an ap-
praisal "We disagree wilh the trial court's charac-
terization of that 'control premium' m this case as 
an impermissible shareholder level adjustment 
The 'control premium' represented a valid 
adjustment to its valuation model which 'applied 
a [bonus] at the company-level agamst all assets 
'" (citing Cavalier Oil Corp v Harnett Del 
Supr, 564 A 2d 1137 (1989)) 
[*6] What follows is a more detailed description of 
how Clarke performed his valuation(s) of MGB 
1 Comparative Company Approach 
Clarke's comparative publicly-traded company ap-
proach mvolved five steps (1) identifying an appropriate 
set of comparable companies, (2) identifying the multi-
ples of earnings and book value at which the comparable 
companies traded, (3) comparing certain of MGB's fi-
nancial fundamentals (e g, return on assets and return on 
equity) to those of the comparable companies, (4) mak-
ing certain adjustments to those financial fundamentals, 
and (5) addmg an appropriate control premium After 
completmg the first four steps, Clarke arrived at a value 
for WBC of $ 33 059 million ($ 48 02 per share), and for 
Greenwood of $ 20 952 million ($ 30 44 per share) 
Clarke next determined that during the period January 
1989 to June 1993, acquirors of controlling interests m 
publicly-traded companies had paid an average premium 
of at least 35% On that basis, Clarke concluded that a 
35% premium was appropriate, and applied that pre-
mium to the values he had determined for Greenwood 
and WBC, to arrive at fair values of $ 43 3 million ($ 
62 90 per share) for [*7] WBC and $ 27 1 million ($ 
39 37 per share) for Greenwood, respectively Clarke 
then valued MGB's 75 5% controlling interest m WBC at 
$ 32 691 million ($ 47 49 per share), and MGB's 100% 
mterest m Greenwood at $ 27 1 million ($ 39 37 per 
share), under his comparative company approach 
2 Discounted Cash Flow Approach 
Clarke's DCF valuation analysis mvolved four steps 
(1) projectmg the future net cash flows available to 
MGB's shareholders for ten years after the Merger date, 
(2) discounting those future cash flows to present value 
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as of the Merger date by using a discount rate based on 
the weighted average cost of capital ("WACC"), (3) add-
ing a terminal value that represented the present value of 
all future cash flows generated after the ten year projec-
tion period, and (4) applying a control premium to the 
sum of (2) and (3). 
Clarke did not create his own cash flow projections. 
He used the projections made by Sheshunoff at the time 
of the Merger, because Southwest's own management 
had accepted those projections when they fixed the 
Merger price. Clarke also accepted Sheshunoff s ten year 
projection period, because he independently had con-
cluded that it would [*8] require ten years for MGB's 
cash flows to stabilize. Based on a 1996 Ibbotson Asso-
ciates ("Ibbotson") study of the banking industry, Clarke 
concluded that the appropriate "small stock" premium to 
be used in the capital asset pricing model ("CAPM") to 
determine MGB's discount rate (WACC), was 1%, and 
that the appropriate discount rate (WACC) for MGB was 
12%. Applying that 12% discount rate, Clarke calculated 
the present value of WBC's future cash flows to be $ 
17.251 million, and WBC's terminal value to be $ 14.824 
million. Applying that same 12% discount rate, Clarke 
arrived at a present value of $ 10.937 million, and a ter-
minal value of $ 9.138 million, for Greenwood. 
Applying the same 35% control premium to those 
values of the two subsidiaries, Clarke calculated MGB's 
75.5% interest in WBC at $ 33.824 million or $ 49.14 
per share; and MGB's 100% interest in Greenwood at $ 
28.3 million, or $ 41.11 per share. 
3. Comparative Acquisition Approach 
Clarke's third valuation approach, the comparative 
acquisition method, focused upon multiples of MGB's 
last twelve months earnings and its tangible book value. 
Those multiples were determined by reference to the 
prices at [*9] which the stock of comparable companies 
had been sold in transactions involving the sale of con-
trol. Unlike the comparative company and DCF valua-
tion approaches, this method did not require adding a 
control premium to the values of the subsidiaries because 
under that methodology, the parent holding company's 
controlling interest in the subsidiaries was already ac-
counted for. 
In valuing MGB under his third approach, Clarke 
identified three transactions involving community banks 
in the relevant geographic area that occurred within one 
year of the Merger. He also considered data published by 
The Chicago Corporation in its September 1993 issue of 
Midwest Bank & Thrift Survey. 4 From these sources, 
Clarke determined that (i) control of WBC could be sold 
for a price between a multiple of 14 times WBC's last 
twelve months' earnings and 200% of WBC's tangible 
book value, and that (ii) control of Greenwood could be 
sold for a price between a multiple of 12 times Green-
wood's last twelve months' earnings and 175% of its tan-
gible book value. Giving equal weight to these two sets 
of values, Clarke valued MGB's 75.5% interest in WBC 
at $ 28.8 million (75.5% x $ 38.1 million) or $ 41.84 
[*10] per share, and MGB's 100% interest in Green-
wood, at $ 22.9 million, or $ 33.27 per share. 
4 That data reflected an analysis of 137 bank 
acquisitions announced from January 1, 1989 to 
June 1, 1993. 
4. MGB's Remaining Assets 
Having valued MGB's two subsidiaries, Clarke then 
determined the fair value of MGB's remaining net assets, 
which included (i) a $ 6.83 million note payable by 
Southwest, (ii) certain intangibles that Clarke did not 
include in his valuation, (iii) $ 78,000 in cash, and (iv) 
other assets worth $ 2000. These assets totaled $ 6.91 
million, from which Clarke subtracted liabilities of $ 
96,000 to arrive at a net asset value of $ 6.814 million ($ 
9.90 per share) for MGB's remaining assets. 
5. Fair Value Computation 
Clarke then added the values he had determined un-
der each of his valuation methodologies, for (i) MGB's 
75.5% interest in WBC, (ii) MGB's 100% interest in 
Greenwood, and (iii) MGB's 100% interest in its remain-
ing assets. Under his comparative publicly-traded [*11] 
method, Clarke concluded that MGB's value was $ 76.59 
per share with no control premium, and $ 96.76 per share 
with a control premium. Under his DCF approach, 
Clarke determined that MGB's value was $ 74.75 per 
share with no control premium, and $ 100.15 per share 
with a control premium. And under his comparative ac-
quisitions method, Clarke concluded that MGB's mini-
mum fair value was $ 85 per share, which represented 
the median of the values described above. 
C. The Respondents' Valuation 
At trial the Respondents did not call the Sheshunoff 
firm as a witness, even though its valuation had served as 
the basis for the $ 41 per share Merger price. Instead, the 
Respondents relied upon the testimony of Mr. Robert 
Reilly ("Reilly"), 5 who opined that as of the Merger 
date, the fair value of MGB common stock was $ 41.90 
per share ~ only 90 cents per share more than Sheshun-
offs $ 41 valuation. Reilly arrived at that result by per-
forming two separate valuations: a DCF analysis and a 
"capital market" analysis. Reilly did not include any con-
trol premium, having determined that a control premium 
was inappropriate in valuing a holding company such as 
MGB. 
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5 Reilly is an expert in performing business 
valuations. He was formerly the National Direc-
tor of Valuation Services for Deloitte and Touche 
and is an accredited senior appraiser and a certi-
fied public accountant. The Petitioners claim that 
Reilly's entire valuation should be rejected be-
cause Reilly had no significant experience in 
valuing banks or bank holding companies, and 
was therefore not competent to value bank hold-
ing companies. Although the Court ultimately re-
jects Reilly's valuations, it is for reasons that con-
cern the merits of his valuation approaches, not 
his expertise. 
[*12] \. DCF Analysis 
Reilly's DCF analysis consisted of: (1) projecting 
MGB's future net cash flows available to shareholders 
for a period of five years after the Merger date, (2) de-
termining an appropriate discount rate and discounting 
those future cash flows back to the Merger date, and (3) 
adding a terminal value that represented the present 
value of all future cash flows beyond the five year pro-
jection period. Reilly used a five year period, because in 
his opinion any longer interval would be too speculative. 
Relying on a 1992 Ibbotson study that was not specific to 
the banking industry, he also concluded that 5.2% was 
the appropriate small stock size premium to use in the 
CAPM for purposes of determining the WACC for 
MGB. 
In determining an appropriate discount rate, Reilly 
concluded that MGB was subject to certain company-
specific risks, namely, litigation involving its data proc-
essor (BYSIS) and MGB's dependence upon a single key 
supplier. Reilly quantified those risks at four percentage 
points, and on that basis concluded that the appropriate 
discount rate for MGB was 18%. Applying that 18% 
discount rate to MGB's future cash flows, Reilly valued 
MGB at $ 29.220 million, [*13] or $ 42.45 per share, on 
the basis of his DCF approach. 
2. Capital Market Method 
Reilly's second method for valuing MGB was the 
"capital market" method, which involved: (1) identifying 
a portfolio of guideline publicly-traded companies, (2) 
identifying appropriate pricing multiples for those com-
panies, (3) using the multiples for the guideline compa-
nies to calculate the appropriate pricing multiples for 
MGB 6 and (4) applying the multiples to the correspond-
ing financial indicators for MGB. By this method, Reilly 
concluded that MGB was worth $ 28.4 million, or $ 
41.26 per share, at the time of the Merger. 
6 Reilly's pricing multiples were all related to 
the market value of invested capital ("MVIC"). 
Reilly computed the ratios of MVIC to: (1) earn-
ings before interest and taxes ("EBIT"); (2) earn-
ings before interest, depreciation and taxes 
("EBIDT"); (3) debt free net income ("DFNI"); 
(4) debt free cash flow ("DFCF"); (5) interest in-
comes; and (6) total book value of invested capi-
tal ("TBVIC"). 
[*14] Reilly then averaged his DCF and capital 
market valuations, to arrive at an ultimate fair value for 
MGB of$ 41.90 per share. 
For ease of reference, the parties' respective valua-
tion conclusions are summarized in the chart below. At 
the trial, Petitioners introduced evidence of what MGB's 
value would be if Sheshunoff s valuation were updated to 
the Merger date and if its minority discount were elimi-
nated. Because of its importance to the analysis, that 
updated and revised valuation is also summarized below. 
Valuation in 
$ '000's: 
Petitioners 
(Clarke) 
Comparative 
Publicly-Traded 
Method: 
With Control 
Premium: 
DCF Method: 
With Control 
Premium: 
Comparative 
Acquisitions 
WBC 
33,059 j 
43,300 
32,075 
44,800 
75.5% 
of WBC 
24,960 
32,692 
24,217 
33,824 
Greenwood 
20,952 
27,100 
20,079 
28,300 
Other 
Assets 
6,814 
6,814 
6,814 
6,814 
Total 
52,726 
66,606 
51,110 
68,938 
Per 
Share 
76.59 
96.76 
74.25 
100.15 
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Valuation in 
$ '000's: 
Method: 
Respondents 
(Reilly) 
Capital 
Market 
Method: 
DCF Method: 
Sheshunoff 
(Updated) 
(Without 
Control 
Premium) 
Adjusted Book 
Value: 
Adjusted 
Earnings 
Value: 
WBC 
38,100 
75.5% 
of WBC 
28,800 
Greenwood 
22,900 
Other 
Assets 
6,814 
Total 
58,514 
28,400 
29,220 
Per 
Share 
85.00 = fair 
41.26 
42.45 
value 
Average: 41.90 = fan-
64.13 
76.80 
value 
[*15] II. THE PARTIES' VALUATION 
CONTENTIONS 
A. The Petitioners' Contentions 
The Petitioners contend, for various reasons, that the 
$ 41 Merger price did not represent MGB's fair value at 
the time of the Merger, and that the valuations offered by 
the Respondents' trial expert to support that price are 
fundamentally flawed. The Petitioners argue that Reilly's 
"capital market" approach and DCF analysis are legally 
deficient because Reilly failed to apply a control pre-
mium to the resulting values of the MGB subsidiaries, as 
Rapid-American requires. 7 The Petitioners also claim 
that the Court should reject Reilly's "capital market" ap-
proach in its entirety because it is not recognized and 
accepted in the financial community. Alternatively, Peti-
tioners argue that even if Reilly's capital market ap-
proach is accepted, the values he arrived at by that 
method must be rejected, because the MVIC-related ra-
tios upon which Reilly relied are irrelevant and inappro-
priate measures to value bank holding companies. Fi-
nally, the Petitioners contend that Reilly's comparative 
publicly-traded company approach is flawed because 
Reilly's "comparable" companies were banks located 
outside the relevant [*16] geographic region (the Chi-
cago suburbs) and (in certain cases) outside MGB's field 
of business.8 
7 See n. 3, supra. 
8 The Petitioners assert that MGB's fair value is 
even greater than what Clarke determined it to be, 
because Clarke's valuation omits the value of 
MGB's breach of fiduciary duty claims against 
the Respondents. The Petitioners claim that (1) 
Southwest engaged in self-dealing loans and 
usurped corporate opportunities that rightly be-
longed to MGB; (2) Southwest engaged in a self-
dealing allocation of expenses that favored itself 
at the expense of MGB; and (3) Southwest 
wrongfully caused MGB's subsidiary banks to en-
ter into contracts with BYSIS, its former data 
processing service provider, to their detriment. 
Because the Petitioners did not include these 
claims in their valuation, the Court does not ad-
dress them. 
The Petitioners also claim that Reilly's DCF analy-
sis is deficient because it is a form of a minority stock 
valuation that is prohibited under Delaware appraisal 
law. 9 Reilly's [*17] DCF analysis is also flawed, Peti-
tioners assert, because Reilly and Southwest seized upon 
the "key supplier dependence" risk and the litigation 
risks involving MGB's former data process service pro-
vider ("BYSIS"), as a contrivance to support an unfairly 
low valuation of MGB. The Petitioners further contend 
that Reilly erroneously relied on the 1992 Ibbotson study 
to determine the WACC for MGB, because the financial 
data contained in the more recent 1996 Ibbotson study 
was specific to the banking industry and, thus, more reli-
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able. Finally, the Petitioners claim that Reilly's use of 
five year projections, rather than the ten year projections 
Sheshunoff employed, was erroneous. 
9 See n. 2; supra, Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 
Del Supr., 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (1989) ("In re-
jecting a minority or marketability discount, the 
Vice Chancellor concluded that the objective of a 
section 262 appraisal is 'to value the corporation 
itself; as distinguished from a specific fraction of 
its shares as they may exist in the hands of a par-
ticular shareholder' [emphasis in original].") 
[*18] B. The Respondents' Contentions 
Not surprisingly, the Respondents dispute these ar-
guments and take the position that the Petitioners' valua-
tion methodologies are improper and must be disre-
garded, on several grounds. 
The Respondents first argue that it is improper to 
add a control premium of any kind to the value of MGB's 
subsidiaries, because that approach violates the require-
ment that the corporation be valued as a going concern. 
Respondents contend that Rapid-American ~ the author-
ity upon which Petitioners rely - does not mandate the 
application of a control premium in this case, because in 
Rapid, the holding company subsidiaries at issue were 
involved in unrelated industries, whereas here MGB's 
two subsidiaries were both banks. The Respondents also 
argue that Clarke's inclusion of a control premium is 
proscribed by the command of 8 Del. C. § 262(h) that 
"fair value" be determined exclusive of post-merger 
events or other possible speculative post-merger business 
combinations. Respondents urge that increasing each 
subsidiary's value by adding a control premium; amounts 
to valuing MGB on the basis of the subsidiaries' acquisi-
tion value, rather than as a going [*19] concern. For 
these reasons, Respondents conclude that the control 
premia Clarke employed in performing his DCF and 
comparative company valuations are legally erroneous 
and must be rejected. 
The Respondents next attack Clarke's DCF valuation 
on the basis that it employs a ten year projection period 
that, Respondents say, is inherently speculative and unre-
liable. Clarke's DCF valuation was also flawed (Respon-
dents argue) because the "small stock" premium Clarke 
used to arrive at a 12% discount rate was derived not 
from the 1992 Ibbotson study that existed on the Merger 
date, but from a 1996 Ibbotson study that was compiled 
three years after the Merger had occurred. Therefore, the 
12% discount rate, which is based on impermissible post-
Merger data, must be rejected. Finally, the Respondents 
claim that in any event, Clarke's 12% discount rate was 
too low because it improperly failed to take into account 
the "key supplier dependence" risk and the risk of litiga-
tion involving MGB's former data process server, 
BYSIS, confronting MGB at the time of the Merger. 
The Respondents also attack Clarke's comparative 
publicly-traded company approach. They argue that 
Clarke considered only two multiples [*20] — price-to-
earnings and price-to-book value - both of which in-
volved distortions in the debt-to-equity ratios of Clarke's 
selected comparable companies and MGB. Respondents 
further criticize Clarke for (i) relying upon comparable 
company stock prices as of September 30, 1993 - six 
weeks before the November 17, 1993 Merger date — 
rather than as of the date immediately before the Merger 
was announced; and (ii) using historical financial aver-
ages for the five years preceding the Merger, rather than 
for the 2.75 year period before the Merger, as Reilly did. 
10
 Finally, the Respondents contend that Clarke's valua-
tion improperly failed to take into account the fact that 
MGB's subsidiaries (i) had poor prospects for growth or 
expansion, (ii) were located in geographic areas that did 
not have significant population growth, and (iii) faced 
significant competition. 
10 Reilly concluded that the banking industry 
had changed too dramatically to justify a longer 
projection period. 
These contentions are flow addressed. 
[*21] III. ANALYSIS 
To determine the fair value of MGB's shares as of 
the Merger date, this Court must decide three issues. 
The first is whether Reilly's "capital market" valua-
tion approach is legally permissible in this case. The spe-
cific question is whether that valuation method is gener-
ally accepted or recognized in the financial community 
for purposes of valuing a bank or bank holding company. 
Neither side contests the validity per se of either the 
comparative publicly-traded company or the DCF valua-
tion approaches. Both sides claim that the other improp-
erly applied those methodologies to MGB. That frames 
the second set of issues regarding Clarke's publicly-
traded company analysis, which are: (i) did Clarke use 
the proper financial indicators, (ii) did Clarke errone-
ously rely upon stock price quotes for the six weeks pre-
ceding the Merger, and (iii) was five years an appropriate 
historical period to compare the financial indicators and 
to make future growth projections? Respecting each 
side's DCF analysis, the issues concern (i) the appropri-
ate discount rate and (ii) the appropriate projection pe-
riod. 
The third issue is whether Clarke's comparative ac-
quisition approach [*22] - in which a control premium 
is inherent - is legally permissible in this case. n 
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11 The specific control premium issue is 
whether Rapid American requires including a 
control premium as an element of the value of 
operating subsidiaries whenever the parent hold-
ing company is the corporation being appraised 
(as the Petitioners urge), or whether a control 
premium is appropriate only where the subsidiar-
ies are in different businesses (as the Respondents 
urge). 
For the reasons next discussed, the Court deter-
mines that (a) Reilly's "capital market" approach is le-
gally impermissible, but even if valid, was improperly 
applied, thereby requiring the rejection of the values 
Reilly derived by that method; (b) both Clarke's and 
Reilly's DCF analyses were improperly applied, thereby 
requiring the rejection of the values both experts derived 
by that approach; (c) Clarke's comparative acquisition 
approach was a legally valid method to value MGB, and 
(d) the credible evidence of record supports Clarke's $ 85 
per [*23] share determination of MGB's fair value as of 
the Merger date. 
A. MGB's Fair Value 
It is a well-established principle of Delaware law 
that "the objective of a section 262 appraisal is 'to value 
the corporation itself, as distinguished from a fraction of 
its shares as they may exist in the hands of a particular 
shareholder' [emphasis in original].'" n Based on that 
principle, this Court determined in its earlier Opinion 
that Sheshunoff s $ 41 valuation was impermissible un-
der 8 Del C § 262, because it was an appraisal not of 
the entire corporation as a going concern but only of a 
minority block of its shares.13 Presumably that is why the 
Respondents chose not to rely upon the Sheshunoff 
valuation or to call Sheshunoff personnel as trial wit-
nesses. Instead, Respondents elected to rely solely upon 
Reilly's valuation, which resulted in the same $ 41 per 
share value that Sheshunoff had arrived at by a valuation 
approach found to be improper. 
12 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Del Supr., 
564A.2d 1137, 1144 (1989) quoting Cavalier Oil 
Corp. v. Harnett, 1988 Del Ch. LEXIS 28, Del. 
Ch., C.A. No. 7959, Jacobs, V.C. (Feb. 22, 
1988)). 
[*24] 
13 See Nebel v. Southwest Bancorp, Inc., 1995 
Del Ch LEXIS 80, *12, Del. Ch, C.A. No. 
13618, Jacobs, V.C. (July 5, 1995). 
The fact that Reilly's per share fair value determina-
tion serendipitously turned out to be only 90 cents per 
share more than Sheshunoff s legally flawed $ 41 valua-
tion, cannot help but render Respondent's valuation posi-
tion highly suspect and meriting the most careful judicial 
scrutiny. As a matter of plain common sense, it would 
appear evident that a proper fair value determination 
based upon a going concern valuation of the entire com-
pany, would significantly exceed a $ 41 per share fan-
market valuation of only a minority block of its shares. If 
Respondents choose to contend otherwise, it is their bur-
den to persuade the Court that $ 41.90 per share repre-
sents MGB's fair value. The Court concludes that the 
Respondents have fallen far short of carrying their bur-
den, and independently determines that the fair value of 
MGB at the time of the Merger was $ 85 per share. 
1. The Validity of Reilly's "Capital Market" Ap-
proach 
The Court first addresses [*25] whether Reilly's 
capital market approach is legally permissible. That 
valuation approach (to repeat) involved deriving various 
pricing multiples from selected publicly-traded compa-
nies, and then applying those multiples to MGB,14 result-
ing in a valuation of $ 41.26 per share. 
14 See n. 6 supra. 
The Petitioners argue that Reilly's capital market 
valuation method is impermissible because it includes a 
built-in minority discount. The valuation literature, in-
cluding a treatise co-authored by Reilly himself, supports 
that position,15 and Respondents have introduced no evi-
dence to the contrary. Nor did the Respondents establish 
that Reilly's capital market method is generally accepted 
by the financial community for purposes of valuing bank 
holding companies, as distinguished from other types of 
enterprises. 16 Reilly determined the ratio of MVIC to 
other financial measures such as EBIT, EBIDT, DFNI, 
DFCF, Interest Income, and TBVIC - ratios that the 
record indicates are not used to value banks. " 
15 See S.P. Pratt, R.F. Reilly & R.P. Schweihs, 
Valuing a Business 194-95, 210 (3d ed. 1996) 
(explaining that comparative publicly traded 
companies produce a minority discounted valua-
tion); C.Z. Mercer, Valuing Financial Institutions 
198-200 and Chapter 13 (1992) (explaining that 
comparative publicly traded company valuation 
technique produces a minority valuation that re-
quires adding a control premium to be accurate). 
[*26] 
16 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., Del. Supr., 457 
A.2d 701, 704 (1983). 
17 Indeed, one of Sheshunoff s witnesses had to 
ask for the definitions of EBIT and EBIDT, and 
Southwest's chairman and CEO testified that 
those measures are not used to value banks. LPC 
Dep. at 154:4-8. 
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Because Reilly's capital market method results in a 
minority valuation, and the Respondents have failed to 
establish that that approach is generally accepted in the 
financial community to value banks or bank holding 
companies, the Court must conclude that in this specific 
case Reilly's capital market approach is improper, and 
must be rejected. 18 
18 This conclusion should not be read as a cate-
gorical, matter-of-law determination that Reilly's 
capital market approach is an inappropriate 
method to value banks. The opposite may be true, 
but in this specific case the Respondents failed to 
discharge their burden of proof on that issue. 
[*27] 2. The Parties' Respective Applications of the 
Comparative Publicly-Traded and DCF Valuation Meth-
odologies 
The Court next considers (i) whether Clarke prop-
erly applied his comparative company analysis to MGB, 
and (ii) whether both sides' experts properly applied their 
respective DCF analyses to MGB. The validity per se of 
these two valuation methodologies is not in dispute. 
a. Comparative Company Approach 
A primary issue dividing the parties concerns the 
companies chosen as "comparable" to the corporation 
being appraised. A determination of that kind is neces-
sarily fact intensive. 
In performing his comparative company analysis, 
Clarke selected as comparables, banks having financial 
ratios, geographic locations, and demographic factors 
similar to those of MGB's two bank subsidiaries. Reilly, 
on the other hand, included companies that operated out-
side MGB's geographic location, in different economic 
environments, and in different lines of business.19 Where 
the valuation exercise rests upon data derived from com-
panies comparable to the company being valued, it 
stands to reason that the more "comparable" the com-
pany, the more reliable will be the resulting valuation 
[*28] information. The Court concludes that in this case 
it was sounder practice to use as comparables suburban 
banks located in the same geographic area (as Clarke 
did), rather than banks located outside of WBC's and 
Greenwood's immediate areas (as Reilly did). Accord-
ingly, I find Clarke's comparable companies to be supe-
rior to Reilly's. 
19 Reilly also erred by including a Savings and 
Loan Institution as one of his comparable compa-
nies. MGB's two subsidiaries were commercial 
banks, not S&L's. 
Another key difference between the parties' com-
parative publicly-traded company approaches is that 
Clarke used the price-to-earnings and price-to-book 
value financial multiples, whereas Reilly used multiples 
based upon the market value of invested capital 
("MVIC"). Relying upon various valuation authorities 
and publications, the Petitioners argue that where the 
enterprise being valued is a bank, the relevant ratios are 
price-to-earnings and price-to-book value. 20 Reilly dis-
agreed. He opined that it is more appropriate to [*29] 
compare the different financial measures as a fraction of 
MVIC, because that approach eliminates the distortions 
inherent in Clarke's financial ratios. Reilly did not elabo-
rate on what those distortions were, however, nor did he 
point to specific cases where MVIC was considered an 
appropriate financial measure of a bank or bank holding 
company. Given this record, the Respondents have not 
persuaded the Court that MVIC is widely accepted in the 
financial community as a measure of the value of a bank 
or bank holding company. 2I Clarke's financial measures 
are generally accepted in the financial community for 
valuing banks, and the Court accepts them. 
20 Security State Bank v. Ziegeldorf Iowa 
Supr., 554 N. W.2d 884 (1996); BNE Mass. Corp. 
v. Sims, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 588 N.E.2d 14 
(1992); Estate of Howard Winston Cook v. 
United States, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24344, 86-2 
US. Tax Cas. (CCH) PI3,678 (June 11, 1986); 
Valuing Financial Institutions, C.Z. Mercer, 219-
221 (1992); The Journal of Bank Auditing and 
Accounting, L.C. Pettit, M.D. Atchison & R.S. 
Kemp, "The Valuation of Small or Closely Held 
Banks," (Spring 1991), at 28-31. 
[*30] 
21 The use of MVIC as a tool to value other 
kinds of enterprises is, of course, widely ac-
cepted. See, Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 
603 A.2d 796 (1992). Again, the Court's conclu-
sion that MVIC has not been shown to be an ap-
propriate measure of a bank's value is fact-
specific to this case, and by virtue of the Respon-
dent's failure of proof. 
A third major difference between the parties' com-
parative company approaches is that Clarke used histori-
cal financial data going back five years before the 
Merger, whereas Reilly used historical financial data 
going back 2.75 years. In performing bank valuations, 
five year historical information is typically used. Reilly's 
position was that the banking industry had changed dra-
matically during the five years before the Merger, such 
that it was not appropriate to rely upon financial data 
going back that far. 
At the heart of this dispute are the experts' differing 
assumptions about MGB's future growth prospects. The 
Respondents paint a bleak picture of MGB's future pros-
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pects for increasing its revenues; the Petitioners argue 
that MGB's future prospects [*31] were far brighter. 
Petitioners agree that a company's more recent historical 
economic averages are a good indicator of its future 
growth rate, but emphasize that a firm's financial trends 
are often more reliably evidenced by its performance 
over the past five years. I concur. Petitioners have dem-
onstrated that MGB's historical performance, whether 
over the past five years, three years, or twelve months 
before the Merger, indicated significant future growth.22 
Although MGB's subsidiary banks did face certain diffi-
culties (specifically, a limited marketplace without high-
potential for growth or expansion and a primarily blue-
collar residential population), 23 the Respondents have 
not persuaded me that this difficulty would likely prevent 
MGB's bank subsidiaries from maintaining their histori-
cal rates of growth. 
22 See e.g., PX 1 at 10-26. The Petitioners also 
claim that the only reason MGB was not in a bet-
ter position to expand was that Southwest had ef-
fectively drained MGB of its profits. (Pet'rs Re-
ply Br. at 3.) ("Respondents do not dispute that 
their constant upstreaming of profits to Southwest 
left MGB and its subsidiaries with insufficient 
funds to carry on their operations, much less ex-
pand.") 
[*32] 
23 Trial Transcript at 942-43 (Meyer). 
A fourth major difference between the parties' com-
parative company analyses is that Reilly relied upon 
comparable company stock prices on the day before the 
Merger, whereas Clarke used price quotations six weeks 
before the Merger. Because the merger date (more spe-
cifically, the date before the public announcement of a 
merger) is normally the time that is relevant, and because 
the Petitioners made no effort to justify Clarke's use of 
stock prices going back six weeks before the Merger, the 
Court cannot accept Clarke's comparative company 
valuation, despite the validity of the technique itself 
Clarke's use of six week old pre-merger stock prices 
represents a departure from the norm without demon-
strated justification. 
To summarize, Reilly's capital market approach 
must be rejected because it was not shown to be gener-
ally accepted in the financial community for bank valua-
tion purposes. Clarke's comparative company valuation 
must be rejected because it was improperly applied in 
this specific case. Accordingly, the only valuation meth-
odologies remaining to [*33] be considered are (i) 
Reilly's and Clarke's DCF valuations and (ii) Clarke's 
comparative acquisition analysis. 
b. The Parties' DCF Analyses 
The parties' competing DCF analyses raise three 
questions. First, were the so-called "key supplier de-
pendence" and "litigation risks" a proper basis for deter-
mining Reilly's 18% discount factor, or were those risks 
contrived solely for litigation purposes? Second, was it 
appropriate for Clarke to determine a 1% small stock size 
premium based on the 1996 Ibbotson study that was spe-
cific to the banking industry? Third, what cash flow pro-
jection period (five or ten years), and what growth rate 
after the fifth year, are appropriate assumptions for a 
DCF valuation of MGB? 
Specifically, the parties' DCF valuations differ with 
respect to: (i) how many years into the future cash flows 
should be projected (ten years versus five years), (ii) 
what growth rate assumption after the fifth projection 
year is appropriate for MGB, (iii) should the Court credit 
the assumptions Sheshunoff made in valuing MGB in 
1993, and (iv) what discount rate is appropriate for 
MGB. As more fully elaborated below, the Court finds it 
appropriate (a) to project future cash [*34] flows for a 
period of ten years into the future at a constant 4% 
growth rate, (b) to assign a high degree of reliability to 
Sheshunoff s remaining DCF assumptions (except for its 
minority discount), and (c) to accept neither Clarke's 
12% discount rate nor Reilly's 18% discount rate. 
The difference between Clarke's 12% discount rate 
and Reilly's 18% discount rate is attributable primarily to 
their different estimates of MGB's cost of equity capital, 
and their different assessments of the company specific 
risks confronting MGB at the time of the Merger. Reilly 
selected an equity risk premium based upon a 1992 Ib-
botson study indicating that an appropriate small stock 
premium factor was 5.2%. Clarke relied on a 1996 Ib-
botson study indicating that a premium of 1% was ap-
propriate. The problem with the 1992 Ibbotson study was 
that it is not specific to the banking industry. The prob-
lem with the 1996 Ibbotson study is that although it was 
specific to the banking industry, the Petitioners have not 
shown that the data contained in that study (and relied 
upon by Clarke) was in existence as of the Merger date. 
The Court, therefore, is unable to accept the 1996 Ib-
botson study, and the 12% discount [*35] rate derived 
therefrom. 
Reilly's 18% discount rate is also flawed, however, 
because it rests on the unsupported assumption that at the 
time of the Merger, MGB was subject to certain material 
risks that required a steep discount of MGB's projected 
future cash flow. Reilly placed great emphasis upon 
MGB's dependence upon one key supplier and upon the 
pending litigation involving BYSIS, MGB's data process 
server as a basis to conclude that MGB involved abnor-
mal business risk to a potential acquiror. The underlying 
evidence that these "risks" were material is unpersuasive. 
No document contemporaneous with the Merger shows 
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that Southwest's or MGB's management or boards 
viewed these developments as material risks. Impor-
tantly, nowhere in its valuation report did Sheshunoff 
allude to those risks. That fact significantly diminishes 
the credibility of a Southwest employee's litigation-
driven trial testimony that management viewed these 
risks as significant. Of considerable importance also is 
that Sheshunoff concluded that a 10% discount factor 
(2% lower than Clarke's) was appropriate, and manage-
ment accepted that discount assumption. Accordingly, 
the Court concludes that Reilly's 18% discount [*36] 
rate is inappropriately high and not supported by the re-
cord. 
The final major difference between the parties' DCF 
analyses is that Clarke projected ten years of future cash 
flows at a constant growth rate of 4% using many of 
Sheshunoff s projections; whereas Reilly projected future 
cash flows for only five years, at a growth rate that de-
creased after the fifth year, using his (Reilly's) own pro-
jections. Sheshunoff used a ten year projection period for 
future cash flows, and assumed a constant rate of growth. 
Because Sheshunoff performed its valuation at the time 
of the Merger, without the benefit of hindsight and when 
no litigation was pending, and management accepted its 
assumptions, the Court accepts Sheshunoff s DCF as-
sumptions (except for its minority discount) as more ap-
propriate than Reilly's litigation-driven (and extremely 
conservative) assumptions. 
Because neither side has supported certain key DCF 
valuation assumptions by a preponderance of persuasive 
evidence, the Court is unable to accept either Clarke's or 
Reilly's discounted cash flow valuations. That leaves 
Clarke's comparative acquisition approach, which the 
Court turns to next. 
2. The "Control Premium" Question [*37] and 
the Validity of Clarke's Comparative Acquisition Ap-
proach 
Having rejected Clarke's DCF and comparative 
company valuations, both of which involved directly 
adding a control premium to the values of MGB's two 
subsidiaries, the Court need not decide whether the direct 
addition of a premium is or is not mandated by Rapid-
American. Nonetheless, the Court must address the con-
trol premium issue, but in a different context. That is, the 
Court must decide whether Clarke's comparative acquisi-
tion valuation, in which a control premium is implicit, is 
proscribed by § 262.1 conclude that it is not. 
In Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 24 the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that in valuing a holding company 
for § 262 appraisal purposes, it was appropriate to in-
clude a control premium as an element of the fair value 
of the majority-owned subsidiaries. The Court said: 
Rapid was a parent company with a 
100% ownership interest in three valuable 
subsidiaries. The trial court's decision to 
exclude the control premium at the corpo-
rate level practically discounted Rapid's 
entire inherent value. The exclusion of a 
"control premium" artificially and unreal-
istically treated Rapid [*38] as a minority 
shareholder. Contrary to Rapid's argu-
ments, Delaware law compels the inclu-
sion of a control premium under the 
unique facts of this case. Rapid's 100% 
ownership interest in its subsidiaries was 
clearly a "relevant" valuation factor and 
the trial court's rejection of the "control 
premium" implicitly placed a dispropor-
tionate emphasis on pure market value.25 
24 Del Supr., 603 A.2d 796, 806-07 (1992). 
25 Rapid-American, 603 A. 2d at 806-07 (em-
phasis in original). 
The Respondents argue that Rapid-American turned 
on the "unique fact" that its subsidiaries were involved in 
three different industries. I do not read Rapid-American 
to hold that that "unique" fact was in any way critical to 
the result. The Respondents' construction of that case is 
too narrow. What the Supreme Court ruled is that a hold-
ing company's ownership of a controlling interest in its 
subsidiaries is an independent element of value that must 
be taken into account in determining a fair value for the 
[*39] parent company. Thus, the rationale of Rapid-
American applies to MGB, and the Respondents have not 
shown otherwise. 
The Respondents also challenge Clarke's compara-
tive acquisition approach on a different basis. Pointing to 
the command in 8 Del. C. § 262(h) that fair value must 
be determined "exclusive of post-merger events or other 
possible business combinations," the Respondents urge 
that any valuation method that includes a control pre-
mium as an element of "fair value" necessarily represents 
post-merger synergies proscribed by § 262(h). I cannot 
agree. The (implicit) control premium at issue here is not 
the product of post-merger synergies. Rather, that control 
premium reflects an independent element of value exist-
ing at the time of the merger, flowing from the fact that 
the parent company owned a controlling interest in its 
subsidiaries at that point in time. Therefore, Clarke's 
comparative acquisition valuation cannot be invalidated 
on that basis either. 
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Because the Respondents have not challenged 
Clarke's comparative acquisition approach on any valid 
ground, and because the Court has rejected the parties' 
valuations based on their other methodologies, by proc-
ess [*40] of elimination the only evidence of MGB's fan-
value is the $ 85 per share Clarke arrived at by the com-
parative acquisition method. Having no other adjudicated 
basis to value MGB, the Court would be justified in ac-
cepting $ 85 per share as the fair value of MGB, and 
does so ~ but not by default or uncritically. 
The Court is mindful that $ 85 per share is more 
than double the Merger price. The Court is also aware of 
its role under § 262, which is to determine fair value in-
dependently. 26 In discharging that institutional function 
as an independent appraiser, the Court should, where 
possible, test the soundness of its valuation conclusion 
against whatever reliable corroborative evidence the re-
cord contains. On that score the record falls far short of 
perfection. Limited corroborative evidence is available, 
however, in the form of Sheshunoffs 1993 fair market 
valuation, (i) adjusted by Clarke to exclude Sheshunoffs 
minority discount and (ii) updated by Clarke to reflect 
value data as of November 17, 1993, the date of the 
Merger.27 When Sheshunoffs 1993 valuation is adjusted 
in that manner, the resulting value of MGB is $ 
48,504,664 or $ 70.46 per share with no control [*41] 
premium. If (for purposes of illustration) a 20% control 
premium were added, the resulting value would be $ 
56,842,796.80 or $ 82.57 per share; and if the premium 
were 35%, the resulting value would be $ 63,096,394.40, 
or $ 91.66 per share. 28 The $ 85 per share fair value 
based upon Clarke's comparative acquisition approach 
fits comfortably within that (hypothetical) range of val-
ues. 
26 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Del. 
Supr., 701 A.2d 357 (1997). 
27 The Sheshunoff valuation, as thus revised, is 
objective in the sense that Southwest's manage-
ment accepted Sheshunoffs DCF projections, and 
Southwest's management accepted Sheshunoffs 
valuation as the basis for the Merger price. 
per share. Using the same arithmetic, a 35% con-
trol premium would yield a value of $ 
63,096,394.40, or $ 91.66 per share. 
[*42] B. Interest 
Next addressed are the appropriate rate of interest 
and compounding interval. Under § 262(h), this Court is 
empowered to award interest in an appraisal action at 
whatever rate (and compounding interval, where rele-
vant) the Court deems equitable. Because MGB's cost of 
debt capital at that time was 8%, the Court finds that to 
be the appropriate interest rate. Because the legal rate of 
interest had risen to 10% as of the date of the trial, the 
Petitioners urge the Court to award them interest at that 
rate. The Court declines to do so. 29 A 10% interest rate 
might arguably be appropriate had the Court found un-
due delay on the Respondents' part, but there has been no 
undue delay here. 
29 Although the Court does not rest its decision 
on that ground, it notes that the legal rate of inter-
est as of the Merger date was also 8%. 
Whether or not to award simple or compound inter-
est is a matter within the Court's discretion. While it may 
be true, as the Respondents point out, that "an award of 
compound [*43] post-judgment interest is the exception 
rather than the rule,"30 in today's financial markets a pru-
dent investor expects to receive a compound rate of in-
terest on his investment. Therefore, it is equitable and 
realistic for the Court to award compound interest in this 
case.31 
30 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 
289, 302; see also Ryan v. Tad's Enterprises, Inc., 
Del. Ch, 709A2d682, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54 
(1996) affd by Order, Del. Supr., 693 A.2d 1082 
(1997) (stating that compound interest is also the 
exception and not the rule with respect to pre-
judgment interest). 
31 See Grimes v. Vitalink Communications 
Corp., 1997 Del Ch. LEXIS 124, Del. Ch., C.A. 
12334, Chandler, C. (Aug. 26, 1997) (holding 
that a monthly compounding interval is appropri-
ate to force the Respondent to give up his gain 
and to fully reimburse Petitioner). 
Turning to the compounding interval, the Petition-
ers argue that it should be monthly. The Respondents do 
not address the issue. Having been furnished no reason to 
do otherwise, [*44] the Court concludes that a monthly 
compounding interval is appropriate. 
28 PX 38 shows that the updated (to reflect in-
formation available as of the Merger date) and 
modified (to exclude a minority discount) valua-
tion of MGB using Sheshunoffs methodology is 
$ 70.66 per share, which when multiplied by 
MGB's 688,400 shares, yields $ 48,504,664 as a 
total value for MGB. Subtracting the $ 6,814,000 
of other assets, multiplying the remaining value 
by 1.2 to include a 20% control premium, and 
then adding back the $ 6,814,000 of other assets, 
yields a valuation of $ 56,842,796.80, or $ 82.57 
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C. Fees and Expenses 
Lastly, the Petitioners request an award of legal fees 
and expenses, but provide no meaningful support for that 
claim. In a single conclusory sentence in their opening 
brief, the Petitioners state: "in addition, and on account 
of Respondents' evidenced bad faith (before, in connec-
tion with, and following the merger), Petitioners urge the 
Court to assess all of their reasonable costs and expenses 
of the litigation, including attorneys' fees and expert fees, 
upon Respondents." In their Reply Brief, the Petitioners 
expand upon their bad faith claim by arguing that the 
Respondents sought to conceal MGB's fair value by 
"withdrawing Sheshunoff as their expert. . . keeping Mr. 
Campbell away from Court. . . proffering Mr. . . . Reilly 
. . . and trumping up a story about litigation risks."32 
32 Pet'rs Reply Br. at 33. 
Without more evidence than these conclusory asser-
tions, the Court is unable to conclude that the [*45] Re-
spondents acted in bad faith. Accordingly, the Court re-
jects the Petitioners' request for fees and expenses. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The parties shall confer and submit an appropriate 
form of order. 
Tab J 
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OPINION 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
An institutional investor petitions the court, pursuant 
to 8 Del C. § 262, seeking judicial appraisal of its equity 
holdings in a large insurance conglomerate as a result of 
that company's July 2004 all-cash, all-shares merger. 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court be-
lieves that a combined sum-of-the-parts and shared syn-
ergies analysis is the most reliable valuation methodol-
ogy in this litigation. The court exercises its independent 
business judgment to make several alterations to the cal-
culations utilized in those models by the respondent's 
[*2] expert, and determines that the fair value of the peti-
tioner's stock on the date of the merger was $ 24.97 per 
share. 
I. 
A. The Parties 
At issue in this litigation is the fair market value, as 
of July 8, 2004, of stock of The MONY Group, Inc., a 
company acquired on that date by the respondent, AXA 
Financial, Inc. ("AXA"). A diversified financial services 
organization, AXA is wholly owned by AXA Group, a 
French holding company for an international group of 
insurance and related financial services firms. 
The petitioners, Highfields Capital Ltd., Highfields 
Capital I L.P., and Highfields Capital II L.P. (collec-
tively, "Highfields"), are affiliated partnerships that have 
invested private funds on behalf of their limited partners 
since 1998. At the time of the AXA-MONY merger, 
Highfields owned 2,184,000 shares, or just over 4.3%, of 
MONY's outstanding common stock. In compliance with 
section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
Highfields perfected its appraisal rights and promptly 
filed its petition following the transaction.* 
1 On September 30, 2004, Cede & Co., as the 
recordholder of MONY shares beneficially 
owned by Don Siegal, filed an appraisal petition. 
The court, pursuant to [*3] an order dated Febru-
ary 24, 2005, consolidated the two actions and 
appointed Highfields's counsel as lead counsel for 
all petitioners. 
B. The Facts 
1. An Overview Of MONY's Business 
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MONY's predecessor-in-interest, Mutual of New 
York, was formed in 1842 as a mutual life insurance 
company. It concentrated its product line on traditional 
life insurance policies sold through a career agency dis-
tribution system.2 
2 In this type of distribution system, retail insur-
ance agents sell the products of only one insur-
ance company. 
In the late 1980s, the insurance market became in-
creasingly consolidated and competitive. Advances in 
both efficiency and scale were necessary for a life insur-
ance company to maintain an edge as the industry 
evolved. These competitive pressures were a substantial 
causative factor in Mutual of New York's decision to 
demutualize in the fall of 1998. On the heels of this 
process and following the completion of the company's 
initial public offering at $ 23.50 per share, MONY listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange.3 
3 This price represented approximately 65% of 
MONY's then existing GAAP book value. 
Following its demutualization, MONY sought to re-
gain some of the competitive advantage [*4] it had lost 
during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. One 
strategy MONY employed was to diversify its product 
lines. Freed of the regulatory requirements which pre-
vented its predecessor as a mutual company from 
branching into financial services areas outside of tradi-
tional life insurance, MONY quickly attempted to adapt 
through a flurry of smaller acquisitions. Between January 
2000 and November 2001, MONY acquired Advest (a 
brokerage firm), Lebenthal (a bond company), and Ma-
trix (an investment bank). In December 2002, the com-
pany also discontinued its underperforming group pen-
sion business. 
Despite its efforts to diversify its product offerings, 
MONY still faced substantial deficiencies in its business 
model that caused it to lag behind industry leaders. The 
company's career system distribution network was ex-
pensive to maintain, as more and more agents demanded 
the ability to sell third-party insurance products. More-
over, MONY lacked scale, a crucial element to success 
in a marketplace teeming with large, globally-based fi-
nancial services companies. MONY's products, espe-
cially life insurance policies, were highly commoditized, 
meaning that the most significant factor in the company's 
[*5] continuing viability was its operating efficiency 
relative to other firms. Because competitors benefitted 
from greater economies of scale, MONY was forced to 
lower its prices on insurance products to maintain sales 
volume. This tactic led to lower operating margins and 
sagging earnings for the company. 
MONY's inability to efficiently generate profitable 
new business was not the sole reason for its earnings 
problems. Shortcomings existed in the company's his-
torical book of business as well. As a mutual company, 
Mutual of New York had not priced its policy premiums 
at maximum possible levels. After demutualization, 
MONY continued to hold a large, yet underpriced, book 
of business at a much higher percentage of assets or total 
revenues than its competitors. Thus, MONY's return on 
equity was materially below that of its peers due to the 
drag on earnings created by these inefficiently priced 
policies. 
Unfortunately for MONY, in the insurance industry, 
low earnings beget still lower earnings. Because of capi-
tal, liquidity, and earnings concerns associated with the 
company, MONY suffered near continuous pressure 
from the ratings agencies in the post-demutualization 
period. 4 In the insurance [*6| industry, ratings matter 
greatly, since agents, creditors, and customers all view a 
company's ratings trend and ratings outlook as strong 
indicators of an insurer's ability to satisfy its current and 
future financial obligations. Low debt ratings affected 
MONY's cost of borrowing and, in turn, its earnings lev-
els. 
4 In late 2002, two agencies lowered MONY's 
senior debt credit ratings and financial strength 
ratings. 
More importantly, low ratings send a signal of a 
higher risk investment to prospective policy purchasers. 
Rational investors demand larger returns in exchange for 
such risk. This incontrovertible law of the free market 
presented MONY with a Hobson's choice: either acqui-
esce to investor demands by pricing policies to increase 
investor returns (thereby writing barely profitable or un-
profitable business), or continue trying to sell overpriced, 
commoditized products in a competitive industry 
(thereby confronting decreased sales volume and un-
happy sales agents fleeing to firms where they could 
enjoy greater commissions). Objectively speaking, a pe-
riod of rating downgrades would spell disaster for 
MONY, and these downgrades were an ever present pos-
sibility for the company in the [*7] early 2000s. 
In the face of these difficulties, MONY actively ex-
plored strategic alternatives to enhance stockholder value 
and to brighten the company's future. In addition to di-
versifying its business lines through the acquisitions 
mentioned above, MONY initiated cost-cutting measures 
that closed certain distribution facilities, realigned 
agency locations throughout the country, and laid off 
hundreds of employees. In late 2002, MONY's manage-
ment devised a long-term cost-reduction and restructur-
ing plan, the more substantive elements of which entailed 
further realignment of the company's distribution net-
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work, a relocation of MONY's corporate headquarters, 
and adjustments to incentive-based executive compensa-
tion. Based on the evidence presented at trial, however, it 
was clear that MONY's management poured most of its 
creative efforts into a different strategic alternative that 
eventually bore fruit: a merger or sale of the company.5 
5 Although MONY probably would have been 
able to implement structural changes that would 
have resulted in at least a portion of the $ 47.2 
million in savings the restructuring plan targeted 
between October 2002 and August 2003, there is 
no credible evidence [*8] that any of these 
changes were ever implemented, and estimating a 
firm figure for the savings achieved would be a 
highly speculative undertaking for the court. In-
deed, Highfields's own expert testified at trial that 
he did not know how much cost saving was ulti-
mately achieved, or whether any material differ-
ence existed between MONY's budgeted and ac-
tual expenses for 2003. Trial Tr. 337-38. 
2. AXA And MONY Agree To Merge 
In 2001, MONY's board of directors informed man-
agement of its general consensus that a business combi-
nation with a third party was likely to provide MONY 
with its best opportunity for long-term success. By late 
2002, a general downturn in the capital markets, coupled 
with the industry-specific and ratings agency pressures 
MONY faced, finally led to an intensification of man-
agement's efforts to locate a potential acquiror. At that 
time, Credit Suisse First Boston ("CSFB"), one of 
MONY's strategic financial advisors, counseled man-
agement to obtain a third-party actuarial appraisal to 
identify cost savings that might be available to a merger 
partner. Instead of announcing a public auction of 
MONY, an option which the board believed might high-
light dangerous weaknesses in [*9] the company to 
competitors, the board instructed Michael Roth, MONY's 
president and chief executive officer, to quietly explore 
combination opportunities. 
Despite the low key approach the board took in find-
ing a purchaser, the marketplace harbored little doubt 
about MONY's candidacy as a potential acquisition tar-
get. Investment bankers, industry analysts, and insurance 
company executives all understood that MONY's days as 
a stand-alone entity were likely numbered. 6 Even the 
timing of a transaction was somewhat predictable, since 
the 5% ownership restriction imposed by New York state 
insurance regulations was set to expire in November 
2003.7 Despite strong informational signals that MONY 
was on the selling block, but perhaps precisely because 
the market knew such a sale was an eventuality in the 
not-too-distant future, potential suitors, when approached 
by MONY's management, balked at the suggestion of a 
transaction due to concern that MONY's existing stock 
price was too high. 
6 Indeed, MONY was "on everybody's list and 
had been for a number of years," so much so that 
the company's probable acquisition "was a source 
of almost constant conversation among invest-
ment bankers, CFOs and CEOs [*10] of insur-
ance companies." Trial Tr. 649, 770. 
7 For the five-year period following MONY's 
demutualization, a potential acquirer would have 
had to obtain special approval from the New 
York Insurance Department to acquire more than 
5% of MONY. 
Unlike other possible buyers, AXA showed an inter-
est in MONY. In the fall of 2002, Roth met with Kip 
Condron, the president and chief executive officer of 
AXA, to gauge AXA's general interest in a deal, without 
specifically discussing price. At a follow-up meeting in 
January 2003, Condron mentioned $ 26 per share as an 
approximate acquisition price, marking the first time that 
any potential buyer talked of a specific price for 
MONY's stock. The two companies executed a confiden-
tiality agreement in February 2003, and MONY thereaf-
ter formally retained CSFB as a financial advisor in con-
nection with the potential transaction. 
Following more than a month of due diligence, 
Condron told Roth that AXA would be willing to con-
sider a transaction to acquire MONY at as much as $ 
28.50 per share in cash. AXA pulled that proposal in 
April 2003, however, when it determined that change in 
control agreements benefitting MONY's management 
were worth nearly $ 163 million. [*11] Instead, AXA 
proposed a stock-for-stock merger using AXA's Ameri-
can Depository Receipts at a fixed exchange ratio valued 
at $ 26.50 per share at the time. The MONY board re-
jected the proposal due to the stock component of the 
deal, as well as the fact that the fixed exchange ratio ef-
fectively required MONY stockholders to make a cur-
rency bet on the U.S. dollar versus the euro during the 
time between deal announcement and closing. 
In the months following the termination of negotia-
tions between MONY and AXA, MONY continued to 
face a market devoid of willing buyers. Eager to increase 
the company's sale prospects, MONY's board negotiated 
new change in control payments for management, greatly 
reducing the payout provisions. 
In the fall of 2003, negotiations resumed between 
AXA and MONY, which ultimately led to AXA's offer 
to acquire MONY for $ 31 per share in cash. Following 
consultation with financial and legal advisors, as well as 
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senior management, the MONY board concluded that the 
$31 per share price was fair and was the best way to 
maximize stockholder value. Absent a transaction, the 
board believed the company would continue to deterio-
rate due to its lack of scale, its reliance on a [*12] fun-
damentally flawed, high-cost field agency system, and its 
inability to adapt to competitive pressures in the financial 
services industry.8 
8 Without a buyer, the directors and officers of 
MONY were convinced that the company's pros-
pects were dire. See Theobald Dep. 51-53 (noting 
that MONY would likely be sold at scrap value 
absent a synergistic sale); Foti Dep. 288-89 (not-
ing that there was a "significant risk that 
[MONY] would face a meltdown scenario" if the 
AXA transaction did not happen). 
3. Uncertainty Follows The Merger Announcement 
The merger was announced on September 17, 2003, 
and represented a 7.3% premium over MONY's then 
current trading price. During a conference call with 
MONY management the following day, a number of 
institutional investors criticized the $ 31 price-
approximately 76% of MONY's GAAP book value at the 
time-as being too low.9 Despite having no written docu-
mentation or analyses with which to justify a conclusion 
that AXA's offer substantially undervalued MONY, 
Highfields became a vocal opponent of the deal and pub-
licly advocated for stockholders to reject it. ,0 Two proxy 
advisory firms, Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS") 
and Glass-Lewis & Co., [*13] also reacted negatively, 
relying on what they believed to be a relatively small 
premium offered by AXA and a low price-to-book value 
for the acquisition. Numerous insurance industry ana-
lysts, however, believed that the merger would deliver 
solid value to MONY stockholders. " 
9 Southeastern Asset Management, MONY's 
largest stockholder at the time, called the offer 
"ridiculously low" and labeled the board's actions 
"egregious." Third Avenue Funds described 
MONY stockholders as being "cashed out at a 
disgraceful number." JX 977 at 11. 
10 On January 29, 2004, Highfields sent a letter 
to MONY stockholders urging them to vote 
against the merger. JX 141 at 1. Based on the 
merger price, Highfields's equity stake in MONY 
was worth almost $ 68 million, yet, apparently 
"consistent with [Highfields's] policy" to store 
"work . . . [in employees'] heads" on valuation 
matters, it prepared no analytical documentation 
to quantify how much more than $ 31 per share 
MONY was worth at the time. Trial Tr. 109-10. 
11 Citigroup analysts commented that 
"[although this valuation appears low at first, we 
believe that it is actually fair given that MONY is 
a 2.0% [return on equity] in a sector that cur-
rently returns [*14] approximately 12.0%." JX 
1119. Fox-Pitt, Kelton believed that "AXA's bid 
to acquire MONY is fairly valued at this time" 
and did not expect a higher bidder to emerge. JX 
1129. Lehman Brothers wrote that "[t]he price 
appears to be reasonable at 75% of reported book 
value." JX 1136. Deutsche Bank claimed that 
"[i]n light of the price multiples offered for . . . 
other recent transactions, we continue to believe 
that AXA's offer of $ 31, or 0.76x non-FAS 115 
book value, for the MONY franchise is a fair 
price." JX 1135. 
Public opinion surrounding the deal was further 
complicated by AXA's proposed method of financing. To 
raise capital to pay for the acquisition, AXA issued in 
France corporate debt instruments called ORANs. 12 A 
number of institutional investors with sizeable holdings 
in MONY stock, including Highfields, purchased sub-
stantial positions in these securities following the merger 
announcement. It was well understood at the time that 
investors with long positions in the ORANs had incen-
tives to acquire MONY shares in support of the merger, 
while investors with short positions in the ORANs had 
motivation to impede the transaction. 
12 The ORANs, or Obligations Remboursables 
en Action [*15] ou en Numeraire, were debt se-
curities issued by AXA Group and were struc-
tured to automatically convert into AXA stock 
upon the closing of the MONY merger. 
On February 3, 2004, Highfields made a $ 15.4 mil-
lion short sale in ORANs, and, following a later trade on 
February 11, Highfields's short position in the ORANs 
grew to $ 40.6 million. Two weeks later, in a publicly 
filed letter to this court, but without revealing its own 
short position, Highfields urged that the vote of stock-
holders with long positions in the ORANs be abridged, 
claiming that such stockholders had financial interests 
contrary to those of other investors in MONY stock. 
During this time, Highfields never disclosed to the mar-
ket that, if the merger was voted down, its short position 
in the ORANs would allow it to make an $ 11 million 
profit on an investment it had held for only a few 
months. 
Not surprisingly, the merger quickly became the 
subject of expedited stockholder litigation in this court. 
Stockholder plaintiffs claimed that, among other things, 
the MONY directors breached their fiduciary duty to 
obtain the highest value reasonably available for stock-
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holders in the sale of the company. l3 This court ulti-
mately [*16] concluded on a thoroughly presented pre-
liminary injunction record that the MONY board acted in 
accordance with its fiduciary obligations under Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 14 and its 
progeny by accepting AXA's $ 31 per share proposal, 
and that "there was ample room for the [MONY] board 
to make a good faith and honest determination that ap-
proval of the merger . . . was in the best interests of the 
corporation." 15 
13 See generally In re MONY Group Inc. 
S'holder Litig, 852 A.2d 9 (Del Ch. 2004) 
("MONY /"); In re MONY Group Inc. S'holder 
Litig, 853 A 2d 661 (Del. Ch 2004) ("MONY 
IF). 
14 506A.2dl73(Del 1986). 
15 MONYII, 853 A.2d at 667-68 (citing MONY 
I)-
As the prospects for the transaction darkened due to 
discontent among institutional investors in early 2004, 
MONY management's gloomy predictions of a ratings 
downgrade looked set to materialize if the merger fell 
through. 16 During February 2004, all of the ratings agen-
cies lowered at least MONY's ratings outlook, largely as 
a result of uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the 
AXA deal. 17 Analysts familiar with the business echoed 
management's concerns that the merger was essential to 
ensure that MONY did [*17] not suffer the financial 
fallout likely to result from a further credit rating slip.18 
16 Management's concerns are expressed in a 
file memorandum written by MONY's chief fi-
nancial officer, Richard Daddario, on February 
12,2004: 
We believe that the most likely 
scenario is that upon announce-
ment that the transaction has not 
been approved MONY's rating 
will be downgraded by one notch . 
. . . In addition, unless results im-
prove dramatically, we believe 
that the negative outlook could re-
sult in another one notch down-
grade in late 2004 or perhaps in 
2005. A combination of the down-
grade and the added uncertainty 
created by the unsuccessful trans-
action adds significant risk to the 
MONY organization. 
JX66. 
17 On February 5, 2004, Fitch changed 
MONY's financial strength rating from "rating 
watch positive" to "rating watch evolving." On 
February 19, 2004, S&P downgraded MONY's 
financial strength rating to "A" and placed this 
rating on "credit watch developing." The same 
day, A.M. Best changed its rating of MONY from 
"under review-positive" to "under review-
developing." On February 23, 2004, Moody's al-
tered MONY's rating from "review for possible 
upgrade" to "direction uncertain." JX [*18] 60 at 
33-37. 
18 Goldman Sachs observed that "[t]he rating 
agencies have downgraded MONY due to the un-
certainty surrounding the completion of the deal 
and have indicated that ratings could slip further 
if the deal is not done. If downgraded again, 
MONY's insurance company could struggle with 
increased lapses, questions about liquidity, and 
lack of sales." JX 1134. Morgan Stanley stated 
that "[i]f . . . MONY is left to make a go of it 
alone, the situation could be rather unpleasant. 
Once an insurance company's financial strength 
comes under question, the sale of new product, 
retention of its sales force and maintaining persis-
tency of its in-force block will become challeng-
ing. At this point, ratings will drop further and the 
company will essentially go into run-off." JX 
1133. 
In the end, AXA's $ 31 per share offer remained out-
standing for eight months. Despite AXA's public state-
ments that it would not increase its offer, no prospective 
buyer submitted a higher bid. The stockholder vote, went 
forward on May 18, 2004, and was approved by 51% of 
the stockholders. The transaction closed on July 8, 2004. 
At the time, holders of 16.7% of MONY's shares indi-
cated they would exercise appraisal rights. [*19] Ulti-
mately, however, Highfields was the only substantial 
stockholder to prefect an appraisal demand.19 
19 The ten largest institutional investors in 
MONY held roughly 24% of the company's out-
standing common stock at the time of the merger. 
Several of these large stockholders who ended up 
accepting the $ 31 merger consideration (South-
ern Asset Management and Third Avenue Funds) 
were the same ones who originally attacked the 
deal for undervaluing MONY. 
4. The Procedural Posture Of This Litigation 
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Highfields filed its appraisal petition on November 
4, 2004. Following extensive fact and expert discovery, a 
trial was held from April 30, 2007 to May 3, 2007. Post-
trial briefing was submitted, and the court heard post-
trial oral argument on June 27, 2007. That same day, the 
parties stipulated to, and the court entered, an order set-
ting the pre-judgment interest rate in this action at 6.2%, 
compounded semi-annually, running from July 8, 2004. 
II. 
In a section 262 appraisal proceeding, the court must 
"determine the fair value of 100% of the corporation [and 
award] the dissenting stockholder his proportionate share 
of that value."20 This evaluation requires an examination 
of "all factors and elements [*20] which reasonably 
might enter into the fixing of value," including market 
value, asset value, earning prospects, and the nature of 
the enterprise, which are "known or susceptible of proof 
as of the date of the merger." 21 The corporation subject 
to valuation is viewed as a going concern "based upon 
the 'operative reality' of the company at the time of the 
merger." 22 This value must be reached regardless of the 
synergies obtained from the consummation of the 
merger, 23 and cannot include speculative elements of 
value arising from the merger's "accomplishment or ex-
pectation." 24 However, the value of a petitioner's shares 
may not reflect discounts for lack of marketability or 
illiquidity.2S 
20 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 1988 Del Ch. 
LEXIS 28, 1988 WL 15816, at *P (Del Ch. Feb. 
22, 1988), affd, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del 1989). 
21 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 
(Del 1983); Tri-Cont'l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 
71, 72 (Del 1950). 
22 M.G. Bancorp, Inc. v. LeBeau, 737 A.2d513, 
524 (Del 1999). 
23 M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 
790, 797 (Del. 1999). 
24 8 Del. C. § 262(h). Ng v. Heng Sang Realty 
Corp., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, 2004 WL 
885590, at *6 (Del Ch. Apr. 22, 2004). 
25 Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 
147 (Del 1980). 
It [*21] is well established that "fair value" for pur-
poses of appraisal is equated with the corporation's 
stand-alone value, "rather than its value to a third party 
as an acquisition." 26 If, however, the transaction giving 
rise to the appraisal resulted from an arm's-length proc-
ess between two independent parties, and if no structural 
impediments existed that might materially distort "the 
crucible of objective market reality," a reviewing court 
should give substantial evidentiary weight to the merger 
price as an indicator of fair value.27 
26 M.P.MEnters., 731 A.2dat 795. 
27 See Van de Watte v. Unimation, Inc., 1991 
WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991) ("The 
fact that a transaction price was forged in the cru-
cible of objective market reality (as distinguished 
from the unavoidably subjective thought process 
of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evi-
dence that the price is fair."). See also Dobler v. 
Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., 2004 Del Ch. 
LEXIS 139, 2004 WL 2271592, at *11 (Del Ch. 
Sept. 30, 2004), affd in relevant part, 880 A. 2d 
206 (Del 2005) (citing M.P.M. Enters., 731 A.2d 
at 797, for the proposition that "a merger price 
resulting from an arm's-length negotiations where 
there are no claims of |*22] collusion is a very 
strong indication of fair value"). 
Fundamentally, a Delaware court must employ a lib-
eralized approach to valuation embracing "proof of value 
by any techniques or methods which are generally con-
sidered acceptable in the financial community." 28 Both 
parties "have the burden of proving their respective 
valuation positions by a preponderance of the evidence." 
29
 However, if neither party adduces evidence sufficient 
to satisfy this burden, "the court must then use its own 
independent judgment to determine fair value."30 
28 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. 
29 M.G. Bancorp, 73 7 A. 2d at 520. 
30 Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Group, 
Inc., 2003 WL 21753752, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 25, 
2003). 
III. 
A. The Parties' General Contentions 
Based on its experts' testimony, Highfields posits 
that MONY's fair value on July 8, 2004 was between $ 
37 and $ 47 per share. Highfields argues that the $ 31 per 
share merger price is an unreliable indicator, and only 
reflects the company's value to AXA as a buyer rather 
than its value as a going concern. According to High-
fields, in the absence of the merger, MONY was poised 
for success because of management's dedication to grow-
ing revenues and cutting expenses [*23] in the future. 
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Moreover, Highfields contends that AXA's valuation 
methodologies are flawed because: (1) they rely on an 
improper elimination of $ 600 million from MONY's 
DAC and goodwill; (2) they do not account for the 
strong performance of the equity markets from Septem-
ber 2003 to July 2004, which allegedly would have in-
creased MONY's going-concern value were it not for an 
effective $ 31 per share cap on the stock price; and, (3) 
they wrongly attribute a great deal of the appreciation in 
the company's stock price in the months before the deal's 
announcement to merger speculation. In the end, High-
fields contends that the opposing expert's reliance on 
actuarial models and assumptions created by AXA, an 
interested party on the buy side of a transaction, was 
unreasonable, and that AXA has failed to show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that its expert properly ap-
plied any relevant valuation metric. 
In response, AXA argues that the going-concern 
value of MONY as of July 8, 2004 was no more than $ 
21 per share. AXA says that the merger price, less syner-
gies, is the best indicator of value in this case because of 
the arm's-length negotiation process employed and the 
lack of material impediments [*24] to a topping bid. 
According to AXA, the standardized valuation method-
ologies applied by its expert also support a value which 
approximates this market-based approach. AXA argues 
that Highfields's valuation work uses improper assump-
tions and inputs, and that AXA's own conclusions— 
particularly with respect to MONY's market appreciation 
post-announcement, the $ 600 million DAC write-down, 
and investors' understanding that MONY would likely be 
acquired—are borne out by the evidence. Ultimately, 
AXA contends that MONY was a troubled business fac-
ing a dire and unprofitable future due to inherent, irrepa-
rable deficiencies in its system of operation, unyielding 
pressure from competitors, and constant monitoring from 
ratings agencies. 
B. The Experts And Their Testimony 
Four experts testified at trial, three on behalf of 
Highfields and one on behalf of AXA. However, only 
one of Highfields's experts actually opined as to 
MONY's fair value. The court now turns to the evidence 
those individuals presented. 
1. The Non-Valuation Experts 
a. Edward W. Buttner 
Edward W. Buttner is a certified public accountant 
licensed in Florida. 31 Buttner has given expert witness 
testimony in state and federal courts [*25] on numerous 
occasions with respect to accounting and auditing issues 
in the insurance industry. 
31 After graduation from Jacksonville Univer-
sity in 1976, Buttner spent 16 years with the ac-
counting firm of Ernst & Young, where he spe-
cialized in accounting, auditing, and consulting 
for insurance companies. As a partner at Ernst, he 
directed valuation engagements on insurance 
companies, and supervised statutory and GAAP 
financial statement examinations on more than 25 
insurance concerns. When Buttner left Ernst in 
April 1992, he was the partner-in-charge of the 
firm's Florida insurance practice. Since May 
1992, Buttner has continued to provide account-
ing and consulting services to insurance compa-
nies as a partner in Buttner Hammock & Co., 
P.A. 
At trial, Buttner testified on behalf of Highfields re-
garding the propriety of certain pro forma accounting 
adjustments made by MONY management and used by 
CSFB in its February 2004 valuation of the company. 
Specifically, Buttner opined that a pro forma $ 600 mil-
lion reduction in MONY's book value, which resulted 
from a hypothetical 50% write-down of the company's 
deferred acquisition cost asset ("DAC") and 100% of its 
goodwill, was inappropriate under [*26] financial re-
porting standards used in the insurance industry. 32 Butt-
ner also testified that the pro forma replacement of these 
assets with a hypothetical value of business acquired 
asset ("VOBA"), a purchase accounting concept nor-
mally used by the purchaser of an insurance company, 
was an unreasonable decision by MONY's management. 
32 DAC reflects an accounting treatment given 
to up-front, variable costs related to an insurance 
company's generation of new business, including 
commissions paid and underwriting expenses. 
DAC is capitalized, and then amortized to corre-
spond with the amount of time the policy that 
generated those costs is outstanding. 
Buttner noted that, according to GAAP reporting 
standards, the amount of DAC an insurance company 
may capitalize on its books should not exceed the present 
value of future profits generated by in-force business. 33 
If MONY's DAC or goodwill were ever impaired before 
the merger, the company would have written those assets 
down in accordance with GAAP financial reporting stan-
dards. 
33 MONY's DAC was tested for impairment 
quarterly. PricewaterhouseCoopers, in making its 
2003 fiscal year report to MONY's audit commit-
tee, noted that the company's DAC [*27] was re-
coverable, and its goodwill was not impaired. In-
deed, the auditor thought the treatment of these 
Page 8 
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assets was appropriate and more conservative 
than industry practice. 
However, instead of using GAAP book value in pre-
paring its fairness opinion, each of the valuation metrics 
CSFB used relied upon the hypothetical $ 600 million 
DAC-VOBA substitution. MONY management arrived 
at this figure by calculating the rate of return a potential 
acquiror would look for in considering whether to pur-
chase MONY, and then backing out the amount by 
which the potential acquiror's VOBA would exceed 
MONY's then-existing DAC and goodwill. Buttner testi-
fied that this effective revaluation of assets would not 
have been available to MONY if the company continued 
as a stand-alone entity, and that CSFB's fairness opinion 
improperly understated MONY's fair value because of 
the DAC-VOBA substitution. 
On cross-examination, Buttner admitted that, if 
MONY was considering a sale, the DAC-VOBA adjust-
ment would be a relevant criterion in determining what 
an acquiror might pay. An acquiror would be interested 
in this adjustment because an elimination of the DAC 
asset and the establishment of a smaller VOBA asset 
would [*28] offer the potential for a meaningful GAAP 
earnings improvement for MONY. Moreover, since pur-
chase accounting standards would require a buyer to 
eliminate goodwill and DAC, while replacing those as-
sets with the acquirer's own calculations as to the value 
of MONY's in-force business, a hypothetical DAC-
VOBA substitution would be of great importance to 
MONY's board in reviewing the range of values at which 
an acquiror might proceed with a sale. 
b. Michael P. Borom 
Highfields also relies upon the expert testimony of 
Michael P. Borom, one of the founding partners of Im-
pala Partners, LLC, a financial advisory boutique. For 
the last 10 years, Borom has provided restructuring ad-
vice to financial services and insurance-related compa-
nies such as Conseco and Leucadia National Corpora-
tion. 34 
34 His engagements with these companies have 
included issues regarding valuation, debt restruc-
turing, cost-reduction plan implementation, and 
rating agency presentations. Borom is a graduate 
of Colgate University, and began his career at 
General Electric in the company's financial plan-
ning and analysis department. He served as chief 
financial officer of GE Capital's mortgage insur-
ance arm from 1991 to 1995. [*29] Borom was 
also chief financial officer of Aetna's property 
casualty insurance subsidiary from 1995 to 1996, 
and worked intensively on valuation issues dur-
ing Aetna's sale of that portion of its business. 
In preparing his expert report, Borom analyzed 
MONY's revenues and net income from 2001 to 2003. 
Borom testified that trial that MONY was a healthy 
company, one which experienced overall revenue growth 
of 11% in both 2002 and 2003. The growth in MONY's 
insurance business during the pre-merger period, accord-
ing to Borom, was substantially attributable to a sizable 
increase in the company's sale of corporate-owned life 
insurance policies ("COLI"), an item which MONY's 
management had focused on improving. The success of 
MONY's asset management wing, however, correlated to 
trends in the capital markets during this time frame, 
showing lulls in performance during 2001 and 2002, but 
a general trend upward in 2003. The brokerage and in-
vestment banking line of the company showed steady 
revenue growth from 2001 to 2003. Borom opined that 
these positive trends in MONY's business would likely 
have continued in the first half of 2004. 
In analyzing the company's pre-tax net income from 
2001 to 2003, [*30] Borom made certain adjustments 
for "unusual and timing items" specific to the insurance 
industry. He also normalized MONY's capital gains by 
removing all capital gains and losses from the period, 
and then substituting for those figures the company's 
five-year average for capital gains. This analysis pro-
duced a steady increase in MONY's pre-tax net income 
for the period, which rose from $ 17.8 million in 2001, to 
$ 31.1 million in 2002, to $ 55 million in 2003. Borom 
believed that this upward trend in net income would 
likely have continued in 2004 before the AXA merger 
closed. 
Furthermore, Borom testified as to the viability of 
management's proposed cost reduction plan. Borom testi-
fied that $ 45 million of the projected $ 47 million in 
expense savings would have been both attainable and 
sustainable for MONY over the long term if the merger 
with AXA never occurred. In his opinion, several factors, 
including management's support for the cost-saving ini-
tiatives, outside pressure from stockholders and ratings 
agencies, and the fact that MONY was near the bottom 
of the industry in terms of operating efficiency, all made 
it more likely than not that the company would have suc-
ceeded in realizing [*31] these expense savings. 
Finally, Borom took issue with the February 2004 
management projections which CSFB relied on in pre-
paring its fairness opinion. Based on numerous meetings 
and consultations with ratings agencies during his career, 
Borom claimed it was unreasonable to assume that, bar-
ring consummation of the AXA merger, MONY would 
have suffered another ratings downgrade in late 2004 or 
early 2005. Finally, Borom commented that the $ 31 
price AXA's expert used to calculate the shared synergies 
generated by the merger was too low. In Borom's view, 
monetary incentives on the part of management to get a 
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deal done, the lack of an open auction at the beginning of 
the sale process, and the significant due diligence costs a 
topping bidder would incur to intelligently make a bid 
were all structural impediments that distorted the sale 
process in AXA's favor. 
On cross-examination, Borom admitted that, despite 
MONY's growth in net income under his analysis, the 
company's return on equity was still between 1% and 
2%, and at the bottom of the insurance industry. Fur-
thermore, Borom agreed that a ratings downgrade would 
have had a significant negative impact on the company's 
COLI sales, the area [*32] where MONY was achieving 
its highest rate of growth. Borom also admitted that the 
only major differences between management's August 
2003 projections (which he relied on) and its February 
2004 projections (which CSFB relied on) were attribut-
able to the downgrades MONY received from the ratings 
agencies in mid-February 2004. He agreed that the Feb-
ruary 2004 projections assumed the implementation of 
the expense reduction initiatives he discussed during his 
direct testimony, and also assumed that MONY could 
avoid further ratings downgrades through remedial ac-
tion if the merger failed to close. Finally, Borom noted 
that he was never provided with, and never analyzed, any 
of the industry analyst reports supporting the $ 31 price 
as fair; instead, he relied only on fairness assessments 
prepared by ISS and Glass-Lewis. 
2. The Valuation Experts 
Both Highfields and AXA presented valuation ex-
perts. Highfields's valuation expert is Dr. Israel Shaked, a 
professor of finance and economics at Boston Univer-
sity's School of Management. For nearly 30 years, 
Shaked has taught courses at the graduate and under-
graduate levels on various topics, including business 
valuation and corporate finance.35 
35 Shaked [*33] graduated from the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem and later earned a doc-
torate in business administration from Harvard 
Business School. Shaked also acts as managing 
director of the Michel-Shaked Group, a financial 
consulting firm which he co-founded. In the past, 
Shaked has been retained as an expert or consult-
ant concerning valuation and financial condition 
issues in a number of cases involving insurance 
and financial services companies, but never in the 
context of valuing a life insurance company. 
AXA's valuation expert is Peter C. Jachym, a man-
aging director of Keefe, Bruyette & Woods ("KBW"), an 
investment banking firm that focuses exclusively on the 
financial services industry. 36 Within the past few years, 
Jachym has worked on SunLife's acquisition of Keyport 
Life and the sale of Forethought Insurance to a private 
investment firm called The Devlin Group.37 
36 On a year-to-year basis, KBW does a greater 
number of merger and acquisition transactions for 
the financial services industry (banks, insurance 
companies, broker-dealers, and asset managers) 
than any other investment bank in the United 
States. 
37 Before joining KBW in 2001, Jachym 
worked for a number of other investment banking 
[*34] firms, including Merrill Lynch and Bane of 
America Securities, where he specialized in 
valuation, capital raising, and sale transactions in 
the insurance industry. Jachym attended Yale 
University for his undergraduate studies, and re-
ceived a masters degree in business administra-
tion from the Amos Tuck School of Business at 
Dartmouth College. 
a. Shaked's Testimony And Jachym's Rebuttal 
Shaked testified that the fair value of MONY as of 
July 8, 2004 was $ 43.03 per share. He reached this con-
clusion using three traditional valuation methodologies. 
First, Shaked employed a discounted cash flow ("DCF") 
analysis based on assumptions taken from management's 
August 2003 projections. Shaked considered these pro-
jections more authoritative than the February 2004 pro-
jections on which CSFB relied because, according to 
him, the August 2003 projections were made when man-
agement was still valuing MONY as a stand-alone entity. 
He used a 5.0% terminal growth rate in his analysis, 
which was derived from IBES, an authoritative source 
that compiles growth rates for certain companies based 
on estimates of different institutional investors. Shaked's 
8.9% discount rate came from the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model [*35] formula, and was consistent with the dis-
count rates AXA applied to value MONY from May to 
September 2003. Shaked arrived at a price of $ 39.18 per 
share for MONY's stock under the DCF formula, which 
he weighed at 50% in his overall analysis.38 
38 The range of values under Shaked's DCF is $ 
34.85 to $ 50.69 per share. 
To compile a list for his comparable company valua-
tion, Shaked combined the businesses included in the 
S&P 500 Life and Health Insurance Index (the "L&H 
Index") with the companies CSFB identified in its Feb-
ruary 2004 presentation to MONY's board. He then 
eliminated companies whose market capitalization was 
more than ten times greater than MONY's. This process 
yielded 13 comparable companies. 
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Shaked used a price-to-book value multiple for this 
analysis, rather than a price-to-earnings multiple. He 
testified that price-to-earnings multiples are not typically 
used to value life insurance companies, and that, if one 
were applied using MONY's 2003 earnings, the result 
would have been a multiple of 97.33. Given that 
MONY's stock was trading at $28.20 at the time the 
merger was announced, a price-to-earnings multiple 
would not have been a reasonable metric. AXA agrees 
with Shaked [*36] on this point. 
Because of MONY's low earnings and due to its be-
low-average financial strength rating, Shaked derived a 
multiple for MONY of .89 from the lower quartile of 
companies he examined. To remove the minority dis-
count, Shaked compiled a list of 55 transactions involv-
ing financial acquirors from July 8, 1999 to July 8, 2004 
in which more than $ 200 million was paid and in which 
at least 51% of the company was purchased. This yielded 
a median minority discount of 30.1%. Shaked multiplied 
MONY's book value per share of $ 40.24 (which omitted 
the $ 600 million write-down of DAC and goodwill) by 
.89, and then added in the 30.1% minority discount. By 
doing so, he arrived at a price for MONY of $ 46.69 per 
share under his comparable company analysis, which he 
weighed at 30% in his overall valuation.39 
39 Shaked's comparable company analysis re-
turned a range of $ 41.45 to $ 51.92 per share. 
Shaked also employed a comparable transactions 
analysis. He examined life insurance acquisitions be-
tween July 8, 1999 and July 8, 2004 involving entire 
enterprises (as opposed to transactions where a line or 
division of a conglomerate was sold) where at least 51% 
of the target was acquired at a cost [*37] of at least $ 
200 million. After excluding deals which were ten times 
greater than the AXA-MONY merger, Shaked ended up 
with a list of seven transactions. 
Based on price-to-book value, the MONY merger 
was assigned a multiple of 1.37, in the lower quartile of 
the comparable transactions. After removing a 14.5% 
synergy premium from the MONY transaction, he ar-
rived at a value of $ 47.15 for each share of MONY 
stock using his comparable transactions analysis, which 
he weighed at 20% overall.40 
40 The range of values for Shaked's comparable 
transactions metric is $ 43.71 to $ 50.59 per 
share. 
Shaked also undertook a market price analysis to 
gauge how MONY's stock price would have reacted to 
appreciation in the capital markets from September 17, 
2003 to July 8, 2004 without what he contends was an 
effective cap of $ 31 per share resulting from the pend-
ency of AXA's offer. Shaked took MONY's stock price a 
month prior to the merger announcement ($ 28.20), ad-
justed for a minority discount, and multiplied this figure 
by MONY's expected percentage return based on the 
appreciation of the L&H Index during the relevant pe-
riod. 41 Doing so, Shaked arrived at $ 42.22 as an ex-
pected unaffected price [*38] for MONY's stock (on a 
control basis) as of July 8, 2004.42 
41 To perform this calculation, Shaked found 
that the value of the L&H Index increased by 
21.7% during the relevant period. MONY's beta 
to that index was .69. Thus, MONY's expected 
return for the period, according to Shaked, was 
15.1%. 
42 This figure reflects the elimination of a 
30.1% minority discount. If the AXA expert's 
minority discount of 16.7% is used, one arrives at 
an unaffected price of $ 37.68. 
To rebut the evidence Shaked presented, Jachym tes-
tified at length regarding what he believed were funda-
mental flaws in Shaked's analyses. First, Jachym noted 
several thematic shortcomings in Shaked's presentation. 
Shaked never used financial data derived from an actuar-
ial appraisal, despite the fact that actuarial appraisals are 
the industry norm for valuation of a life insurance com-
pany. Also, Shaked paid no attention to the actual $ 31 
per share price AXA paid, even though MONY was ac-
quired through an arm's-length bargaining process. 
Moreover, Shaked used dated managerial projections 
from August 2003 throughout his report, projections pre-
pared before MONY suffered a ratings downgrade in 
February 2004. 
Jachym testified that [*39] Shaked's valuation 
methodologies are unreliable. In Shaked's DCF analysis, 
GAAP earnings estimates are used, which do not equate 
with cash flows in the life insurance business due to 
capital retention and dividend maintenance requirements. 
Also, Jachym stated that Shaked improperly arrived at 
MONY's terminal value by growing projected earnings at 
a constant rate. According to Jachym, Shaked erred in his 
comparable company analysis by assigning MONY mul-
tiples based on the median of the bottom quartile of each 
model, even though MONY was outperformed by com-
panies at the very bottom of the list. Finally, Jachym 
stated that Shaked's comparable transactions model is 
flawed because it completely ignores the Safeco transac-
tion, 43 which was the most similar in size, timing, and 
financial performance to the MONY deal. Jachym ada-
mantly disagreed with Shaked's contention that Safeco 
was a distressed sale, noting that Safeco's parent com-
pany had capital raising alternatives and that the avail-
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ability of Safeco's statutory financial statements would 
have precluded any material marketability discount. 
43 This deal involved the March 15, 2004 pur-
chase of Safeco Life & Investments by a group of 
investors [*40] (including Highfields). 
As to Shaked's calculation of a control premium for 
the transaction, Jachym noted that Shaked used transac-
tions involving both financial and non-financial institu-
tions to calculate his figure, an improper technique con-
sidering regulatory constraints on dividends and cash 
flows to stockholders typically result in lower control 
premiums being paid to acquire a financial institution. As 
to Shaked's synergy premium calculation, Jachym testi-
fied that the transactions Shaked relied on were not com-
parable to the AXA-MONY merger, and that they oc-
curred in the bull market of the late 1990s when the typi-
cal merger premium was inflated in comparison to 2004 
standards. Finally, Jachym claimed that MONY's stock 
price was artificially inflated by merger speculation at 
the time of the transaction. He stated that Shaked's trad-
ing volume analysis and event study were poor indicators 
of an inflated price in this case, since those models ex-
amine the effect of a single event or a single piece of 
information on a stock's price, rather than testing for the 
presence of a long-term price condition. Indeed, Jachym 
noted that MONY was operationally underperforming 
firms in its peer group [*41] from March 13, 2003 to 
September 17, 2003, yet the company's stock outper-
formed that same group by approximately 25% during 
the same time period.44 
44 On cross-examination, AXA's counsel ques-
tioned Shaked about his use of capitalized earn-
ings estimates derived from management's Au-
gust 2003 projections in his DCF analysis. 
Shaked noted that earnings for insurance compa-
nies are normally higher than free cash flows to 
stockholders, due to, among other things, the ef-
fect of DAC amortization. Indeed, AXA's counsel 
questioned Shaked at length about the profes-
sional acceptability of using capitalized earnings 
as an input in a DCF analysis for an insurance 
company. Shaked also observed that the earnings 
estimates he used for 2004 were approximately 
six times MONY's 2003 actual earnings, while 
those for 2005 were around 12 times the 2003 
numbers. Shaked testified that if MONY man-
agement's February 2004 projections were substi-
tuted into his model, the DCF value of MONY 
would have been less than $ 20 per share. More-
over, Shaked noted that his DCF calculation re-
sults in the same value no matter which year is 
used as the terminal year, and that nearly 100% 
of MONY's value from his DCF analysis [*42] 
derives from terminal value. 
AXA's counsel also attacked Shaked's com-
parable company and comparable transactions 
metrics. Shaked admitted that MONY's return on 
equity for 2004 was projected to be the worst, 
and was the second worst historically, of any of 
the comparable companies he analyzed. Further-
more, the returns on equity reported by the target 
companies in Shaked's comparable transactions 
analysis were all substantially higher than that of 
MONY. Despite all of this, Shaked placed 
MONY in the lower quartile in both his compa-
rable company and comparable transactions 
analyses, rather than at the very bottom. 
b. Jachym's Testimony And Shaked's Rebuttal 
Jachym testified that the fair value of MONY as of 
July 8, 2004 was $ 20.80 per share. He used five differ-
ent metrics in forming this conclusion. The first method 
involved a shared synergies analysis, wherein Jachym 
assumed that the price AXA paid ($ 31 per share), less 
synergies derived from the transaction that AXA was 
willing to share with MONY stockholders ($ 7.75 per 
share), was the best indicator of the company's value as a 
going concern because no material impediments existed 
to a competing bid. Jachym derived the synergy value 
[*43] of the transaction from AXA's September 2003 
board presentation, and from valuation materials created 
by CSFB in February 2004 for MONY's directors. 
Jachym arrived at a value for MONY of $ 23.75 per 
share using a shared synergies approach, and weighed 
this price at 50% in his overall valuation opinion. 
Second, Jachym created a sum-of-the-parts analysis, 
which he claimed to be the best method by which to 
value MONY absent an arm's-length transaction. Ac-
cording to Jachym, a sum-of-the-parts analysis was ap-
propriate due to a lack of comparable companies and 
comparable transactions for MONY, as well as the fact 
that MONY was comprised of three distinct segments 
(its insurance, brokerage, and asset management busi-
nesses). 
For the insurance segment, Jachym broke the busi-
ness down into three components: the adjusted net asset 
value, the value of in-force business, and the value of 
future business. Jachym used financial data prepared by 
MONY as of June 30, 2004, which the company pre-
pared to meet statutory accounting requirements, to ar-
rive at a net asset value figure. To value the in-force and 
future business, Jachym relied on actuarial projections 
developed by AXA in September 2003 when it [*44] 
was deciding how much to bid for MONY. Because 
KBW is not an actuarial firm, Jachym and his team con-
ducted interviews with several of the AXA actuaries re-
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sponsible for compiling the actuarial model to determine 
the reasonableness of the assumptions used therein. 
Jachym calculated MONY's adjusted net asset value 
to be $ 1.02 billion, and assigned values of $ 74.7 million 
and $ 97.9 million to the in-force business and the future 
business, respectively. He testified that the discount rates 
used to calculate the latter two figures were consistent 
with those employed by the actuarial appraisal firm 
MONY retained in early 2003, and that his valuation of 
MONY's future business was quite aggressive, consider-
ing that AXA ascribed no value at all to this segment 
when it examined MONY in September 2003. 
In valuing MONY's brokerage business, Jachym 
used a weighted average of comparable company and 
comparable transactions metrics to arrive at a value of $ 
273.1 million. He testified that a DCF methodology was 
not used because KBW did not have reliable, contempo-
raneous projections for the brokerage segment for the 
necessary time periods. 
For MONY's asset management business, Jachym 
used a weighted [*45] average of comparable companies 
and DCF analyses to arrive at a value of $ 93.5 million. 
Jachym testified that, after subtracting the company's 
long-term debt and adding back holdings of cash and 
cash equivalents, the total value of MONY using a sum-
of-the-parts analysis was $ 893 million, or $ 17.68 per 
share. Jachym weighed his sum-of-the-parts approach at 
35% in his overall analysis. 
Jachym also applied a comparable company meth-
odology. He selected publicly traded life insurance com-
panies with a market capitalization between $ 500 mil-
lion and $ 5 billion, and then analyzed each firm's price-
to-book, price-to-2004 estimated earnings, and price-to-
2005 estimated earnings ratios. Jachym testified that, 
statistically speaking, MONY was the worst performing 
and most troubled company of any in its peer group. Af-
ter eliminating an implied minority discount of 16.1%, 
Jachym arrived at a value of $ 19.98 per share under the 
comparable company approach, which he weighed at 
7.5% in his overall valuation opinion. 
In Jachym's comparable transactions analysis, he se-
lected six relevant acquisitions of life insurance compa-
nies that occurred between 2001 and mid-2004. While 
Jachym assigned a 10% weighting [*46] to five of these 
transactions, he testified that one transaction in particular 
was highly comparable to AXA's purchase of MONY--
the Safeco transaction. Safeco was operationally similar 
to MONY, and struggled with low returns on equity. At 
$ 1.35 billion, the Safeco acquisition was slightly less 
than the price paid for MONY, and the transaction closed 
three months prior to the AXA-MONY merger. Thus, 
Jachym chose to apply a 50% weight to the Safeco trans-
action, and ultimately derived an $ 18.83 per share price 
under the comparable transactions method after making a 
16.1% discount to eliminate synergies. Jachym weighed 
his comparable transactions metric at 5% in his overall 
valuation of MONY. 
Jachym testified that, in applying a DCF methodol-
ogy, he looked for financial data that would equate well 
with MONY's free cash flows available to stockholders. 
According to Jachym, Shaked's metric of GAAP earn-
ings bears no resemblance to the actual cash flows of an 
insurance company, but statutory earnings, which he 
used, do. Jachym characterized his discount rate of 10% 
as aggressive, and examined discount rates discussed in 
proxy statements from financial transactions occurring 
between 1999 and [*47] February 2004 to validate the 
reasonableness of this assumption. Applying these in-
puts, Jachym arrived at a per share price for MONY of $ 
21.83 as of July 8, 2004, which he weighed at 2.5% in 
his overall analysis. 
To rebut Jachym's opinion, Shaked highlighted cer-
tain portions of the KBW analysis which he found to be 
flawed. He testified that the 10%-12% discount rate used 
in Jachym's DCF analysis was unduly high, and that the 
$ 600 million write-down of MONY's DAC and good-
will fundamentally skewed Jachym's comparable com-
pany and comparable transactions metrics downward. 
Shaked also stated that Jachym's inclusion of the Safeco 
transaction in his comparable transactions analysis was 
inappropriate because it was a distressed sale of a larger 
company's line of business, rather than the sale of an 
entire enterprise. 
In order to test the validity of AXA's contention that 
the share price of MONY was artificially inflated at the 
time of the merger announcement due to market specula-
tion, Shaked conducted an event study and a volume 
analysis on MONY stock. In the event study, he found 
that statistically significant abnormal activity in the price 
fluctuation of MONY's stock rarely occurred from [*48] 
March 13, 2003 to September 17, 2003,45 In the trading 
volume analysis, Shaked found that differences in the 
average trading volumes for MONY stock from January 
5, 2001 to March 12, 2003 and from March 13, 2003 to 
September 17, 2003 were not statistically significant. 46 
Shaked concluded that MONY's share price was not ma-
terially driven up by market speculation in the time pre-
ceding the announcement of the merger.47 
45 Shaked ran a regression analysis on MONY's 
stock price versus a "peer index" established by 
AXA's expert, as well as the L&H Index, be-
tween February 19, 2002 and February 13, 2003. 
Once he derived a "normalized" relationship be-
tween the movement of MONY's stock and these 
indexes, Shaked looked for abnormal activity in 
the seven months prior to the merger announce-
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ment. He found statistically significant variations 
on only nine trading days for the "peer index," 
and only two trading days for the L&H [*49] In-
dex comparison. On none of these days was there 
news in the marketplace discussing a possible ac-
quisition of MONY. Shaked testified that if there 
were rampant merger speculation surrounding 
MONY in this period, many more statistically 
significant variations would have occurred. 
46 Shaked said that a statistically significant 
variation between the two periods would have 
been likely if MONY's stock was trading in an-
ticipation of a merger during the March to Sep-
tember 2003 time frame. 
47 On cross-examination, Jachym admitted that 
he had no statistical analysis to assign a specific 
dollar amount of merger speculation imbedded in 
the price of a MONY share, and admitted that 
some of the price increase in the six months prior 
to the merger announcement could have been due 
to upward trends in the equity markets. High-
fields's counsel repeatedly questioned Jachym re-
garding his assumptions as to MONY's potential 
difficulty in generating profitable new business. 
Moreover, Jachym admitted that the price-to-
book value ratio assigned to Safeco in KBW's 
comparable transactions analysis did not adjust 
for Safeco's unrecognized capital gains and 
losses, which resulted in a substantial under-
statement of [*50] MONY's value under that par-
ticular metric. 
IV. 
As an initial matter, the court finds that neither party 
fully satisfied its burden of persuasion regarding a valua-
tion of MONY. 48 Generally speaking, however, several 
of Jachym's models—namely, his shared synergies ap-
proach and his sum-of-the-parts/actuarial appraisal 
analysis—are more credible, and therefore form the un-
derlying basis for the court's determination of fair value 
in this case. Strikingly, despite the industry standard of 
using a sum-of-the-parts/actuarial appraisal methodology 
to value an insurance conglomerate as a going concern, 
and despite the reliance this court typically places on the 
merger price in an appraisal proceeding that arises from 
an arm's-length transaction, Shaked provided no testi-
mony about MONY's value pursuant to these important 
models. 
48 Indeed, the parties' briefs are like two ships 
passing in the night, with each litigant showing 
an equal amount of tedium in attacking (often 
with good cause) every assumption used or con-
clusion reached by the other party's expert, no 
matter how minor. In using KBW's shared syner-
gies and sum-of-the-parts analyses as a frame-
work for a fair value determination (while [*51] 
making adjustments based on its own independ-
ent business judgment), the court feels compelled 
to observe that, like democracy was to Winston 
Churchill, Jachym's work was basically the least 
worst valuation scheme presented in this case. 
Shaked's valuation not only suffers because of these 
analytical gaps, it is also markedly disparate from market 
price data for MONY's stock and other independent indi-
cia of value. 49 Because Shaked's conclusions substan-
tially deviate from these objective barometers, it is ap-
propriate to use Jachym's opinion as a baseline for the 
court to formulate its own independent judgment as to a 
fair value for MONY. 
49 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
2003 WL 23700218, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 
2003) (noting that a valuation supported by sev-
eral independent indicia of value is more reliable 
than an expert who "does not even attempt to per-
form reasonableness checks upon his valuation"); 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 
161084, at *31 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (employ-
ing market price data not as an independent 
valuation source, but "as corroboration of the 
judgment that [an expert's] valuation is a reason-
able estimation of intrinsic value of [the ap-
praised [*52] company], exclusive of elements 
of value arising from expectation or accomplish-
ment of the merger"), rev'don other grounds, 634 
A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). For example, Shaked's 
comparable transactions analysis indicated that 
MONY should have sold for $ 55.12 before back-
ing out synergies, a figure 77% higher than the 
actual merger consideration of $ 31 per share, and 
a price at which a bidder topping AXA's bid by $ 
4 per share would have made $ 1 billion on a $ 
1.75 billion investment. Likewise, Shaked's com-
parable company analysis ascribes a value to 
MONY of $ 46.69, even though on the last day of 
trading before the announcement of the merger, 
and given the market knowledge of a likely trans-
action, MONY stock traded at only $ 29.33. See 
also JX 1135 (March 22, 2004 Deutsche Bank 
report stating that "if the AXA-MNY deal were to 
fall apart, we expect the MNY stock to trade in 
the $ 25-27 range"); JX 1132 (February 11, 2004 
Fox-Pitt report stating that "we expect the stock 
will drop below $ 30 if the merger is voted 
down"); JX 125 at 13 (ISS Proxy Report stating 
that "[cjommentary from Wall Street analysts 
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suggest MONY may fall into the mid twenties if 
the merger is not consummated"). 
A. The [*53] Experts' DCF Analyses 
Typically, Delaware courts tend to favor a DCF 
model over other available methodologies in an appraisal 
proceeding.50 However, that metric has much less utility 
in cases where the transaction giving rise to appraisal 
was an arm's-length merger,51 where the data inputs used 
in the model are not reliable, 52 or where a DCF is not 
customarily used to value a company in a particular in-
dustry. While all of these factors influence the court's 
decision when ascribing weight to an expert's DCF 
model, only the latter two factors require substantial dis-
cussion here. 
50 Crescent/Mach I P'ship v. Turner, 2007 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 63, 2007 WL 1342263, at *9 (Del. Ch. 
May 2,2007). 
51 See, e.g., Union III. 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union 
Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340 at 359-61 (dis-
counting the utility of a DCF analysis in this type 
of circumstance). 
52 See, e.g., Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com, Inc., 
2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, 2004 WL 1152338, at 
*5-7 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004) (rejecting a DCF 
valuation because the inputs were not reasonably 
reliable). 
1. Shaked's DCF Analysis 
A DCF assigns a value to an enterprise by adding (1) 
an estimation of net cash flows that the company will 
generate over a period of time to (2) a terminal value 
equal to the future value, as of the end of the projection 
[*54] period, of the company's cash flows beyond the 
projection period. 53 Fundamentally, Shaked's DCF is 
flawed because it does not estimate cash flows over a 
time period, but simply capitalizes an earnings estimate 
for MONY's 2005 fiscal year devised by management in 
August 2003. 
53 ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 
917 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
Shaked relies on GAAP earnings to hypothesize a 
cash flow stream for MONY. However, GAAP earnings 
are not useful because state regulation materially reduces 
the free cash flows an insurance company has available 
for distribution to stockholders by imposing capital re-
tention and dividend set-aside requirements on those 
earnings. Shaked also improperly uses a constant rate of 
growth beginning in 2005 to extrapolate his earnings 
estimates (without presenting any evidence that MONY's 
earnings would stabilize after 2005). The unreliability of 
Shaked's "DCF" analysis is further demonstrated by the 
observation that it yields substantially the same valuation 
for MONY regardless of whether a five-year, ten-year, or 
even one-year projection was used, thus rendering the 
projection time period irrelevant. 54 Indeed, Shaked's 
DCF becomes nothing more than an extension [*55] of 
2005 financial projections in which MONY's calculated 
terminal value represents almost 100% of Shaked's total 
estimated value of the company.55 
54 See Dobler, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, 2004 
WL 2271592, at *10 (noting that a DCF is mean-
ingless where a projection time period becomes 
irrelevant because it is essentially nothing more 
than an extension of one year's financial results). 
55 Although his wrongful extrapolation of one 
year's estimated earnings is by itself sufficient to 
render Shaked's DCF useless, his use of dated 
management projections further undermines his 
DCF calculations. Shaked used August 2003 pro-
jections, rather than February 2004 projections. 
The latter accounted for MONY's then-recent rat-
ings downgrade, and its most recent financial per-
formance (including all of 2003). Truly, it was 
hopelessly optimistic for Shaked to assume that 
MONY, as a stand-alone company facing further 
ratings downgrades and trying to implement cost 
saving measures which would affect its revenues, 
would be able to increase its 2005 earnings to 12 
times its actual 2003 figures. His utilization of 
these figures completely ignores the fundamental 
nature of the enterprise subject to this appraisal 
proceeding. Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 
A.2d 796, 805 (Del. 1992) [*56] (citing 8 Del. C. 
§ 262(h)). 
2. Jachym's DCF Analysis 
In several ways, Jachym conducted his DCF analysis 
in a more credible fashion than did Shaked. Jachym did 
not rely on outdated management projections which 
were, by any reasonable measure, not indicative of 
MONY's future prospects. Jachym also used estimated 
statutory earnings, which correlate more strongly with 
cash available for distribution to stockholders, as a proxy 
for cash flow. But these indications that Jachym's DCF is 
more structurally sound do not mean the court should 
blindly rely on Jachym's application of this metric. 
As the evidence at trial showed, industry experts and 
executives do not consider a DCF a particularly impor-
tant framework for valuing a company whose primary 
business is selling life insurance. A successful insurer 
can have massive (and misleading) outflows of cash in 
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times of high sales volume, whereas a troubled, yet es-
tablished, company can show sizeable positive cash 
flows because its in-force policy premiums overshadow 
small commission payments and other variable expenses 
resulting from low current sales. Jachym, an analyst with 
more than 20 years of experience in the insurance sector 
and who works [*57] for an investment bank that is a 
juggernaut in the financial services and insurance indus-
tries, chose to assign only a 2.5% weighting, no more 
than a token figure, to a DCF in his overall valuation of 
MONY. Therefore, while a properly conducted DCF 
analysis is typically granted substantial evidentiary 
weight by a court in an appraisal proceeding,56 court will 
not utilize a pure DCF methodology in determining 
MONY's fair value. 
56 Crescent, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63, 2007 WL 
1342263, at *9. 
B. The Experts' Comparable Transactions Analyses 
A comparable transactions analysis is an accepted 
valuation tool in Delaware appraisal cases. The analysis 
involves identifying similar transactions, quantifying 
those transactions through financial metrics, and then 
applying the metrics to the company at issue to ascertain 
a value. 57 The utility of the comparable transactions 
methodology is directly linked to the "similarity between 
the company the court is valuing and the companies used 
for comparison." 58 Because a testifying expert necessar-
ily exercises a degree of subjective judgment in selecting 
the transactions he actually compares to the one at issue, 
a reviewing court must closely evaluate whether a party 
who relies on [*58] a comparable transactions analysis 
has met its burden of persuasion. 
57 In re United States Cellular Operating Co., 
2005 Del Ch. LEXIS 1, 2005 WL 43994, at *17 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2005) (citing Dobler, 2004 Del. 
Ch LEXIS 139, 2004 WL 2271592, at *8). 
58 Id. (citing Lane v. Cancer Treatment Centers 
of America, Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, 2004 
WL 1752847, at *34 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004)). 
1. Shaked's Comparable Transactions Analysis 
In his comparable transactions analysis, Shaked used 
dated transactions that occurred during a strong bull 
market in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the majority of 
which were five years removed from the closing of the 
AXA-MONY merger. 59 More detrimentally, however, 
Shaked relied on companies that were not directly com-
parable to MONY, while omitting from his analysis one 
highly probative transaction-the purchase of Safeco. 60 
These discretionary judgments resulted in a substantial 
overvaluation of MONY. 
59 Of the seven transactions Shaked classified 
as comparable, four were from 1999. 
60 In Highfields's post-trial briefing, Shaked be-
latedly attempts to include the Safeco transaction 
in his comparable transactions analysis. This ef-
fort is procedurally inappropriate, and casts great 
doubt on Shaked's objective judgment consider-
ing he [*59] originally believed it was appropri-
ate to ignore the Safeco transaction altogether. In 
any event, the court gives this dilatory tactic no 
weight, since Shaked still relies on other non-
comparable transactions. 
The Safeco transaction is temporally relevant to the 
AXA-MONY merger. It was announced in late Septem-
ber 2003 and closed in March 2004. Moreover, the con-
sideration paid in the two transactions was similar. Per-
haps most strikingly, the life insurance businesses of 
both companies suffered from low returns on equity, an 
influential factor in both companies being sold at sub-
stantial discounts to GAAP book value.61 
61 The Safeco transaction occurred at approxi-
mately 78% of book value, while the MONY 
transaction went through at roughly 72% of book 
value. 
Highfields's argument that the Safeco transaction is 
irrelevant because it involved a distressed sale at a sig-
nificant marketability discount is simply makeweight. 
Goldman Sachs, a respected financial advisor, conducted 
an auction for Safeco. 62 Contemporaneous buy-side and 
sell-side actuarial appraisals conducted by prominent 
actuarial firms confirm that the discount from book value 
in the Safeco transaction was justified, and erodes [*60] 
Highfields's contention that Safeco was sold at a market-
ability discount. 63 Indeed, one would expect this to be 
the case, considering that Safeco's life insurance segment 
filed statutorily-required financial statements that were 
readily available to members of the investment commu-
nity. For these reasons, the court finds Shaked's compa-
rable transactions methodology unreliable and unpersua-
sive. 
62 Trial Tr. 356-57. 
63 JX 1222; JX 1251. 
2. Jachym's Comparable Transactions Analysis 
In his rebuttal report, Jachym criticizes as improper 
the use of a price-to-book value multiple in Shaked's 
comparable transactions model. However, it is Jachym's 
reliance on an implied price-to-earnings multiple of 
12.5x to value MONY that fails the test of reasonable-
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ness. This calculation resulted in an implied value for 
MONY of only $ 4.50 per share. Despite the fact that, in 
the court's view, no conceivable basis exists to assign 
any weight to such an outlying value of MONY, Jachym 
insisted it was sound judgment to weigh this figure at 
30%. The powerful influence the $ 4.50 per share num-
ber imparted on his comparable transactions model un-
reasonably reduced the going-concern value Jachym de-
rived for MONY. 
Although [*61] the court could adjust the weight 
Jachym placed on the price-to-earnings multiple to reach 
an acceptable valuation for MONY, there remains an 
irreparable structural malady in Jachym's comparable 
transactions methodology—a failure to adjust the price-
to-book value metric for each selected company's unreal-
ized capital gains and losses. Under Financial Account-
ing Standard 115 ("FAS 115"), insurance companies are 
permitted to report losses in their investment portfolio 
without adjusting their book value to reflect those losses. 
If an adjustment is made for FAS 115, unrealized losses 
not yet booked will increase the reported book value of 
the firm. The effect of this adjustment, for present pur-
poses, is a decrease in the insurer's price-to-book value 
multiple. 
Despite the analyst and industry preference of 
evaluating a firm after making an FAS 115 adjustment, 
Jachym did not do so for his comparable transactions. In 
his presentation to the court at trial, Jachym assigned a 
ratio of .53x for the Safeco transaction, despite admitting 
on cross-examination that the multiple would increase to 
.78x when adjusted for FAS 115. Although the court 
requested that Jachym reconfigure his model to compen-
sate [*62] for this shortcoming, he was unable to do so 
because book value excluding FAS 115 is not publicly 
available for three of the six transactions he used. There-
fore, the court finds that Jachym's comparable transac-
tions analysis is irretrievably defective, and cannot form 
a legitimate basis from which to derive MONY's fair 
value. 
C. The Experts' Comparable Company Analyses 
The comparable company valuation model involves 
"(1) identifying comparable publicly traded companies; 
(2) deriving appropriate valuation multiples from the 
comparable companies; (3) adjusting those multiples to 
account for the differences from the company being val-
ued and the comparables; and (4) applying those multi-
ples to the revenues, earnings, or other values for the 
company being valued." 64 When evaluating the utility of 
this methodology in a particular case, a court must con-
sider the degree of similarity between the company val-
ued and the companies compared, for "at some point, the 
differences become so large that the use of the compara-
ble company method becomes meaningless for valuation 
purposes."65 
64 Dobler, 2004 Del Ch. LEXIS 139, 2004 WL 
2271592, at *8 (quoting Agranoff v. Miller, 791 
A.2d880, 892 (Del. Ch. 2001)). 
65 Lane, 2004 Del Ch. LEXIS 108, 2004 WL 
1752847, at *34 [*63] (quoting In re Radiology 
Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 
1991)). 
1. Shaked's Comparable Company Analysis 
Shaked's comparable company methodology suffers 
from the same problem the court found with his compa-
rable transactions analysis—namely, the companies 
Shaked examined were not sufficiently comparable to 
MONY to render his work reliable for purposes of a 
Delaware appraisal proceeding. Using a price-to-book 
value metric, 66 Shaked placed MONY at the median of 
the bottom quartile in his model, assigning the company 
a multiple of .89x. This multiple is a 27% discount from 
Shaked's own comparable company median, and repre-
sents a 33% discount from the mean. Thus, Shaked's 
conclusion implicitly supports AXA's critique that his 
comparable company analysis is overly biased and sub-
jective. In the past, other Delaware courts have found a 
comparable company metric to be unreliable where such 
a discrepancy is present.67 
66 In deriving these ratios, Shaked used data 
from second quarter Form 10-Qs, an improper 
approach as this information was not publicly 
available as of July 8, 2004, and thus was not re-
flected in the market price of the companies as of 
that date. 
67 Dobler, 2004 Del Ch. LEXIS 139, 2004 WL 
2271592, at *77 [*64] (quoting Taylor, 2003 
WL 21753752, at *9, for the proposition that by 
choosing a drastically reduced multiple, "[an ex-
pert] demonstrate [s] that he believes the guideline 
companies are not truly comparable," and reject-
ing a deviation of 48% as unreasonable); Gotham 
Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 855 
A.2d 1059, 1076 & n.31 (Del. Ch. 2003) (discuss-
ing the dangers of significantly deviating from 
the mean or median of guideline companies' mul-
tiples because the analysis becomes too biased 
and subjective). 
Shaked's calculation of a 30.1% control premium in 
his comparable company analysis, which he achieved by 
removing the implicit minority discount from the calcu-
lated stock price of MONY, was also conducted in a 
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questionable fashion. None of the more than 50 transac-
tions he examined, all of which involved a financial 
buyer taking the acquired company private, involved an 
insurance company. Indeed, only one transaction even 
involved a financial institution. The use of a pool of such 
dissimilar transactions, leaves the court with no confi-
dence that Shaked's calculation of a 30.1% control pre-
mium was proper, particularly since he ignored the fact 
that financial buyers may also enjoy [*65] synergistic 
benefits from their acquisitions. 68 For these reasons, the 
court finds Shaked's comparable company methodology 
unreliable and gives it no weight. 
68 See, e.g., Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan 
Corp., 1995 WL 376911, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 16, 
1995) (observing that the premium necessary to 
remove the inherent minority discount in a pub-
licly traded stock is somewhere between zero and 
the full value of the control premium, and dis-
counting available premium data which ranged 
from 34%-48% to 12.5% to account for syner-
gies). As Jachym testified, even financial buyers 
have some synergies when making an acquisition, 
such as the ability to reduce the acquired com-
pany's cost of capital and to attract best-in-breed 
management and board members. 
2. Jachym's Comparable Company Analysis 
As was the case with his DCF analysis, Jachym both 
explicitly (in his trial testimony) and implicitly (by 
weighing the metric at only 7.5% in his overall valua-
tion) admits to the lack of real comparability between 
MONY and the other publicly traded life insurance com-
panies examined in his comparable company model. The 
price-to-book value metric for Jachym's comparable 
firms, which he weighted at 60%, ranged [*66] from 
.54x to 1.36x. Jachym placed MONY at the bottom of 
this range. This .54x multiple is a 40% discount from 
Jachym's own price-to-book value median, and repre-
sents a 41.4% discount from the mean. Jachym's compa-
rable company analysis, then, bears the same hallmarks 
of unreliability Shaked's.69 
69 Id. 
Jachym's methodology is further undermined by 
contradictions in his trial testimony and his report. 
Jachym stated that the market did not value MONY on 
the basis of its earnings, and that it was not acceptable 
practice to derive stock values for an insurance company 
solely from earnings. Thus, Jachym's decision to rely 
heavily on price-to-estimated earnings multiples was 
unreasonable, particularly in light of market estimations 
of MONY's value.70 By weighting an implied value of $ 
10.70 per share at 40% in his comparable company 
analysis, Jachym unduly skewed downward the result 
obtained from this model. 7I Viewed with the shortcom-
ings associated with his price-to-book value metric, the 
court rejects Jachym's comparable company analysis.72 
70 Market analysts suggested a stand-alone 
price for MONY in the mid-$ 20 range several 
months before the transaction closed. See note 49 
supra. 
71 Jachym [*67] ascribed 20% weight to an 
implied value per share of $ 8.26 based on price-
to-2004 estimated earnings, and 20% weight to 
an implied value of $ 13.14 based on price-to-
2005 estimated earnings. 
72 Despite the court's pointed questioning at 
trial, both Shaked and Jachym stood by their de-
cisions to remove an implicit minority discount in 
MONY's stock when conducting their compara-
ble company analyses. Although Delaware courts 
now seem to accept that the application of this 
valuation metric requires such an adjustment, the 
debate in the legal and financial community con-
tinues. Compare Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Mi-
chael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of 
the "Implicit Minority Discount" in Delaware 
Appraisal Law (Univ. of Penn. Inst. For Law & 
Economics, Research Paper No. 07-01), available 
at 
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/clb/docs/Events/IMD_Dr 
aft_l-18-07.pdf (arguing that the implicit minor-
ity discount has not gained general acceptance in 
the financial community) and Richard A. Booth, 
Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in 
Appraisal Proceedings, 57 BUS. LAW. 127, 148-
51 (2001)(same) with John C. Coates IV, "Fair 
Value" As An Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law; 
Minority Discounts in Conflict [*68] Transac-
tions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (1999) (arguing 
that the elimination of an implied minority dis-
count is, in some instances, appropriate). 
D. Shaked's Market Price Analysis 
Although Shaked technically gave it no weight in his 
ultimate determination of MONY's fair value, he con-
ducted a market price analysis as a purported test of rea-
sonableness, and concluded that MONY's expected unaf-
fected share price as of July 8, 2004 was $ 42.22. To 
arrive at this price, Shaked took what he believed was 
MONY's unaffected share price a month before the an-
nouncement of the merger ($ 28.20), eliminated a minor-
ity discount (30.1%), and then applied a beta multiple 
against the return of the L&H Index from the date of the 
merger announcement to the merger closing.73 
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73 The return on the L&H Index during this pe-
riod was 21.7%. Shaked calculated a beta of 0.69, 
and thereby derived an expected return for 
MONY of 15.1% during the same time frame. 
As an initial matter, the court is convinced that 
MONY's stock price included an element of value re-
flecting merger speculation leading up to the September 
17, 2003 announcement. MONY was well covered by 
analysts, and the evidence at trial overwhelmingly 
showed [*69] the market was aware that a transaction 
involving MONY would probably occur soon after the 
volume ownership restrictions on the company's stock 
expired in November 2003. Due to the extended period 
of time that this information was available, the court 
finds plausible Jachym's contention that a merger specu-
lation premium was an imbedded condition in MONY's 
pre-September 17 stock price.74 
74 Additionally, the imbedded nature of this 
merger speculation condition would arguably 
render Shaked's addition of a minority discount to 
MONY's stock price an improper double-
counting. 
The event study and the volume study conducted by 
Shaked, which form his basis for opining that MONY's 
stock price was unaffected, are not meaningful where 
such an imbedded condition exists.75 Moreover, Shaked's 
assumption that MONY's stock price would move in 
direct proportion to an index is highly speculative. Sig-
nificantly, Shaked admitted at trial that three of the seven 
companies on the L&H Index were not comparable to 
MONY, and that MONY historically underperformed 
those component companies. 
75 The predictive value of such analyses are 
granted great deference only in those situations 
where the market suddenly becomes [*70] aware 
of novel and previously unknown information 
about a particular security. See, e.g., Schwab v. 
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 992, 
1181 (E.D.N. Y. 2006) ("According to the Effi-
cient Capital Markets Hypothesis, securities 
prices in efficient market incorporate all available 
public information. One way to determine 
whether price incorporates new and relevant pub-
licly available information is to conduct an event 
study.. . .") (emphasis added). 
Jachym testified that such an indexing technique 
was not commonly relied upon in the financial commu-
nity. Indeed, Jachym said that, at least in his experience, 
indexing is unprecedented. This court has previously 
considered, and rejected, the explanatory power of a 
similar model.76 
76 In Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2003 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 42, 2003 WL 21003437 (Del Ch Apr. 28, 
2003), the defendants' expert applied a discount 
based on decreases in the market capitalization of 
purportedly comparable companies to opine that 
the going-concern value of an appraised entity 
decreased in the time period between the Novem-
ber 30, 1987 merger announcement and the Au-
gust 1988 merger closing. The court rejected that 
approach, noting that: 
From a methodological stand-
point, [*71] [the expert's] dis-
count approach to valuing [the 
company] is highly problematic, 
because what it discounts is a go-
ing concern value based upon a 
decline in market capitalization of 
selected companies in the same 
industry. That method of valuation 
is counterintuitive, because 
(among other things) it assumes 
that each firm's going concern 
value has a constant relationship to 
the average market capitalization 
of all comparable firms within the 
same industry . . . . [This valuation 
approach] has not been shown to 
be generally accepted as valid in 
the business/financial valuation 
community. 
Id. at *35-36 (emphasis in original). That instruc-
tion applies with equal force to Shaked's model 
here. 
Finally, Shaked's market price analysis assumes, and 
wrongly so, that AXA's $ 31 offer acted as a market ceil-
ing on MONY's stock price, rather than a floor. In real-
ity, the latter is more likely. If the going-concern value of 
MONY was somehow depressed by AXA's bid during a 
time of highly favorable market conditions, the emer-
gence of a topping bid would be all the more probable. 
For these reasons, the court finds Shaked's market price 
analysis flawed and will not consider it reliable in deter-
mining MONY's [*72] fair value. 
E. The AXA-MONY Transaction Provides A Reli-
able Basis On Which To Value MONY 
As mentioned above, a court may derive fair value 
in a Delaware appraisal action if the sale of the company 
in question resulted from an arm's-length bargaining 
process where no structural impediments existed that 
might prevent a topping bid.77 The court must, however, 
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exclude synergistic elements from the sale 
at a fair value.78 
77 Union III, 847 A.2d at 357. 
price to arrive 
78 Montgomery Cellular Holding Co. v. Dobler, 
880A.2d206, 220 (Del. 2005). 
Jachym's decision to weigh the $ 31 per share 
merger price, less synergies, at 50% in his valuation 
analysis is both justified and not surprising. Clearly, the 
merger between AXA and MONY was an arm's-length 
transaction. No MONY officer or director participated in 
the buy-side of the deal, and none of these individuals 
continued employment with AXA following the merger. 
The directors "consistently acted in an independent man-
ner" throughout the merger process, and the three inside 
directors on MONY's board who stood to receive 
change-in-control payments recused themselves from the 
vote of the MONY board that approved the transaction.79 
79 MONYII 853 A.2d at 667. 
Of [*73] equal importance, no material impedi-
ments existed to prevent another bidder from entering the 
sale process for MONY during the eight-month period 
between the merger announcement and the MONY 
stockholder vote. 80 With a market check of this length, 
the court must conclude that any seriously interested 
bidder would have come forward, given that (1) AXA 
publicly stated that it would not increase its bid beyond $ 
31 per share, 81 (2) industry analysts and executives un-
derstood that MONY was "in play,"82 and (3) CSFB was 
unaware of any other entity that had an interest in acquir-
ing MONY at a higher price.83 
80 Trial Tr. 647-48; 774-75. 
81 Trial. Tr. 646-47; JX 1405. 
82 Durham Dep. 38-40; Foti Dep. 82-84, 233, 
235. 
83 MONY I, 852 A.2d at 22. 
Highfields's contention that impediments to a top-
ping bid existed does not bear scrutiny. Highfields says 
that substantial due diligence costs deterred a bidder 
from entering the process. However, a prospective buyer 
could have defrayed those costs through a hedging strat-
egy, buying up to a 5% stake in MONY before surfacing 
an interest in making a competing bid. Indeed, if High-
fields was actually convinced, despite offering no con-
temporaneous analysis prepared [*74] by its own em-
ployees as evidence in this case, that AXA's bid under-
valued MONY by nearly $ 12 per share, it could have 
either made a topping bid by itself or as part of a group 
or encouraged a third party to do so. 84 If MONY was 
truly worth $ 43 per share, certainly some savvy investor 
likely would have competed with AXA, as each dollar 
per share below that level, according to Highfields's the-
ory, would have resulted in the purchaser realizing ap-
proximately $ 50 million in value.85 
84 Highfields was intimately familiar with in-
vestors who might have been willing to purchase 
an undervalued insurance company, since it par-
ticipated in the Safeco transaction in the same 
time frame as the AXA-MONY merger. Further-
more, Highfields had significant financial re-
sources available with which to acquire a highly 
undervalued firm. Just seven months following 
the merger, Highfields made a $ 3.25 billion cash 
offer for 100% of Circuit City, Inc. 
85 It seems that much of this discrepancy be-
tween the merger price and Shaked's valuation re-
sults from Highfields's view that MONY's DAC 
and goodwill were improperly discounted by $ 
600 million. The evidence shows that this finan-
cial accounting-purchase accounting [*75] sub-
stitution, however, was little more than an ac-
counting game which, when implemented, has 
the effect of driving up valuation metrics based 
on earnings, while driving down metrics based on 
book value. In any event, the valuation tech-
niques the court ultimately uses to determine the 
fair value of MONY's shares (sum-of-the-parts 
and shared synergies) are not directly dependent 
on the DAC write-down. For instance, with re-
spect to the shared synergies approach, investors 
and the marketplace were aware of the $ 600 mil-
lion adjustment because it was included in the 
proxy statement issued in connection with the 
merger. If this adjustment vastly understated 
MONY's fair value, then a topping bidder would 
have had all the more reason to enter the fray and 
compete with AXA to purchase the company. 
The more logical explanation for why no bidder ever 
emerged is self-evident: MONY was not worth more 
than $ 31 per share because no prospective purchaser, 
either strategic or financial, stood to gain the synergies 
AXA anticipated in the merger, synergies which it was 
willing to share with MONY's stockholders. 86 On these 
facts, the transaction giving rise to this appraisal action is 
a solid indicator [*76] of MONY's fair value, and the 
court finds reasonable and appropriate Jachym's decision 
to grant the merger price great deference in his valuation 
analysis. 
86 See MONY I 852 A.2d at 22 ("Using these 
resources and the considerable body of informa-
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tion available to it, the board determined that be-
cause MONY and AXA share a similar business 
model, the career agency distribution system, and 
have complementary products, AXA was a 'per-
fect fit' for MONY, and thus presented an offer 
that was the best price reasonably available to 
stockholders."). 
The court's determination on this point, however, is 
not entirely dispositive. The court must still account for 
the amount of shared synergies imbedded in the $ 31 per 
share merger price. The parties' positions on this issue 
differ. Highfields levels several meritorious attacks on 
Jachym's analysis, but fails to offer any alternative posi-
tion on how synergies ought to be determined. Therefore, 
the court, exercising its independent business judgment, 
finds it appropriate to rely on Jachym's shared synergy 
calculations after certain adjustments. 
Based on conclusions reached by industry analysts, 
CSFB, and AXA's management, Jachym opined that 
shared synergies [*77] represented at least 25% of the 
merger price, or $ 7.75 per share. Despite Jachym's view 
that a DCF methodology generally yields an unreliable 
valuation result in the insurance company context, and 
despite the fact that, in conducting his own broader 
valuation analysis, Jachym never relied on CSFB's Feb-
ruary 2004 board presentation, he did rely on those mate-
rials in calculating shared synergies. The court finds this 
reliance improper. 
AXA's view of the synergistic elements of the trans-
action are likely more reliable in Jachym's sum-of-the-
parts analysis. Jachym relied heavily on the actuarial 
assumptions in AXA's September 2003 valuation of 
MONY, which lends credence to the synergy estimations 
contained in AXA's valuation. Trial testimony also 
showed that the September 2003 valuation was not of the 
typically skewed, buy-side variety: rather, it was an ob-
jective study created by a team of actuaries whose pro-
fessional standards require neutrality. 87 It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that, based on its September 2003 
valuation of MONY, AXA viewed the lower end of 
shared synergies in the transaction at $ 9.54.88 
87 Actuarial work in the insurance context, of 
course, stands in contrast [*78] to the often bi-
ased valuation work presented to opposing boards 
by investment bankers representing a particular 
company. 
88 JX 167 at 55. 
The synergy figures, however, must take into ac-
count certain discrepancies between AXA's September 
2003 valuation and Jachym's sum-of-the-parts valuation 
(the only other legitimately conducted valuation metric 
presented in this litigation) as of the transaction closing 
date. Essentially, AXA's good faith estimations in Sep-
tember 2003, according to a corrected version of 
Jachym's later analysis, undervalued MONY by ap-
proximately $ 5.42 per share.89 Therefore, AXA's calcu-
lation of shared synergies as $ 9.54 per share must be 
adjusted downward to $ 4.12 per share, with the result 
being a merger price, less shared synergies, of $ 26.88 
per share. For the above reasons, the court will weigh 
this figure at 75% in determining MONY's going con-
cern value as of July 8, 2004. ^ 
89 AXA did not place a value on MONY's term 
life business as part of its September 2003 analy-
sis, and Jachym testified that this value should 
have been approximately $ 97,887,259. Addi-
tionally, Jachym's report; shows that AXA under-
valued MONY's broker-dealer subsidiary by $ 
145,940,000 [*79] and its fund management 
group by $ 57,996,785. However, Jachym calcu-
lated MONY's corporate debt at a higher figure 
than AXA by $ 27,972,935. Together, these fig-
ures represent approximately $ 5.42 for each of 
the 50,521,772 shares outstanding at the time of 
the merger. These modifications are discussed in 
greater detail later in this opinion. 
90 Highfields's argument that the shared syner-
gies approach is improper because the synergy 
calculation only represents synergies to AXA as a 
particular buyer is unpersuasive. Synergies result-
ing from a transaction are always buyer-specific, 
and will fluctuate depending on efficiencies and 
expense savings a purchaser can achieve. Yet this 
fact has no real bearing on a company's going-
concern value, since the synergies are always 
subtracted out from the merger price. Indeed, ac-
ceptance of this argument would cast great doubt 
on the entire line of Delaware cases that assume 
an arm's-length transaction price, less synergies, 
is strong evidence of fair value. 
F. Jachym's Sum-Of-The-Parts Analysis Provides A 
Reliable Valuation 
Jachym's sum-of-the-parts analysis consisted of four 
distinct calculations: (1) an actuarial appraisal to value 
MONY's life insurance [*80] and annuity business; (2) a 
blended comparable company and comparable transac-
tions approach to value MONY's broker-dealer subsidi-
ary; (3) a weighted discounted cash flow and comparable 
company metric to value MONY's asset management 
business; and (4) a standard accounting approach to 
value MONY's corporate assets and liabilities. For the 
reasons that follow, the court finds this methodology, 
with slight modifications, a reliable means of deriving 
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MONY's fair value since such a metric is standard pro-
cedure in the financial community when valuing an in-
surance conglomerate consisting of diverse lines of busi-
ness where no directly comparable companies or transac-
tions exist. 
1. The Life Insurance And Annuity Business 
Jachym's valuation of MONY's life insurance and 
annuity business consisted of an actuarial appraisal. He 
determined that, as of July 8, 2004, MONY's statutory 
net asset value was $ 1,020,390,155, while the value of 
its in-force business was $ 74,673,875. Jachym also 
opined that the present value of MONY's new business 
was $ 97,887,359. Thus, this component of his sum-of-
the-parts analysis is worth $ 1,192,951,290. 
As Jachym testified, an actuarial appraisal is the pre-
ferred valuation [*81] methodology in the insurance 
industry. Highfields's witnesses did not contradict this 
assertion. Strangely, Highfields offered no alternative 
actuarial appraisal in this litigation, despite relying on 
actuarial analyses when it invested in the Safeco transac-
tion. Instead, it labels Jachym's testimony incompetent 
because AXA, not Jachym, created the assumptions un-
derlying the actuarial model. Moreover, Highfields con-
tends that Jachym's analysis improperly relied on stale 
projections created by MONY management. Under scru-
tiny, however, both of these points are unpersuasive. 
The evidence at trial overwhelmingly showed that 
Jachym's reliance on the actuarial assumptions used in 
AXA's model was reasonable. His team conducted ex-
tensive interviews with AXA's actuarial staff to vet those 
assumptions. Not only was the Jachym's work with AXA 
more extensive than the work done on one of his typical 
valuation engagements, but the questions his team posed 
to AXA's actuaries were materially similar to those AXA 
asked of MONY's actuarial staff during its due diligence 
inquiry. Additionally, the court does not find it trouble-
some, given the particular type of business being valued 
in this case, that [*82] a prospective buyer created the 
actuarial assumptions used by Jachym. In the insurance 
business, actuaries act as neutral evaluators whose pro-
fessional obligations and reputations depend upon the 
objectivity of their work product. 
Moreover, the court finds that Jachym reasonably 
updated MONY's management projections as of July 8, 
2004. Jachym determined the company's net asset value 
component based on statutory filings MONY submitted 
to state regulators on June 30, 2004. For MONY's in-
force business, Jachym testified that he adjusted 
MONY's post-tax earnings and expenses to bring those 
figures in line with the closing date of the merger, and 
also eliminated certain downward adjustments made by 
AXA. Finally, the court agrees with Jachym's assessment 
that the company would not be able to write profitable 
business in the future (other than its specialty products 
line). 91 Therefore, the court finds that the valuation con-
clusions Jachym reached with respect to MONY's life 
insurance and annuities business are reasonable and are 
supported by competent evidence. 
91 Highfields argues that Jachym essentially 
adopted AXA's assumptions on this point, and 
that those assumptions were wrong because 
[*83] they assigned a zero value to MONY's fu-
ture business only because AXA planned to dis-
continue selling MONY products after comple-
tion of the merger. This argument is unpersuasive 
for two reasons. First, Jachym did estimate a 
positive value $ 97,887,359 for MONY's new 
business, although that amount solely derives 
from the company's specialty products line. Sec-
ond, as to other insurance and annuity products, 
MONY's prospects of ratings downgrades and its 
lack of a competitive position in the marketplace 
meant that its future run-of-the-mill insurance 
underwriting would not generate a positive re-
turn. As Jachym testified, although writing un-
profitable business seems foolish from an eco-
nomic standpoint, MONY would have continued 
to do so to keep its moderately profitable in-force 
business from fleeing and to maintain its distribu-
tion system. Trial Tr. 841-45, 853-60. See also id. 
at 642, 679-80 (Stanley Tulin commenting that 
although MONY was selling products, it was not 
making money off of what it was selling); Dad-
dario Dep. 241-42 (explaining that, in the event 
of a ratings downgrade, MONY might need to 
sell business at a loss to maintain its distribution 
network); Stoddard Dep. 196-97 [*84] (noting 
that CSFB believed MONY would not be able to 
write profitable future business over the long 
term). 
2. The Broker-Dealer Business 
Jachym's decision to employ a weighted average of 
comparable transactions (66.7%) and comparable com-
pany (33.3%) analyses to value MONY's broker-dealer 
business was justified methodologically, particularly 
since reliable, contemporaneous projections for this 
business segment were not available. Indeed, Highfields 
did not specifically argue with Jachym's decision to em-
ploy these two models, nor did it note any impropriety in 
his choice of comparable companies and transactions. 
The court does find, however, that Jachym erred in 
placing weight on backwards-looking earnings metrics in 
both of these models. In Jachym's comparable company 
analysis, this particular multiple, which was assigned a 
2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 126, * 
Page 22 
20% weight, valued the broker-dealer business at $ 113.8 
million. n In his comparable transactions analysis, this 
specific metric, weighted at 22.2%, implied values of $ 
99.1 million and $ 100.4 million. 93 As Jachym readily 
admitted at deposition and at trial, these figures are out-
liers in each model, and there is no likelihood that they 
accurately estimate the fair [*85] value of the broker-
dealer subsidiary. Exercising its business judgment, the 
court must remove these values from Jachym's analysis, 
and finds that the fair value of the broker-dealer business 
as of July 8, 2004 was $ 345.94 million.94 
92 The other metrics returned values of $ 389 
million, $ 307.5 million, $ 271.6 million, and $ 
349.5 million. Without the backward-looking 
earnings metric, the comparable company analy-
sis implies a value of $ 382.4 million. 
93 The other metrics returned values of $ 286.3 
million, $ 381.9 million, $ 314.0 million, and $ 
640 million. Without the backward-looking earn-
ings metric, the comparable transactions analysis 
implies a value of $ 327.7 million. 
94 This figure is achieved by the following for-
mula: ($ 327.7 million x (2/3)) + ($ 382.4 million 
x (1/3)) = $ 345.94 million. 
3. The Asset Management Business 
To value the asset management segment of MONY, 
Jachym conducted a DCF analysis and a comparable 
company analysis, which he then weighted at 60% and 
40%o, respectively. At trial, the Highfields expert wit-
nesses offered no material criticism of Jachym's valua-
tion of the asset management business, and gave no al-
ternative valuation. Instead, Highfields argues that [*86] 
Jachym improperly relied upon AXA projections in his 
DCF analysis. This assertion is incorrect because the 
projections Jachym used were based on historical and 
projected figures obtained from MONY's management. 
As Jachym admitted at trial, however, the projec-
tions used for both the DCF and the comparable com-
pany models were denominated in euros rather than dol-
lars. Recalculating this figure results in a $ 24,538,425 
increase in the going-concern value of the asset man-
agement business. 95 Thus, the court finds that the proper 
value of that operation is $ 117,996,785 as of July 8, 
2004. 
95 Jachym testified that changing the denomina-
tion would result in a $ 0.17 increase in his over-
all estimated value of MONY (i.e. from $ 20.80 
to $ 20.97). The court must back this figure out of 
Jachym's overall analysis to determine the error's 
effect on his sum-of-the-parts model. Because 
Jachym weighted the sum-of-the-parts at 35% 
overall, the true distortion in the model is $ 
0.4857 per share (solving for "X" in the equation: 
X = $ 0.17/.35). Thus, the overall adjustment is $ 
0.4857 multiplied by the number of outstanding 
shares (50,521,772) to arrive at $ 24,538,425. 
In sum, an adjusted sum-of-the-parts [*87] valua-
tion for MONY results in a total value for the company 
of $ 970,915,140 as of July 8, 2004, or $ 19.22 per share. 
96
 Using its independent business judgment, the court 
weights this figure at 25% in its determination of 
MONY's going-concern value. 
96 This figure is calculated by adding the life 
insurance and annuity value ($ 1,192,951,290) 
with the broker-dealer value ($ 345,940,000) and 
the asset management value ($ 117,996,785). 
Corporate assets and liabilities are then sub-
tracted ($ 685,972,935). There is no dispute re-
garding Jachym's calculation of the corporate as-
sets and liabilities of MONY. 
V. 
By weighting the modified shared synergies analysis 
at 75% and the modified sum-of-the-parts analysis at 
25%, the court finds that Highfields is entitled to $ 24.97 
for each share of MONY stock it held on July 8, 2004. 97 
Counsel for AXA is instructed to submit, on notice, a 
final form of order in accordance with this opinion (in-
cluding a provision for the parties' agreed upon rate of 
interest) within 10 days. 
97 ($ 26.88 x .75) + ($ 19.22 x .25) = $ 24.97. 
